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Abstract
The aim of this article is to analyse the relation between the second law of
thermodynamics and the so-called arrow of time. For this purpose, a number of
different aspects in this arrow of time are distinguished, in particular those of
time-(a)symmetry and of (ir)reversibility. Next I review versions of the second
law in the work of Carnot, Clausius, Kelvin, Planck, Gibbs, Carathe´odory and
Lieb and Yngvason, and investigate their connection with these aspects of the
arrow of time. It is shown that this connection varies a great deal along with
these formulations of the second law. According to the famous formulation by
Planck, the second law expresses the irreversibility of natural processes. But in
many other formulations irreversibility or even time-asymmetry plays no role. I
therefore argue for the view that the second law has nothing to do with the arrow
of time.
Key words: Thermodynamics, Second Law, Irreversibility, Time-asymmetry,
Arrow of Time.
1 Introduction
There is a famous lecture by the British physicist/novelist C. P. Snow about the
cultural abyss between two types of intellectuals: those who have been educated in
literary arts and those in the exact sciences. This lecture, the Two Cultures (1959),
characterises the lack of mutual respect between them in a passage:
A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people who, by the stan-
dards of the traditional culture, are thought highly educated and who have with
considerable gusto been expressing their incredulity at the illiteracy of scientists.
Once or twice I have been provoked and have asked the company how many of
them could describe the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The response was cold:
it was also negative. Yet I was asking something which is about the equivalent
of: have you read a work of Shakespeare?
Snow stands up for the view that exact science is, in its own right, an essential part
of civilisation, and should not merely be valued for its technological applications.
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Anyone who does not know the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and is proud of it
too, exposes oneself as a Philistine.
Snow’s plea will strike a chord with every physicist who has ever attended a birth-
day party. But his call for cultural recognition creates obligations too. Before one
can claim that acquaintance with the Second Law is as indispensable to a cultural
education as Macbeth or Hamlet, it should obviously be clear what this law states.
This question is surprisingly difficult.
The Second Law made its appearance in physics around 1850, but a half century
later it was already surrounded by so much confusion that the British Association for
the Advancement of Science decided to appoint a special committee with the task of
providing clarity about the meaning of this law. However, its final report (Bryan 1891)
did not settle the issue. Half a century later, the physicist/philosopher Bridgman still
complained that there are almost as many formulations of the second law as there
have been discussions of it (Bridgman 1941, p. 116). And even today, the Second Law
remains so obscure that it continues to attract new efforts at clarification. A recent
example is the work of Lieb and Yngvason (1999).
This manifest inability of the physical community to reach consensus about the
formulation and meaning of a respectable physical law is truly remarkable. If Snow’s
question had been: ‘Can you describe the Second Law of Newtonian Mechanics?’
physicists would not have any problem in producing a unanimous answer. The idea
of installing a committee for this purpose would be just ridiculous.
A common and preliminary description of the Second Law is that it guarantees
that all physical systems in thermal equilibrium can be characterized by a quantity
called entropy, and that this entropy cannot decrease in any process in which the
system remains adiabatically isolated, i.e. shielded from heat exchange with its envi-
ronment. But the law has many faces and interpretations; the comparison to a work
of Shakespeare is, in this respect, not inappropriate.1 One of the most frequently
discussed aspects of the Second Law is its relation with the ‘arrow of time’. In fact,
in many texts in philosophy of physics the Second Law figures as an emblem of this
arrow. The idea is, roughly, that typical thermodynamical processes are irreversible,
i.e. they can only occur in one sense only, and that this is relevant for the distinction
between past and future.
At first sight, the Second Law is indeed relevant for this arrow. If the entropy
can only increase during a thermodynamical process, then obviously, a reversal of this
process is not possible. Many authors believe this is a crucial feature, if not the very
essence of the Second Law. Planck, for example, claimed that, were it not for the exis-
tence of irreversible processes, ‘the entire edifice of the second law would crumble [. . . ]
and theoretical work would have to start from the beginning.’ (Planck 1897, §113),
and viewed entropy increase as a ‘universal measure of irreversibility’ (ibid. §134). A
similar view is expressed by Sklar in his recent book on the foundations of statistical
1Actually, in the second edition of The Two Cultures, Snow expressed regret for comparing the
Second Law to a work of Shakespeare, due to the formidable conceptual problems connected with the
former.
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mechanics (1993, p. 21): ‘The crucial fact needed to justify the introduction of [. . . ]
a definite entropy value is the irreversibility of physical processes.’
In this respect, thermodynamics seems to stand in sharp contrast with the rest
of classical physics, in particular with mechanics which, at least in Hamilton’s formu-
lation, is symmetric under time reversal. The problem of reconciling this thermody-
namical arrow of time with a mechanical world picture is usually seen as the most
profound problem in the foundations of thermal and statistical physics; see Davies
(1974), Mackey (1992), Zeh (1992), Sklar (1993) and Price (1996).
However, this is only one of many problems awaiting a student of the Second Law.
There are also authors expressing the opposite viewpoint. Bridgman writes:
It is almost always emphasized that thermodynamics is concerned with reversible
processes and equilibrium states and that it can have nothing to do with irre-
versible processes or systems out of equilibrium . . . (Bridgman 1941, p. 133)
It is not easy to square this view, —and the fact that Bridgman presents it as prevailing
among thermodynamicists— with the idea that irreversibility is essential to the Second
Law.
Indeed, one can find other authors maintaining that the Second Law has little to do
with irreversibility or the arrow of time; in particular Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa, (1925,
1956, 1959), Landsberg (1956) and Jauch (1972, 1975). For them, the conflict between
the irreversibility of thermodynamics and the reversible character of the rest of physics
is merely illusory, due to a careless confusion of the meaning of terms. For example,
Landsberg remarks that the meaning of the term ‘reversible’ in thermodynamics has
nothing to do with the meaning of this term in classical mechanics. However, a
fundamental and consistent discussion of the meaning of these concepts is rare.
Another problem is that there are indeed many aspects and formulations of the
Second Law, which differ more or less from the preliminary circumscription offered
above. For example, consider the so-called ‘approach to equilibrium’. It is a basic
assumption of thermodynamics that all systems which are left to themselves, i.e. iso-
lated from all external influences, eventually evolve towards a state of equilibrium,
where no further changes occur. One often regards this behaviour as a consequence
of the Second Law. This view is also suggested by the well-known fact that equi-
librium states can be characterised by an entropy maximum. However, this view is
problematic. In thermodynamics, entropy is not defined for arbitrary states out of
equilibrium. So how can the assumption that such states evolve towards equilibrium
be a consequence of this law?
Even deliberate attempts at careful formulation of the Second Law sometimes end
up in a paradox. One sometimes finds a formulation which admits that thermody-
namics aims only at the description of systems in equilibrium states, and that, strictly
speaking, a system does not always have an entropy during a process. The Second
Law, in this view, refers to processes of an isolated system that begin and end in
equilibrium states and says that the entropy of the final state is never less than that
of the initial state (Sklar 1974, p. 381). The problem is here that, by definition, states
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of equilibrium remain unchanged in the course of time, unless the system is acted
upon. Thus, an increase of entropy occurs only if the system is disturbed, i.e. when
it is not isolated.
It appears then that it is not unanimously established what the Second Law ac-
tually says and what kind of relationship it has with the arrow of time. The aim
of the present paper is to chart this amazing and confusing multifariousness of the
Second Law; if only to help prevent embarrassment when, at a birthday party, the
reader is faced with the obvious counter-question by literary companions. Or, if the
reader wishes to be counted as a person of literary culture, and guard against arrogant
physicists, one can also read this article as a guide to how to bluff your way in the
Second Law of Thermodynamics.
The organization of the article is as follows. In section 2, I will describe a few
general characteristics of thermodynamics, and its status within physics. Section 3 is
devoted to the distinction between several meanings one can attribute to the arrow
of time. Next, in sections 4, 5 and 6, I will trace the historical development of the
orthodox versions of the Second Law, focussing at each stage on its relation to the
arrow of time. This historical development finds its climax in the intricate arguments
of Planck, which I review in section 7.
Then I address two less orthodox but perhaps more vital versions of the Second
Law, due to Gibbs (section 8) and Carathe´odory (section 9). I will argue that these
versions do not carry implications for an arrow of time (with a slight qualification for
Carathe´odory). In section 10, I discuss the debate in the 1920’s between Born, Planck
and Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa, which was triggered by the work of Carathe´odory.
Despite a number of original defects, the approach pioneered by Carathe´odory has
in recent years turned out to be the most promising route to obtain a clear formulation
of the Second Law. Section 11 is devoted to the work of Lieb and Yngvason, which
forms the most recent major contribution to this approach. Finally, in section 12, I
will discuss some conclusions. In particular, I will discuss the prospects of giving up
the idea that the arrow of time is crucially related to the Second Law.
2 The status of thermodynamics
Classical thermodynamics can be described as the study of phenomena involved in the
production of work by means of heat; or, more abstractly, of the interplay of thermal
and mechanical energy transformations. The theory is characterised by a purely em-
pirical (often called ‘phenomenological’) approach. It avoids speculative assumptions
about the microscopic constitution or dynamics of the considered systems. Instead, a
physical system is regarded as a ‘black box’ and one starts from a number of funda-
mental laws (Hauptsa¨tze), i.e. generally formulated empirical principles that deny the
possibility of certain conceivable phenomena, in particular various kinds of perpetual
motion. The goal is then to introduce all specific thermodynamical quantities and
their general properties by means of these laws. This is the approach to the theory
4
taken by Carnot, Clausius, Kelvin, and Planck, and with some differences also by
Gibbs and Carathe´odory.
Anyone who studies classical thermodynamics today will encounter a wide range
of views on its status. In the eyes of many modern physicists, the theory has acquired
a somewhat dubious status. They regard classical thermodynamics as a relic from a
bygone era. In particular the refusal to adopt the atomic hypothesis is seen as typical
nineteenth century cold feet. Also, one often reads that thermodynamics is really
a subject for engineers and therefore(?) not an appropriate vehicle for fundamental
knowledge about nature. Further, the ‘negative’ character of its laws, i.e. the fact that
they state what is impossible rather than what is possible, seems offensive to many
authors.2
Indeed, the view that thermodynamics is obsolete is so common that many physi-
cists use the phrase ‘Second Law of Thermodynamics’ to denote some counterpart of
this law in the kinetic theory of gases or in statistical mechanics. However, I will not
embrace this manoeuvre. In this article, the term ‘Second Law of Thermodynamics’
refers to an ingredient of classical thermodynamics, and not some other theory.
On the other hand, even in the twentieth century one can find prominent physicists
who appreciated thermodynamics. Einstein, whose earliest publications were devoted
to the foundations of the Second Law, remained convinced throughout his life that
thermodynamics is the only universal physical theory that will never be overthrown.
He recommended this remark ‘for the special attention of those who are skeptics on
principle’ (Einstein 1948, p. 33). Other important physicists who devoted part of their
work to thermodynamics are Sommerfeld, Born, Schro¨dinger, Pauli, Chandrasekhar
and Wightman. Planck in particular reported (1948, p. 7) how strongly he was
impressed by the universal and irrefutable validity of thermodynamics. As a schoolboy,
he already experienced his introduction to the First Law of Thermodynamics as an
evangelical revelation (‘wie eine Heilsbotschaft’). The Second Law became, mainly
through his own contributions, a proposition of comparable stature; (see e.g. Planck
(1897, §136)).
Similar veneration is expressed in a famous quotation by Eddington:
The law that entropy always increases, —the second law of thermodynamics—
holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature. If someone points
out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell’s
equations—then so much the worse for Maxwell’s equations. If it is found to
be contradicted by observation—well, these experimentalists bungle things some-
times. But if your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics
I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humilia-
tion (Eddington 1935, p. 81).
2This objection, expressed again and again by many commentaries, is not easy to comprehend.
Elsewhere in physics one also finds ‘negatively’ formulated principles (like the light postulate, the
uncertainty principle, etc.) but one never encounters this reproach. Besides it is obvious that every
negative lawlike statement, can also be rephrased positively by a change of vocabulary. The issue
is therefore only cosmetic. A more substantial problem that probably lurks in the background is
ambivalence in the meaning of ‘possible’.
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Apparently there is, apart from the view that thermodynamics is obsolete, also a
widespread belief among physicists in its absolute authority.
Apart from its authority, thermodynamics is also often praised for its clear and
rigorous formulation. Maxwell (1877) regarded the theory as a ‘a science with secure
foundations, clear definitions and distinct boundaries’. Sommerfeld (1952) called it a
‘Musterbeispiel ’ of an axiomatised theory. It is also well-known that Einstein drew
inspiration from thermodynamics when he formulated the theory of relativity and
that he intended to construct this theory in a similar fashion, starting from similar
empirical principles of impossibility (Klein 1967).
But there are also voices of dissent on this issue of clarity and rigour. The historian
Brush notes:
As anyone who has taken a course in thermodynamics is well aware, the mathe-
matics used in proving Clausius’ theorem [i.e. the Second Law] is of a very special
kind, having only the most tenuous relation to that known to mathematicians
(1976, Vol. 1, p. 581).
He was recently joined by the mathematician Arnold (1990, p. 163):
Every mathematician knows it is impossible to understand an elementary course
in thermodynamics.
Von Neumann once remarked that whoever uses the term ‘entropy’ in a discussion
always wins:
. . . no one knows what entropy really is, so in a debate you will always have the
advantage (cited by Tribus and McIntire, 1971, p. 180).
an invaluable piece of advice for the true bluffer!
The historian of science and mathematician Truesdell made a detailed study of the
historical development of thermodynamics in the period 1822–1854. He characterises
the theory, even in its present state, as ‘a dismal swamp of obscurity’ (1980, p. 6) and
‘a prime example to show that physicists are not exempt from the madness of crowds’
(ibid. p. 8). He is outright cynical about the respect with which non-mathematicians
treat the Second Law:
Clausius’ verbal statement of the second law makes no sense [. . . ]. All that
remains is a Mosaic prohibition; a century of philosophers and journalists have
acclaimed this commandment; a century of mathematicians have shuddered and
averted their eyes from the unclean. (ibid. p. 333).
Seven times in the past thirty years have I tried to follow the argument Clausius
offers [. . . ] and seven times has it blanked and gravelled me. [. . . ] I cannot
explain what I cannot understand (ibid. p. 335).
From this anthology it emerges that although many prominent physicists are firmly
convinced of, and express admiration for the Second Law, there are also serious com-
plaints, especially from mathematicians, about a lack of clarity and rigour in its for-
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mulation.3 At the very least one can say that the Second Law suffers from an image
problem: its alleged eminence and venerability is not perceived by everyone who has
been exposed to it. What is it that makes this physical law so obstreperous that every
attempt at a clear formulation seems to have failed? Is it just the usual sloppiness of
physicists? Or is there a deeper problem? And what exactly is the connection with
the arrow of time and irreversibility? Could it be that this is also just based on bluff?
Perhaps readers will shrug their shoulders over these questions. Thermodynamics
is obsolete; for a better understanding of the problem we should turn to more recent,
statistical theories. But even then the questions we are about to study have more than
a purely historical importance. The problem of reproducing the Second Law, perhaps
in an adapted version, remains one of the toughest, and controversial problems in
statistical physics. It is hard to make progress on this issue as long as it remains
unclear what the Second Law says; i.e. what it is that one wishes to reproduce. I will
argue, in the last section, using the example of the work of Boltzmann, how much
statistical mechanics suffered from this confusion.
Since there is no clear-cut uncontroversial starting point, the only way to approach
our problem is by studying the historical development of the Second Law. I will further
assume that respect ought to be earned and from now on write the second law without
capitals.
3 Possibility, irreversibility, time-asymmetry, arrows and
ravages
In order to investigate the second law in more detail, it is necessary to get a tighter
grip on some of the philosophical issues involved, in particular the topic of the arrow
of time itself. But first there is an even more general issue which needs spelling
out. As we have seen, the basis of the second law is a claim that certain processes
are impossible. But there are various senses in which one can understand the term
‘possible’ or related dispositional terms. At least three of these are relevant to our
enterprise.
(i) ‘Possible’ may mean: ‘allowed by some given theory’. That is, the criterium for
calling a process possible is whether one can specify a model of the theory in which
it occurs. This is the sense which is favoured by modern philosophers of science,
and it also seems to be the most fruitful way of analysing this notion. However,
thermodynamics has a history of more than 150 years in which it did not always have
the insights of modern philosophy of science at hand to guide it. So, one should be
prepared to meet other construals of this term in the work of our main protagonists.
(ii) The term ‘possible’ may be taken to mean: ‘available in the actual world’ (or in
‘Nature’). This is the view that Planck and many other nineteenth century physicists
3But here too there are dissidents: ‘Clausius’ . . . definition [of entropy] . . . appeals to the mathe-
matician only.’ (Callendar 1911).
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adopted. For them, e.g. the statement that it is possible to build a system which
exhibits a particular kind of perpetual motion means that we can actually build one.
An important aspect of reading ‘possibility’ in this way is that the question of
whether a process is possible or not, is not decided by the theory, but by ‘the furniture
of the world’, i.e. the kinds of systems and interactions there actually are. This includes
the systems and forms of interactions which we have not even discovered and for which
we lack an appropriate theory. So, the claim that such a process is impossible, becomes
a statement that transcends theoretical boundaries. It is not a claim to be judged by
a theory, but a constraint on all physical theories, even those to be developed in the
future. Clearly, the idea that the second law is such a claim helps explaining why it
inspired such feelings of awe.
(iii) A third sense of ‘possible’ is ‘available to us’. We shall see that some authors,
in particular Kelvin, were concerned with the loss of motive power ‘available to man’.
This reading makes the notion dependent on the human condition. This is generally
considered as a drawback. If the second law would be merely a statement expressing
a human lack of skills or knowledge, it would cease to be interesting, both physically
and philosophically.4
Next we consider the arrow of time. What exactly does one mean by this and re-
lated terms? For this question one can consult the relevant literature on the philosophy
of time (Reichenbach 1956, Gru¨nbaum 1967, Earman 1967, Kroes 1985, Horwich 1987).
An important aspect of time that is distinguished in this literature is the idea of
the flow or progress of time. Human experience comprises the sensation that time
moves on, that the present is forever shifting towards the future, and away from the
past. This idea is often illustrated by means of the famous two scales of McTaggart.
Scale B is a one-dimensional continuum in which all events are ordered by means of
a date. Scale A is a similar one-dimensional continuous ordering for the same events,
employing terms like ‘now’, ‘yesterday’, ‘next week’, etc. This scale shifts along scale
B as in a slide rule.
Another common way of picturing this idea is by attributing a different ontological
status to the events in the past, present and future. Present events are the only ones
which are ‘real’ or ‘actual’. The past is gone, and forever fixed. The future is no more
actual than the past but still ‘open’, etc. The flow of time is then regarded as a special
ontological transition: the creation or actualisation of events. This process is often
called becoming. In short, this viewpoint says that grammatical temporal tenses have
counterparts in reality.
Is this idea of a flow of time related to thermodynamics? Many authors have
4However, this not to say that the viewpoint is unviable. In fact, it seems to be very close to
Maxwell’s views. He often emphasized the importance of the human condition (as opposed to the
‘demonic condition’) in writings like: ‘. . . the notion of dissipated energy would not occur to a being
who . . . could trace the motion of every molecule and seize it at the right moment. It is only to a being
in the intermediate stage, who can lay hold of some forms of energy while others elude his grasp, that
energy appears to be passing inevitably from the available to the dissipated state.’ (Maxwell 1878).
Planck strongly opposed this view; see (Planck 1897, §136).
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indeed claimed that the second law provides a physical foundation for this aspect of
our experience (Eddington 1935, Reichenbach 1956, Prigogine 1980). But according to
contemporary understanding, this view is untenable (Gru¨nbaum 1967, Kroes 1985). In
fact the concept of time flow hardly ever enters in any physical theory.5 In a physical
description of a process, it never makes any difference whether it occurs in the past,
present or future. Thus, scale B is always sufficient for the formulation of physical
theory 6 and the above-mentioned ontological distinctions only play a metaphysical
role. Thermodynamics is no exception to this, and therefore unable to shed any light
on this particular theme.
A second theme, which is much closer to the debate on the second law, is that of
symmetry under time reversal. Suppose we record some process on film and play it
backwards. Does the inverted sequence look the same? If it does, e.g. a full period of
a harmonic oscillator, we call the process time-symmetric. But such processes are not
in themselves very remarkable. A more interesting question concerns physical laws or
theories. We call a theory or law time-symmetric if the class of processes that it allows
is time-symmetric. This does not mean that all allowed processes have a palindromic
form like the harmonic oscillator, but rather that a censor, charged with the task of
banning all films containing scenes which violate the law, issues a verdict which is the
same for either direction of playing the film.
More formally, the criterion can be phrased as follows. Many theories employ a
state space Γ which contains all possible states of a system. The instantaneous state
is thus represented as a point s in Γ and a process as a parametrised curve:
P = {st ∈ Γ : ti ≤ t ≤ tf}
The laws of the theory only allow a definite class of processes (e.g. the solutions of the
equations of motion). Call this classW, the set of all possible worlds (according to this
theory). Let now R be a transformation that turns a state s into its ‘time reversal’ Rs.
It is always assumed that RRs = s (i.e. R is an involution). In classical mechanics, for
example, R is the transformation which reverses the sign of all momenta and magnetic
fields. In a theory like classical thermodynamics, in which the state does not contain
velocity-like parameters, one may simply take R to be the identity transformation.
Further, the time reversal P∗ of a process P is defined as:
P∗ = {(Rs)−t : −tf ≤ t ≤ −ti}.
The theory is called time-symmetric if the class W of possible worlds is closed under
time reversal, i.e. if the following holds:
If P ∈ W then P∗ ∈ W. (1)
5Newton’s conception of absolute time which ‘flows equably and of itself’ seems the only exception.
6This statement holds strictly speaking only for non-relativistic theories. Nevertheless, for special-
relativistic theories an analogous statement is valid, when the one-dimensional scales of McTaggart
are replaced by partial orderings (Dieks 1988, Muller 1992).
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Note that this criterion is formulated without recourse to metaphysical notions like
‘becoming’ etc. The mathematical form of the laws themselves (and a given choice
for R) determines whether the theory is time-symmetric or not. Note also that the
term ‘time-reversal’ is not meant literally. That is to say, we consider processes whose
reversal is or is not allowed by a physical law, not a reversal of time itself. The prefix
is only intended to distinguish the term from a spatial reversal. Furthermore, note
that we have taken ‘possibility’ here in sense (i) above; that is, it is not relevant here
whether the reversed processes P∗ occur in the actual world. It is sufficient that the
theory allows them. Thus, the fact that the sun never rises in the west is no obstacle
to celestial mechanics qualifying as time-symmetric.7
Is this theme of time-(a)symmetry related to the second law? Even though the
criterion is unambiguous, its application to thermodynamics is not a matter of routine.
In contrast to mechanics, thermodynamics does not possess equations of motion. This,
in turn, is due to the fact that thermodynamical processes only take place after an
external intervention on the system. (Such as: removing a partition, establishing
thermal contact with a heat bath, pushing a piston, etc.) They do not correspond
to the autonomous behaviour of a free system. This is not to say that time plays
no role. Classical thermodynamics in the formulation of Clausius, Kelvin or Planck
is concerned with processes occurring in the course of time, and its second law does
allow only a subclass of possible worlds, which is indeed time-asymmetric. However,
in the formulations by Gibbs and Carathe´odory this is much less clear. We shall
return in due course to the question of whether thermodynamics in these versions is
time-asymmetric.
As a side remark, I note that the discussion about the relation between the second
law and time-asymmetry is often characterized by a larger ambition. Some authors
are not satisfied with the mere observation that a theory like thermodynamics is time-
asymmetric, but claim that this theory can be held responsible, or gives a physical
foundation, for the distinction between past and future. This claim has been advanced
in particular by Reichenbach. He argued that by definition we could identify our
concept of ‘future’ with the direction of time in which entropy increases.
Reichenbach’s claim has been criticized by (Sklar 1981). The main objections, in
my opinion, are that the claim would entail that all other forms of time-asymmetry
which might be found in other physical theories (such as cosmology, elementary par-
ticles physics, etc.) should also be characterizable in terms of a thermodynamical
asymmetry. The question whether this is really the case, has often been discussed
(Landsberg 1984, Savitt 1995) but an affirmative answer is not yet established. An-
7Of course one may also develop notions of time-(a)symmetry in other senses. It is interesting to
mention, in this context, the distinction between Loschmidt’s and Kelvin’s arguments for the time-
symmetry of classical mechanics, i.e. their versions of the Umkehreinwand. Loschmidt observed that
for every mechanical process P a time reversed process is also a model allowed by classical mechanics.
This is possibility in sense (i). Kelvin, on the other hand, discussed the issue of actually obtaining the
time reversal of a given molecular motion, by means of a physical intervention, namely by collisions
with ‘molecular cricket bats’. This is closer to sense (ii).
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other objection is that even if humans are placed in a local environment in which
entropy decreases, e.g. in a refrigerator cell, this does not seem to affect their sense of
temporal orientation. More important perhaps is the objection that the programme
to define the distinction between past and future by means of the second law is only
sensible if it turns out to be possible to introduce the second law itself without pre-
supposing this distinction. The classical formulations of the second law certainly do
not meet this criterion.
Another theme concerns ‘irreversibility ’. This term is usually attributed to pro-
cesses rather than theories. In the philosophy of science literature the concept is
however intimately connected with time-asymmetry of theories. More precisely, one
calls a process P allowed by a given theory irreversible if the reversed process P∗
is excluded by this theory. Obviously, such a process P exists only if the theory in
question is time-asymmetric. Conversely, every time-asymmetric theory does admit
irreversible processes in this sense. These processes constitute the hallmark of time-
asymmetry and, therefore, discussions about irreversibility and time-asymmetry in
the philosophy of science coincide for the most part. However, in thermodynamics,
the term is commonly employed with other meanings. Therefore, in an attempt to
avoid confusion, I will not use the term ‘(ir)reversibility’ in this sense.
In the thermodynamics literature one often uses the term ‘irreversibility’ to denote
a different aspect of our experience which, for want of a better word, one might also
call irrecoverability. Our experience suggests that in many cases the transition from an
initial state si to a final state sf , obtained during a process, cannot be fully undone,
once the process has taken place. Ageing and dying, wear and tear, erosion and
corruption are the obvious examples. In all such cases, there is no process which
starts off from the final state sf and restores the initial state si completely. As we
shall see in more detail in Section 7, this is the sense of irreversibility that Planck
intended, when he called it the essence of the second law.
Many writers have followed Planck’s lead and emphasised this theme of irrecover-
ability in connection with the second law. Indeed, Eddington introduced his famous
phrase of ‘the arrow of time’ in a general discussion of the ‘running-down of the
universe’, and illustrated it with many examples of processes involving ‘irrevocable
changes’, including the nursery rhyme example of Humpty-Dumpty who, allegedly,
could not be put together again after his great fall. In retrospect, one might perhaps
say that a better expression for this theme is the ravages of time rather than its arrow.
This present concept of irreversibility is different from that of time-asymmetry in
at least three respects. In the first place, for a ‘recovery’ the only thing that counts is
the retrieval of the initial state. It is not necessary that one specifies a process P∗ in
which the original process is retraced step by step in the reverse order. In this respect,
the criterion for reversibility is weaker than that for time-symmetry, and irreversibility
is a logically stronger notion than time-asymmetry.
A second difference is that in the present concept, one is concerned with a complete
recovery. As we shall see, Planck repeatedly emphasised that the criterium for a
‘complete recovery’ of the initial state involves, not only the system itself, but also its
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environment, in particular all auxiliary systems with which it interacted.
This reference to states of the environment of a system already lends a peculiar
twist to classical thermodynamics that we do not meet in other theories of physics.8
The problem is that the theory aims at stating conditions which allow the introduction
of the notions temperature, entropy and energy, which are needed to characterise
the thermodynamical state of a system. This entails that one cannot assume —on
pains of circularity— that (auxiliary systems in) the environment already possess a
thermodynamical state. We will meet several instances where this problem raises its
head.
However, assuming for the moment that it makes sense to attribute, at least for-
mally, a state Z to the environment, one may give a formal criterion for the present
concept of reversibility as follows. Since we are not interested in the intermediate
stages of a process here, we adopt an abbreviated representation. Let P be a process
that produces the transition:
〈si, Zi〉
P
−→ 〈sf , Zf 〉.
(Such an abbreviated representation of a process is often called a ‘change of state’.)
Then P is reversible iff another process P ′ is possible which produces the state change
〈sf , Zf 〉
P ′
−→ 〈si, Zi〉.
The third respect in which Planck’s concept of irreversibility differs from time-
asymmetry concerns the notion of ‘possible’. As we shall see, Planck insisted that
the ‘recovery process’ P ′ is available in our actual world, not merely in some model
of the theory. That is, in the question of whether the recovery of an initial state
is possible, one wishes to obtain this recovery in our actual world. The idea, e.g.,
that a return to our youth would be permitted by a particular theory, (i.e. the theory
allows a possible world in which it occurs) is a too meager solace for those who would
like to see the effects of ageing undone in the actual world. In this reading, the
notion of theoretically allowed models plays no role. In this respect, recoverability
is stronger than time-symmetry. Taking the first and third respect together, we see
that (ir)recoverability does not imply, and is not implied by time-(a)symmetry. See
Figure 1 for illustrations.
However, the thermodynamical literature also uses the term ‘reversible’ in yet
another meaning, which is not straightforwardly connected with the arrow of time
at all. It is used to denote processes which proceed so delicately and slowly that
the system remains close to an equilibrium state during the entire process. This is
comparable to, say, moving a cup of tea filled to the brim, without spilling. We shall
8The reason for this is, again, that in thermodynamics processes are due to an external intervention
on the system; whereas in mechanics it is natural —or at least always possible— to study autonomous
processes of a system which is isolated from its environment. That is to say: even in those cases where
interactions with external environment occur it is in principle possible to include their mechanical
behaviour into the description, in order to obtain a larger, isolated system.
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Figure 1: Illustrating the distinction between time-(a)symmetry and irreversibility in the
sense of irrecoverability. Consider some processes of a fictional system in an otherwise empty
universe, characterised by the time evolution of some quantity f . Process (a) is time-symmetric
and recoverable; (b) is time-asymmetric and recoverable. The processes (c) and (d) are both
time-asymmetric and irrecoverable. A theory allowing only these two irrecoverable processes
is time-symmetric.
see in section 6 that this is the meaning embraced by Clausius. Actually, it seems
to be the most common meaning of the term, at least in the physical and chemical
literature; see e.g. (Hollinger and Zenzen 1985, Denbigh 1989). A modern and more
apt name for this kind of processes is quasi-static.9
The present concept makes no direct reference to a direction of time. Indeed, the
concept is neutral with respect to time reversal, because the time reversal of a (non-
)quasi-static process is obviously again a (non-)quasi-static process. Still, one can
easily see, at least roughly, how the terminology arose. Indeed, for simple systems,
thermodynamics allows all quasi-static processes. That is to say, for any two equilib-
rium states s and t, and every smooth curve in the space of equilibrium states which
connects them, there always is a quasi-static process (in an appropriate environment,
of course) which always remains close to this curve, but also one which closely follows
the curve in the opposite direction (i.e. from t to s). In this sense, the time reversal
9Yet another term employed for this type of process is adiabatic. This terminology probably
originates from the so-called ‘adiabatic theorem’ of P. Ehrenfest (1916). This usage is highly confusing,
because in the terminology of thermodynamics (which is adopted here) a process is called adiabatic if
it takes place without heat exchange between the system and its environment. I note that Ehrenfest
formulated his theorem for what he at first called ‘adiabatic-reversible changes’ (with reversible in
the sense of quasi-static). A few pages later he dropped the adjective ‘reversible’ as being superfluous
when the process is periodic or quasi-periodic. (Obviously, he was now interpreting reversible in the
sense of recoverable.) As a result, ‘adiabatic’ became the stand-in terminology for quasi-static.
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of a quasi-static process is allowed by the theory.10 This, clearly, is why quasi-static
processes are traditionally called reversible. This conclusion does not hold generally
for non-quasi-static curves, and, therefore, they are considered as irreversible.
Note that in the present sense, a process is ‘irreversible’ if and only if it involves
non-negligible deviations from equilibrium. Obvious examples are turbulence and life
processes. It is well-known that classical thermodynamics is inadequate to give a
detailed description of such processes (or, indeed, of their time reversal). From this
perspective, Bridgman’s view that thermodynamics has little to say about irreversible
processes becomes less puzzling.
In fact, Bridgman is one of few authors who recognise a distinction between notions
of (ir)reversibility:
[. . . ] reversible engines and reversible processes play an important role in the con-
ventional thermodynamical expositions. I would like to make the comparatively
minor point that the emphasis on reversibility is somewhat misplaced. [. . . ] It is
not the reversibility of the process that is of primary importance; the importance
of reversibility arises because when we have reversibility, we also have recoverabil-
ity. It is the recovery of the original situation that is important, not the detailed
reversal of steps which led to the original departure from the initial situation.
(Bridgman 1941, p. 122)
Note, however, that at the same instant at which he makes the distinction Bridgman
also draws a close connection between the two: he claims that reversibility implies
recoverability. We shall see later that this inference is incorrect.
The above discussion of meanings of irreversibility is not exhaustive. Part of the
physical literature on (ir)reversibility employs the term in order to denote (in)determinism
of the evolutions allowed by a theory. A deterministic process is then called reversible
because the evolution Ut : s → Ut(s) = st is an invertible mapping (Landauer 1961,
Mackey 1992). Indeterministic evolutions arise in classical mechanics in the descrip-
tion of open systems, i.e. systems that form part of a larger whole, whose degrees of
freedom are not included in the state description.
Indeed, one important approach to the foundations of thermal and statistical
physics aims at explaining irreversibility by an appeal to open systems (Bergmann
and Lebowitz 1955, Davies 1976, Lindblad 1983, Ridderbos and Redhead 1998). In
this article, however, this view is not discussed.11 Other ramifications, even farther
removed from our subject, can be found in the literature on the so-called ‘principle of
microscopic reversibility’.
In his the Nature of the Physical World Eddington introduced the catch phrase
‘the arrow of time’. Actually he employed the term as a metaphor that could cover
10However, one should be careful not to take this statement literally. The ‘reversal’ of the quasi-
static process is generally not the exact time reversal of the original process, but remains close to it
within a small error.
11Yet it is somewhat ironic that, whereas some of the above formulations of the second law pertains
exclusively to isolated systems, this view regards it as essential condition for irreversible processes
that the system is interacting with an environment.
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the whole array of themes discussed above. It is perhaps best to follow him and
use the ‘arrow of time’ as a neutral term encompassing both time-asymmetry and
irreversibility.
4 The prehistory of thermodynamics: Carnot
Sadi Carnot’s Re´flexions sur la Puissance motrice du Feu appeared in 1824. It was this
work which eventually led to the birth of thermodynamics. Still, Carnot’s memoir itself
does not belong to what we presently understand as thermodynamics. It was written
from the point of view that heat is an indestructible substance, the so-called calorique.
This assumption proved to be in conflict with empirical evidence.12 However, Carnot’s
main theorem did agree with experience. Classical thermodynamics was born from the
attempts around 1850 to save Carnot’s theorem by placing it on a different footing.
Even though Carnot’s work does not belong to thermodynamics proper, it is impor-
tant for our purpose for three reasons. First, his theorem became, once encapsulated
in that later theory, the first version of a second law. Secondly, the distinction between
reversible and irreversible processes can already be traced back to his work. And most
importantly, many commentators have claimed that Carnot’s work already entails an
arrow of time.
Carnot was concerned with heat engines: devices which operate in a cycle and
produce work by absorbing heat from one heat reservoir (the ‘furnace’) with high
temperature θ1 and ejecting heat in another (the ‘refrigerator’) with a lower temper-
ature θ2. Both reservoirs are assumed to be so large that their state is unaltered by
their heat exchange with the engine. The engine is then capable of repeating the cycle
over and over again.
The operation of such an engine is comparable to that of a water mill: its power
to produce work results from the transport of heat from high to low temperature, just
as a mill works by transporting water from a higher to a lower level. And just as
the mill does not consume water, no more does the heat engine reduce the amount of
calorique.
Naturally, Carnot was interested in the efficiency of such heat engines: i.e., the
ratio of the total work produced during a cycle and the amount of heat transported
from the furnace to the refrigerator. He obtained a celebrated result, which in a
modern formulation, can be stated as follows:13
Carnot’s Theorem: Let the furnace and refrigerator temperatures θ1 and θ2
be given (with θ1 > θ2). Then:
(i) all heat engines operating in a reversible cycle have the same efficiency. Their
12After his death, papers were found in which Carnot expressed doubt about the conservation of
heat. These notes were only published in 1878 and did not influence the factual development of the
theory.
13An elaborate analysis and reconstruction of his argumentation has been given by Truesdell and Ba-
haratha (1977),Truesdell (1980). This reconstruction differs, however, from the formulation adopted
here. See also footnote 16 below.
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efficiency is therefore a universal expression depending only on the temperatures
θ1 and θ2.
(ii) all other heat engines have an efficiency which is less than or equal to that
obtained by reversible cycles.
Thus, the efficiency obtained by the reversible cycle is a universal function, often called
the Carnot function: C(θ1, θ2).
Carnot obtained his theorem from a principle that states the impossibility of a
perpetuum mobile: it is not possible to build an apparatus that produces an unlimited
amount of work without consumption of calorique or other resources.14
His argument is a well-known reductio ad absurdum: If there were a heat engine
A, performing a reversible cyclic process between the reservoirs with temperatures
θ1 and θ2, having less efficiency than some other engine B, which also performs a
cycle between these two reservoirs, then we should be able to combine them in a
composite cycle in which the reversible engine A is employed backwards, pumping the
same amount of heat from the refrigerator back into the furnace, that B had used
in producing work. But since A is assumed to have a lower efficiency, it needs less
work to restore the heat to the furnace than produced by B. In other words, we
would obtain a surplus of work, which can be used for any purpose we like. Moreover,
this composite process is cyclic, because both engines and heat reservoirs return to
their initial states. It is can thus be repeated as often as we like, and we would have
constructed a perpetuum mobile.
The most striking point about this theorem, at least for Carnot himself and for
those who continued his work, was the implication that the maximum efficiency should
be independent of the medium used in the heat engine. It remains the same, whether
the engine employs steam, air, alcohol or ether vapour, etc. This was not at all obvious
to his contemporaries.
The obvious next question is then to determine the function C(θ1, θ2). Because
the efficiency of a reversible cyclic process is independent of the construction of the
engine or details of the process, one may restrict attention to the simplest version:
the Carnot cycle. This is a reversible cyclic process consisting of four steps: two
isothermal steps, where heat exchange takes place with the reservoirs of temperature
θ1 and θ2, alternating with two steps in which the system is adiabatically isolated.
Carnot realised that the analogy with the water mill could not be stretched too
far. Thus, while the maximal efficiency of a mill depends only on the difference in the
height of the levels, we have no grounds for assuming that the efficiency of a Carnot
cycle simplifies to a function of θ1 − θ2 alone.
To avoid this difficulty, Carnot specialised his consideration to Carnot cycles where
the heat reservoirs have infinitesimally different temperatures θ and θ + dθ. Let the
14Carnot’s principle states the impossibility of what is today called the ‘perpetuum mobile of the
first kind’. This fact is remarkable because it has often been claimed that this principle immediately
entails the first law of thermodynamics (Joule’s principle of equivalence of work and heat), e.g. by
Von Helmholtz (1847) and Planck (1897). The caloric theory employed by Carnot, which violates the
first law, is a manifest counterexample for this claim.
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efficiency of such a cycle be µ(θ)dθ where
µ(θ) :=
∂C(θ, θ2)
∂θ2
∣∣∣∣
θ2=θ
. (2)
Assuming the cycle is performed on an ideal gas, he obtained the result:
µ(θ) =
R
Q
log
V2
V1
, (3)
where Q is the amount of heat absorbed by the gas when its volume is expanded from
V1 to V2 at constant temperature θ, and R is the gas constant. Thus, µ(θ) can be
determined from experimentally accessible quantities. This is the closest Carnot got
to the actual determination of C(θ1, θ2).
The main question for my purpose is now to what extent the work of Carnot is
connected with the arrow of time. I cannot find any passage in his work in which he
mentions such a connection. But it is true that his theorem introduced the dichotomy
between two types of cycles, which are today called ‘reversible’ and ‘irreversible’.
However, he does not actually use these terms.15 So we should be cautious about the
meaning of this dichotomy in this context.
In actual fact, Carnot’s own discussion starts by giving an explicit description of
a Carnot cycle for steam. In passing, he mentions that: ‘The operations we have just
described might have been performed in an inverse direction and order (Mendoza,
1960, p.11).’ Next, he formulates his theorem by claiming that ‘the maximum of
motive power resulting from the employment of steam is also the maximum of motive
power realizable by any means whatever.’ (ibid. p. 12)
However, he realised that a more precise formulation of this conclusion was desir-
able. He continued:
We have a right to ask, for the proposition just enunciated, the following questions:
what is the sense of the word maximum? By what sign can it be known that this
maximum is attained? By what sign can it be known whether the steam is
employed at the greatest possible advantage in the production of motive power?
(ibid. p. 12)
In answer to this question, he proposes a necessary and sufficient criterion (Mendoza
1960, p. 13): it should be avoided that bodies of different temperature come into direct
thermal contact, because this would cause a spontaneous flow of heat. In reality, he
says, this criterion cannot be met exactly: in order to exchange heat with a reservoir
the temperature of the system needs to be slightly different from that of the reservoir.
But this difference may be as small as we wish, and therefore we can neglect it. In
modern terms: the condition is that the process should be quasi-static at all stages
which involve heat exchange.
15The name ‘reversible’ is apparently due to Kelvin (1851).
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Carnot explicitly mentions cases where the condition is not met (p. 12,14), and
argues that the spontaneous heat flow occurring there is unaccompanied by the pro-
duction of work, and that thus motive power is lost, just as in a mill that spills its
water.
Accordingly, even at this early stage, there are two plausible options for a definition
of the ‘reversible cycle’. Either we focus on the property of the Carnot cycle that it
can also be run backwards, and use this as a definition. This is the option later chosen
by Kelvin in 1851. Of course, this is a natural choice, since this property is essential to
the proof of the theorem. Or else, one can view the necessary and sufficient condition
which Carnot offers as a definition of reversibility. As we shall see, this is more or less
the option followed by Clausius in 1864. In that case, a cyclic process is by definition
irreversible if, and only if, it involves a direct heat exchange between bodies with
different temperature.
However this may be, let me come back to the main question: does Carnot’s work
imply an arrow of time, either in the sense of time-asymmetry, or in the sense of
irrecoverability? Let us take these questions one by one.
Is Carnot’s theory time-asymmetric? That is: does it allow the existence of pro-
cesses while prohibiting their time reversal? And more precisely, are the above irre-
versible cycles examples of such processes? The answer to the first question is easy.
Carnot’s principle forbids devices which produce work without consuming some kind of
resources. It has no qualms about their time reversals, i.e. devices that consume work
without producing any effect, or leaving any trace on other resources. We conclude
that the theory is time-asymmetric.
The answer to the last-mentioned question, however, is less obvious. Still, I think
it is affirmative. Consider some cycle C which violates Carnot’s criterion, and may
therefore be called ‘irreversible’. This cycle has less than maximum efficiency. Now,
suppose that its time reversal C∗ is also allowed. Does this entail a contradiction?
We may assume that the efficiency of the reverse process C∗ is the same as that of C.
After all, process C∗ would not be considered as the reversal of C, unless it requires the
same amount of work to transport the same amount of heat back to the furnace. Its
efficiency is therefore also less than maximal. Clearly, the supposition that C∗ exists
does not by itself violate Carnot’s theorem. However, we do obtain a contradiction
by a very similar argument. Indeed, the cycle C∗ operates as a heat pump. Thus,
‘less than maximum efficiency’ means that it requires less work to transport a given
amount of heat from the refrigerator into the furnace than a Carnot cycle. Hence,
combining the heat pump C∗ with a Carnot cycle in ordinary mode one obtains a
perpetuum mobile of the first kind. Thus C∗ is not allowed by this theory.16
16 I note, however, that Truesdell and Baharatha (1977) and Truesdell (1980) reach the opposite
conclusion. They argue that Carnot implicitly relied on a background theory of calorimetry, which
involves standard differential calculus for heat and work and in which processes are always repre-
sentable as differentiable curves in some state space. They call this ‘the doctrine of specific and
latent heat’. Truesdell points out that all processes which can be handled by this approach are by
definition reversible (by which he means that the curve can be traversed in either direction). Thus,
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Yet it seems to me that Carnot’s work gives no indications of an irreversibility
of physical processes, in the sense of irrecoverability discussed in section 3. In the
first place, Carnot’s theory does not imply the existence of irreversible processes: his
principle and theorem would remain equally valid in a world were all cyclic processes
have maximum efficiency. However, this is clearly not the world we live in. Carnot
explicitly acknowledged, that as a matter of fact, irreversible cycles do exist, and that,
moreover, it is rather the reversible cycle which is an ideal that cannot be constructed
in reality.
Even so, even if we accept this fact, it is not evident whether these irreversible
processes bring about irrecoverable changes. Carnot is concerned only with cycles. At
the end of a cycle, all changes in the system have become undone, even if the cyclic
process was (in his sense) irreversible. There is no question of a quantity of the system
that can only increase. The only option for find irreversible (irrecoverable) changes
must then lie in the environment, i.e. in the heat reservoirs employed. But these are
conceived of as buffers of fixed temperature, whose states do not change as a result
of the working of the engine.
I admit that it is possible to adopt a more liberal reading of the link between
Carnot’s work and irreversibility. The spontaneous flow of heat, arising when two
bodies of different temperatures come in thermal contact constitutes, in his words, a
‘loss of motive power’ (p.13, 14). One may think that this denotes a loss in the course
of time; i.e. that during the operation of an irreversible cycle, motive power somehow
disappears. In this reading —adopted e.g. by Kelvin, and also by later commentators
e.g. Brush (1976)— the power of the reservoirs to produce useful work is decreased by
irreversible cycles. Irreversible cyclic processes thus bring about irrecoverable changes:
a ‘degradation’ of energy from useful to less useful forms.17
Apart from the fact that it is hard to make this reading precise, in view of the
construal of the reservoirs as unchanging buffers, there is to my eyes a more natural
explanation of these passages. One can understand the term ‘loss’ as expressing only
the counterfactual that if an ideal, reversible machine had been employed, a higher
efficiency would have been achieved. There is only loss in an irreversible cyclic process
in the sense that the potential of the heat reservoirs to produce work has not been
fully exploited. We are then concerned with a comparison of the actual irreversible
their reconstruction of Carnot’s theory is completely time symmetric. As a consequence, Truesdell
denies that the dichotomy between cycles with maximum efficiency and those with less than maximal
efficiency should be identified with that between reversible and irreversible processes. His interpre-
tation of Carnot’s theorem is rather that it states that Carnot cycles attain the maximum efficiency
among all those reversible cycles where θ1 and θ2 are the extreme temperatures; see (Truesdell 1980,
p. 117,168,303) for details.
17The problem is here, that one would like to see this change in the environment reflected in the
state of the heat reservoirs. There are specific cases were this is conceivable. For example, consider a
case where the heat reservoirs are systems of two phases, say a water/ice mixture and a liquid/solid
paraffine mixture. These heat reservoirs maintain their fixed temperature, while at the same time,
one can register the heat absorbed or lost by the heat reservoir by a shift of the boundary surface
between the two phases. However, it is not easy to generalise this to arbitrary heat reservoirs.
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cycle and another reversible cycle in a possible world, not with irretrievable changes
in this world.
But even if one accepts the liberal view, we still cannot say, in my opinion, that
this irreversibility is a consequence of the theorem of Carnot. Maybe a comparison
with mechanics clarifies the point. The first law of Newtonian mechanics states that
a free body persists in a state of uniform rectilinear motion. But free bodies are,
just like the reversible cyclic process of Carnot, only an idealisation. ‘Real’ bodies,
as is often said, always experience friction and do not persevere in a state of uniform
motion. In fact, in the long run, they lose their speed. Here too, if one so desires,
one can discern an irreversibility or one-sided tendency of nature.18 But even so, it is
clear that this view is an addition to, and not a consequence of, Newton’s first law.
Similarly, the idea that the reversible cycle is only an idealisation, and all actual cycles
are irreversible, is an addition to and not a consequence of Carnot’s theorem.
Another argument to the same effect is the following. If Carnot’s theory implies
irreversibility then this should also be the case when we actually apply it to wa-
ter mills. The theorem that all reversible water mills operating between two given
water levels have the same efficiency (and that this efficiency is larger than that of
any irreversible mill) can be obtained by an analogous argument. But there are few
authors willing to draw the conclusion that there is an arrow of time in purely me-
chanical/hydrodynamical systems; even if such a hydrodynamical arrow is also not
excluded by this theorem (e.g. the principle: ‘water always seeks the lowest level’).
5 Clausius and Kelvin
5.1 The introduction of the second law
The main contributions towards the development of thermodynamics are those by
Kelvin (W. Thomson) and Clausius.19 Kelvin had noted in 1848 that Carnot’s theorem
allows the design of an absolute scale for temperature, i.e. a scale that does not depend
on the properties of some special substance (water, mercury, alcohol, the ideal gas).
But at this time, he was still convinced of the caloric view of heat which Carnot had
adopted.
The birth of the second law, or indeed of thermodynamics itself, is usually located
in an article by Clausius (1850). In this work one finds, for the first time, a clear rejec-
tion of the conservation of heat, while the validity of Carnot’s theorem is maintained.
Clausius showed that this theorem could also be derived from another argument, in
which the conservation of heat was replaced by the equivalence principle of Mayer and
18One can even adduce the authority of Newton himself for this point of view: ‘Motion is much
more apt to be lost than got and is always on the decay’; (cited by (Price 1996, p. 23)).
19Of course the work of several other authors was also highly significant, such as Rankine, Reech
and Clapeyron. And although I agree with those historians who argue that the role of these lesser-
known authors is commonly underestimated in the traditional historiography of thermodynamics, I
will not attempt to do justice to them.
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Joule, stating that from work heat can be produced, and vice versa, with a universal
conversion rate (J =4.2 Nm/Cal). This is the ‘first law’ of thermodynamics.
In order to obtain Carnot’s theorem the argument employing the perpetuum mo-
bile had to be adapted. Clausius’ reasoning assumed the impossibility of what we
today call the perpetuum mobile of the second kind : a periodically operating ma-
chine producing no other effect but the transport of heat from a lower to a higher
temperature.
The argument rests, just like Carnot’s, on a reductio ad absurdum. If Carnot’s
theorem were false, Clausius argues, we could build a combined machine that works
in a cycle and whose only effect would be that heat is transported from a cold to a
hot reservoir. But this would be absurd, says Clausius, because:
[. . . ] das widerspricht dem sonstigen Verhalten der Wa¨rme, indem sie u¨berall das
Bestreben zeigt, vorkommende Temperaturdifferenzen auszugleichen und also aus
den wa¨rmeren Ko¨rpern in die kaltern uberzugehen20 (Clausius 1864a, p. 50).
This particular statement of Clausius is often regarded as the first formulation of the
second law. But, remarkably, Clausius offers the statement more or less en passant,
as if it were obvious, and not as a new principle or law in the theory.21 According
to the view of this paper, there are indeed two fundamental laws (Grundsa¨tzen) for
the theory. But they are: (i) the Joule-Mayer principle and (ii) a (somewhat obscure)
formulation of what he takes to be Carnot’s theorem:
Der Erzeugung von Arbeit [entspricht] als Aequivalent ein blosser Uebergang von
Wa¨rme aus einem warmen in einen kalten Ko¨rper22 ((Clausius 1864a, p. 48)).
In the context, he makes clear that this equivalence is intended to refer to the maxi-
mum amount of work that can be produced in a cycle by a heat transfer between two
reservoirs of given temperatures. The previous statement about the natural behaviour
of heat is only an element in his argument to establish this ‘zweiten Grundsatz ’.
Note that although Clausius’ argument in order to establish this theorem only deals
with cyclic processes, his statement about the natural behaviour of heat flow does not
explicitly mention this restriction (and nor does his version of Carnot’s theorem). This
is our first indication that the second law might develop into something more general.
One year later, Kelvin (1851) also accepted the validity of the first law, and sim-
ilarly sought to put Carnot’s theorem on this new footing. In his article On the Dy-
namical Theory of Heat he paraphrased Clausius’ argument, and raised his incidental
remark to an axiom:
20‘[. . . ]this contradicts the further behaviour of heat, since it everywhere shows a tendency to
smoothen any occurring temperature differences and therefore to pass from hotter to colder bodies.’
21The passage is apparently so inconspicious that in a recent compilation of historical papers on
the second law (Kestin 1976) this article by Clausius is abridged before the author had a chance to
state his seminal contribution.
22The production of work [has] as its equivalent a mere transition of heat from a warm into a cold
body.’
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It is impossible for a self-acting machine, unaided by any external agency, to
convey heat from one body to another at a higher temperature(Kelvin) 1882,
p. 181).
He also formulated a variant by means of which Carnot’s theorem could likewise be
obtained:
It is impossible, by means of inanimate material agency, to derive mechanical
effect from any portion of matter by cooling it below the temperature of the
coldest of the surrounding objects (ibid. p. 179).
Either of these axioms allows one to derive what Kelvin calls ‘the second funda-
mental proposition’ of the theory:
Prop. II. (Carnot and Clausius) If an engine be such that, when it is worked
backwards, the physical and mechanical agencies in every part of its motions are
all reversed, it produces as much mechanical effect as can be produced by any
thermo-dynamic engine, with the same temperatures of source and refrigerator,
from a given quantity of heat (ibid. p.178).
This is a clear formulation of the first part of Carnot’s theorem, i.e. the part pertain-
ing to reversible cycles.23 In fact, Kelvin introduces this term here, referring to the
condition mentioned above as the ‘condition of complete reversibility’.
Kelvin then applies this proposition to an infinitesimal Carnot cycle performed on
an arbitrary fluid, where the temperature varies between θ and θ+dθ, and the volume
between V and V + dV . He shows that the function (2) can be written as
µ(θ) =
1
M(V, θ)
∂p(V, θ)
∂θ
, (4)
whereM is the latent heat capacity.24 He calls this result the ‘complete expression’ of
‘the second fundamental proposition’ (ibid. p. 187) and emphasises the remarkable fact
that the right-hand side of (4) is the same for all substances at the same temperature.
Next, Kelvin considers Carnot cycles with a finite range of variation for tempera-
ture and volume. He analyses these cycles into an infinite number of cycles operating
in an infinitesimal temperature range. Integrating the above result, he obtains the
following expression for the ratio of the work produced by the engine and the heat
supplied by the source (i.e. the Carnot function):
C(θ1, θ2) =
W
Q
= J
(
1− exp
(
−
1
J
∫ θ2
θ1
µ(θ)dθ
))
.
23Although Kelvin does not explicitly mention the restriction to cyclic processes, this restriction
was intended. At the beginning of the article he writes: ‘Whenever in what follows, the work done
or the mechanical effect produced by a thermo-dynamic engine is mentioned without qualification, it
must be understood that the mechanical effect produced, either in a non-varying machine, or in a
complete cycle, or any number of complete cycles of a periodical engine, is meant.’ (Kelvin 1851b,
p. 177).
24That is, M(V, θ)dV is the amount of heat the system takes in when its volume is changed from
V to V + dV at constant temperature θ.
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Choosing the absolute temperature scale T (θ) such that
T (θ) = exp
1
J
∫ θ
θ0
µ(θ′)dθ′
(a step only taken by Kelvin in 1854) and units such that J = 1, the result takes the
simpler and more familiar form:
W
Q
= 1−
T (θ2)
T (θ1)
= 1−
T2
T1
. (5)
The rest of his article is mainly devoted to an attempt to determine the values of∫
µ(θ)dθ from the steam tables collected in the experiments by Regnault.
Thus, for Kelvin too, the ‘second fundamental proposition’ of the theory is still
the Carnot theorem, or its corollaries (4) and (5) for Carnot cycles. The axioms
only serve to derive these propositions. But today nomenclature has shifted. The two
axioms are usually themselves seen as versions of ‘the second law’. They are commonly
presented as follows (see e.g. (Born 1921, Zemansky 1937, Buchdahl 1966)).
Clausius’ Principle: It is impossible to perform a cyclic process which has no
other result than that heat is absorbed from a reservoir with a low temperature
and emitted into a reservoir with a higher temperature.
Kelvin’s Principle: It is impossible to perform a cyclic process with no other
result than that heat is absorbed from a reservoir, and work is performed.
The most striking difference from the original formulation is obviously that the explicit
exclusion by Kelvin of living creatures has been dropped. Another important point is
that they are concerned only with cyclic processes. It is not hard to devise examples
in which heat is transmitted from a lower to a higher temperature, or used up as work,
when the condition that the system returns to its original state is dropped. A further
noteworthy point is the clause about ‘no other result’. A precise definition of this
clause has always remained a difficult issue, as we shall see in later sections. Another
question is the definition of a heat reservoir.25
Kelvin already claimed that these two formulations of the second law were logi-
cally equivalent. An argument to this effect can be found in almost all text books: one
shows that violation of one principle would lead to the violation of the other, and vice
versa. It took three-quarters of a century before Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa (1925,1956)
25Hatsopoulos and Keenan (1965, p. xxv) argue that the definition of the concept of a heat reservoir
can only be given such a content that the second law becomes a tautology. Although I have doubts
about this claim I agree that the question of the definition of a heat reservoir is not trivial. The most
natural conception seems to be that a heat reservoir is a system in thermal equilibrium which can
take in or give off a finite amount of heat without changing its temperature or volume. This means
that it must have an infinite heat capacity. The question is then whether the thermodynamical state
of such a system changes if it absorbs or emits heat, and how this can be represented theoretically.
That is, if an infinite heat reservoir exchanges a finite quantity of heat, does its own state change or
not?
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noticed that the two formulations only become equivalent when we add an extra ax-
iom to thermodynamics, namely that all temperatures have the same sign. When we
allow systems with negative absolute temperature —and there is no law in thermo-
dynamics that disallows that— one can distinguish between these two formulations.
Her observation became less academic when Ramsey (1956) gave concrete examples
of physical systems with negative absolute temperatures.26
With hindsight, it is easy to see that the two formulations are not equivalent.
Clausius’ principle makes recourse to the distinction between low and high temper-
ature. That is to say, his formulation makes use of the idea that temperatures are
ordered, and it is therefore sensitive to our conventions about this ordering. If, for
example we replace T by −T the statement is no longer true. The modern formulation
of Kelvin’s principle on the other hand only mentions the withdrawal of heat from a
reservoir and does not rely on the ordering of temperatures. This principle is thus
invariant under a change of conventions on this topic.
How is it possible that so many books prove the equivalence of these two formula-
tions? A short look at the argumentation makes clear where the weak spot lies: one
argues e.g. that the violation of Clausius’ formulation implies the violation of Kelvin’s
formulation by coupling the ‘anti-Clausius engine’ to a normal Carnot cycle. Such a
coupling is assumed to be always possible without restriction. The idea is apparently
that everything which has not been said to be impossible must be possible. But in an
unusual application (such as a world in which negative temperatures occur) such an
assumption is not at all evident.
However this may be, let us return to the main theme of our essay. What are the
implications of the second law for the arrow of time in the early papers of Clausius
and Kelvin? If we consider their own original statements (the ‘zweite Grundsatz ’ of
1850 or the ‘second fundamental proposition’ of 1851), there is none. For these are
just statements of the part of Carnot’s theorem concerning reversible cycles. This
part is time-symmetric.
But what if we take the more modern point of view that their formulation of the
second law is to be identified with Clausius’ and Kelvin’s principle? We can largely
repeat the earlier conclusions about the work of Carnot. Both are explicitly time-
asymmetric: they forbid the occurrence of cyclic processes of which the time reversals
are allowed. It is much harder to connect them to the idea of irreversibility. Both ver-
sions refer exclusively to cyclic processes in which there occur no irrecoverable changes
in the system. The only option for finding such changes must lie in the environment.
But also in the work of Kelvin and Clausius it is not clear how the environment can
be described in thermodynamical terms.27 A connection with this aspect of the arrow
26Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa argued that when we allow systems with both positive and negative tem-
peratures the principle of Clausius, but not that of Kelvin is violated. At present, common opinion
seems to be the opposite (Ramsey 1956, Marvan 1966).
27The conceptual problem that is created when the properties of the environment (a heat reservoir
or perhaps the whole universe) play a role in the argument is —with some sense of drama— expressed
by Truesdell: ‘This kind of argument [requires that ] properties of the environment are specified
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of time is therefore simply not present at this stage of the development of the second
law.
Also the negative character of both formulations gives rise to this conclusion.
Brush observes that ‘it is clear that both [Kelvin’s and Clausius’ principles] are neg-
ative statements and do not assert any tendency toward irreversibility’ (Brush 1976,
p. 571). The objection is here that these versions of the law would also be valid in a
world in which all cyclic processes were reversible.
6 From the steam engine to the universe (and back again)
6.1 Universal dissipation
After the original introduction in 1850/1851 by Clausius and Kelvin the second law
underwent a number of transformations before it was given the form in which we
recognise it today, i.e. as the entropy principle. A development which, indeed, is no
less impressive than the psychological development of Macbeth, where the loyal and
rather credulous general evolves into a suspicious and cruel tyrant. Here too, the
metamorphosis starts with the prophecy of a foul future.
In 1852 Kelvin proposed the view that there exists a one-sided directedness in
physical phenomena, namely a ‘universal tendency in nature to the dissipation of
mechanical energy’, and argued that this is a necessary consequence of his axiom. He
expressed this tendency in the following words:
I. When heat is created by a reversible process (so that the mechanical energy
thus spent may be restored to its primitive condition), there is also a transference
from a cold body to a hot body of a quantity of heat bearing to the quantity
created a definite proportion depending on the temperatures of the two bodies.
II. When heat is created by an unreversible process (such as friction) there is
a dissipation of mechanical energy, and a full restoration of it to its primitive
condition is impossible.
III. When heat is diffused by conduction, there is a dissipation of mechanical
energy, and perfect restoration is impossible.
IV. When radiant heat or light is absorbed, otherwise than in vegetation, or in
chemical action, there is a dissipation of mechanical energy, and perfect restora-
tion is impossible (Kelvin 1852).
He then considers the question how much energy is dissipated by friction when steam
is compressed in a narrow pipe, and estimates that even in the best steam engines no
less than 3/4 of the available motive power is wasted. He draws from this and other
along with the properties of the bodies on which it acts. Here the environment is not described by
[the theory], so there is no place in the formal argument where such a proof [. . . ] could start. [. . . ]
Mathematicians instinctively reject such arguments, because they stand above logic. [. . . ] This is the
point in history where mathematics and physics, which had come together in the sixteenth century,
began to part company’ (Truesdell 1980, p. 98).
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unspecified ‘known facts with reference to the mechanics of animal and vegetable
bodies’ the conclusions:
Any restoration of mechanical energy, without more than an equivalent of dissipa-
tion is impossible in inanimate material, and probably never effected by organized
matter, either endowed with vegetable life or subjected to the will of an animated
creature.
Within a finite period of time past, the earth must have been, and within a
finite time to come the earth must again be, unfit for the habitation of man as
presently constituted, unless operations have been, or are to be performed, which
are impossible under the laws to which the known operations going on at present
in the material world are subject.
Here a number of important themes in the debate on the thermodynamical arrow of
time meet. It is the first time in the history of thermodynamics that a universal ten-
dency of natural processes is mentioned, and attributed to the second law. Thus this
law obtains a cosmic validity and eschatological implication: the universe is heading
for what later became known as the ‘heat death’.28 All but one of the aspects that
make the second law so fascinating and puzzling are present in this short paper, the
only exception being the concept of entropy.
At the same time the logic of Kelvin’s argumentation is astonishing. Many com-
mentators have expressed their surprise at his far-reaching conclusions about the fate
of humankind immediately following his consideration of the steam pipe. Further, his
claim that the universal tendency towards dissipation would be a ‘necessary conse-
quence’ of his axiom, is not supported with any argument whatsoever.29 Instead, he
simply reinterprets Carnot’s theorem as ‘Carnot’s proposition that there is an abso-
lute waste of mechanical energy available to man when heat is allowed to pass from
one body to another at a lower temperature, by any means not fulfilling his criterion
of a “perfect thermo-dynamic engine” ’. Kelvin thus apparently adopts the ‘liberal’
reading of Carnot that we discussed in section 4. His addition of the phrase ‘available
to man’ blocks an otherwise reasonable reading of ‘waste’ in terms of a comparison
between possible worlds.
Note that Kelvin now uses the terms ‘reversible/unreversible’ in a sense which
is completely different from that of the ‘condition of reversibility’ in his 1851 paper.
28Parenthetically it may be remarked that Kelvin presented his conclusion in time-symmetric form:
‘. . .must have been . . . and must again be. . . ’. The idea is here probably that the temperature
differences on earth were too large in the past and will be too small in the future to sustain life.
29The only explanation for this omission I can think of is that Kelvin thought that the implication
had already been demonstrated. Indeed one finds in his earlier article of 1851 (§22) in discussing the
case of a non-ideal machine the remark that the heat is only partly used for a useful purpose, ‘the
remainder being irrecoverably lost to man, and therefore “wasted,” although not annihilated.’ Here
the idea of irrecoverable dissipation is apparently already present. A draft of this article is even more
explicit about his belief in the universal directedness: ‘Everything in the material world is progressive’
((Kelvin 1851a)). But here he does not connect this opinion with the second law. See also the passage
in Kestin (p. 64 = Kelvin 1849). Recent historical work suggests that Kelvin’s view on dissipation is
to be explained by his religious convictions (Russell 1981, Smith and Wise 1989).
26
He does not consider cyclic processes but instead processes in which the final state
differs from the initial state. Such a process is ‘unreversible’ if the initial state cannot
be completely recovered. A cyclic process is therefore by definition reversible in the
present sense, even if it is irreversible in the sense of Carnot. Obviously the necessary
and sufficient criterion of Carnot for reversibility is no longer applicable to Kelvin’s
1852 usage of the term.30
6.2 The second law in mathematical, modified, analytical and ex-
tended form
In 1854 Kelvin published another instalment of his Dynamical Theory of Heat. Here
he adopts the absolute temperature scale defined in terms of the Carnot function,
leading to the result (5) for the Carnot process. If Q1 and Q2 denote the quantities
of heat exchanged with the heat reservoirs, with Q1 =W +Q2, we can write this as
Q1
T1
−
Q2
T2
= 0 (6)
Adopting the convention to take the sign of heat positive when heat is taken in by
the system, and negative when it is emitted, this becomes
Q1
T1
+
Q2
T2
= 0. (7)
He then expands the consideration to a reversible cyclic process of a system which can
exchange heat with an arbitrary number of heat reservoirs, and obtains the result:
∑
i
Qi
Ti
= 0. (8)
He concludes:
This equation may be regarded as the mathematical expression of the second
fundamental law of the dynamical theory of heat (p. 237).
In a following instalment (part VII, from 1878) he even calls the result (8): ‘the full
expression of the Second Thermodynamic Law’ (Kelvin 1882, p. 295).
Thus, once again, the second law in Kelvin’s formulation, remains a time-symmetric
statement, that only pertains to reversible cycles. His doctrine of universal dissipation
apparently plays no role whatsoever!
Clausius too developed his point of view. Also in 1854, he presented a ‘modified
version’ of the second law (now called: Hauptsatz ). He put it in the form:
30Note too that Kelvin does not consider the recovery of the state of the system but rather of the
form of energy. The idea that irreversibility is a characteristic aspect of energy remained alive for a
long time, e.g. in the shape of the principle of ‘degradation’ of energy. It was more or less extinguished
by Planck.
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Es kann nie Wa¨rme aus einem ka¨lteren in einen wa¨rmeren Ko¨rper u¨bergehen,
wenn nicht gleichzeitig eine andere damit zusammenha¨ngende Aenderung ein-
tritt.31(Clausius 1864a, p. 134)
The fact that Clausius offers this statement, which is closely related to what he had
already written in 1850, as a modified formulation of the second law underlines that
at that time he had not regarded this as a law. Nevertheless, his present formulation
is indeed modified: instead of a sweeping but vague statement about the natural
tendency of heat to flow from a hot to a cold body, he now says that heat never flows
from cold to hot unless there is some accompanying change. Unfortunately, it remains
unclear what one should understand by such changes.
He then considers, just like Kelvin, reversible cycles in which a system exchanges
heat with an arbitrary finite number of heat reservoirs of different temperatures Ti
and obtains the equation (8) by an analogous argument.32 Clausius calls Qi/Ti the
‘equivalence value’ (‘Aequivalenzwerth’), of the heat exchange, and he reads the equa-
tion (8) as expressing that the heat absorbed and ejected in a Carnot process possess
equal equivalence value.
Clausius also discusses the case in which the heat reservoirs undergo a temperature
change during the cyclic process. In this case he replaces the sum by an integral:∮
dQ
T
= 0 (9)
This is his ‘analytical expression’ of the second law for reversible (umkehrbare) cyclic
processes.33
In this formulation, T stands for the temperature of the heat reservoir with which
the system exchanges the heat dQ. But, because of Carnot’s criterion, the cyclic pro-
cess is reversible if and only if the heat reservoir and system have the same temperature
during the exchange. Thus, if the system has a uniform temperature, the integral can
be considered as referring to the system by itself, and no longer to properties of the
heat reservoirs.
At the end of this paper (Clausius 1864a, p. 151) Clausius gives a brief treatment of
irreversible (nicht umkehrbare) cyclic processes, for which case he obtains the equation∮
dQ
T
≤ 0. (10)
His argument is as follows: for an umkehrbar cyclic process the result (9) rests on
the argument that according to the modified version of the second law the integral
31‘Heat cannot of itself pass from a colder to a hotter body without some other change, connected
herewith, occurring at the same time.’
32The only distinction between Clausius and Kelvin is that at this time the former did not accept
Kelvin’s definition for absolute temperature and therefore uses an indefinite function f(θ) instead
of T . He restricts himself to a cyclic process for an ideal gas, and expresses as a conjecture that
f(θ) ∝ pV .
33Clausius had no special notation for cyclic integrals or non-exact differentials and wrote the
left-hand side of (9) as
∫
dQ
T
.
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cannot be positive. The reversed cyclic process, where the integral has the opposite
sign, must also satisfy this condition, and the integral is therefore also not negative.
Therefore it must vanish. In the case of the nicht umkehrbar cyclic process the second
part of this argument is not applicable, but the first part remains valid. Hence we
obtain (10).
A further paper (Clausius 1862) presents what in his collected work is referred to
as the ‘extended form’ of the second law. Here, he studies processes where the final
state of the system differs from the initial state. For convenience I will call these
‘open processes’. For this purpose Clausius needs a number of assumptions about the
possible change of states of that system, and hence about its internal constitution.
He characterizes the state of the system by introducing two abstruse quantities: the
‘vorhandene Wa¨rme’ H and the ‘Disgregation’ Z. The definition of these quantities
is not very clear (Clausius merely remarks about the Disgregation that it represents a
‘degree of distribution’, which is related to the ordering of the molecules) and for our
purpose actually not very important.34
I only mention that Clausius here considers infinitesimal pieces of an open process
and formulates the second law as:
dQ+ dH
T
+ dZ = 0 (11)
forumkehrbar and
dQ+ dH
T
+ dZ ≥ 0 (12)
for nicht umkehrbar processes. He emphasizes (Clausius 1864a, p. 244) that this
extension of the second law rests on additional assumptions and does not follow from
the earlier versions.
More important for our purpose is that, now the limitation to cyclic processes is
dropped, Clausius has to be more explicit than before in stating the criterion for what
he means by the term ‘umkehrbar ’.
Wenn die Anordnungsa¨nderung in der Weise stattfindet, dass dabei Kraft und Ge-
genkraft gleich sind, so kann unter dem Einflusse derselben Kra¨fte die Aenderung
auch im umgekehrten Sinne geschehen. Wenn aber eine Aenderung so stattfindet,
dass dabei die u¨berwindende Kraft gro¨sser ist als die u¨berwundene, so kann unter
dem Einflusse derselben Kra¨fte die Vera¨nderung nicht im umgekehrten Sinne
geschehen. Im ersteren Falle sagen wir, die Vera¨nderung habe in umkehrbarer
Weise stattgefunden, im letzeren, sie habe in nicht umkehrbarer Weise stattge-
funden.
34Apparently, Clausius was inspired by, and aimed to improve upon, Rankine’s 1853 formulation of
thermodynamics, which adopted the quantityH (‘actual heat’) and a quantity F which was intimately
related to Z, known as the ‘heat potential’ (see Hutchison, 1973). Unlike Clausius, however, Rankine
employed an elaborate microscopic picture of molecular vortices in terms of which these functions could
be defined. Nevertheless, the idea of separating entropy into two distinct quantities was not so weird
as it may seem to modern eyes. See Klein (1969) for a clear exposition.
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Streng genommen muss die u¨berwindende Kraft immer sta¨rker sein, als die u¨berwundene;
da aber die Kraftu¨berschuss keine bestimmte Gro¨sse zu haben braucht, so kann
man ihn sich immer kleiner und kleiner werdend denken, so dass er sich dem
Werthe Null bis zu jedem beliebigen Grade na¨hert. Mann sieht daraus, dass der
Fall, wo die Vera¨nderung in umkehrbarer Weise stattfindet, ein Gra¨nzfall ist, den
man zwar nie vollsta¨ndig erreichen, dem man sich aber beliebig na¨hern kann35
(Clausius 1864a, p. 251).
This definition is clearly related to, and in a certain sense a sharpening of, the
necessary and sufficient criterion of Carnot. For both authors the reversible process
may be regarded as a limit of a series of processes in which the disturbance from
the equilibrium state become smaller and smaller. But Clausius’ condition is more
stringent. Whereas Carnot only demanded equality of temperature for all bodies in
thermal contact, Clausius demands equality for all kinds of ‘forces’. (Note that Clau-
sius’ concept of ‘force’ is more or less Aristotelian. It denotes any cause of change and
includes temperature gradients). Thus, his criterion demands also, e.g. in a compres-
sion process, that the piston is pushed very gently, with a force which nearly balances
the pressure exerted by the gas. Thus a Carnot process is not necessarily reversible
in Clausius’ sense. Indeed, in an experimental realisation of a Carnot process, adi-
abaticity of the two adiabatic stages of the cycle is often secured by making them
so fast that the system has no chance to exchange heat with its environment. The
main difference with Carnot is, however, that Clausius applies the criterion to open
processes.
More importantly, Clausius’ definition differs considerably from Kelvin’s 1852 no-
tion of reversibility. For Clausius, a process is called reversible when it proceeds very
gently. This is very close to what we today call ‘quasi-static’. Whether the initial state
of such a process is recoverable is another matter. We shall return to this distinction
between Kelvin’s notion of ‘reversible’ and Clausius’ ‘umkehrbar’ below.
In his (Clausius 1864b), he embraced the idea that the second law has implications
for the direction of natural processes. For this occasion he adopts a more positive read-
ing of this law: heat transport from bodies with high to bodies with low temperature
can occur ‘by itself’, but is not possible from low to high temperature ‘without com-
pensation’. These rather vague clauses are intended to express the same idea as the
phrase ‘without other associated changes’ from 1854. (See in particular the footnote
35‘When a change of arrangement takes place in such a way that force and counterforce are equal,
the change can take place in the reverse direction also under the influence of the same forces. But if
a change takes place in such a way that the overcoming force is greater than that which is overcome,
the transformation cannot take place in the opposite direction under the influence of the same forces.
We may say that the transformation has occurred in the first case in a reversible manner, and in the
second case in an irreversible manner.
Strictly speaking, the overcoming force must always be more powerful than the force which it over-
comes; but as the excess of force is not required to have any assignable value, we may think of it as
becoming continually smaller and smaller, so that its value may approach to nought as nearly as we
please. Hence it may be seen that the case in which the transformation takes place reversibly is a
limit which in reality is never reached but to which we can approach as nearly as we please.’
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p. 134-5 in (Clausius 1864a).) The clause serves to exclude both the possibility of
changes of states in the environment as well as in the system itself (when it does not
perform a complete cycle).
He then proposes the view that his present formulation of the second law expresses
a universal tendency, that will end in the heat death of the universe:
In diesen Sa¨tzen [. . . ] dru¨ckt sich eine allgemein in der Natur obwal-
tende Tendenz zu Vera¨nderungen in einem bestimmten Sinne aus. Wen-
det mann dieses auf das Weltall im ganzen an, so gelangt man zu einer
eigenthu¨mlichen Schlußfolgerung, auf welche zuerst W.Thomson aufmerk-
sam machte, nachdem er [. . . ] sich meiner Auffassung des zweiten Haupt-
satzes angeschlossen hatte. Wenn na¨mlich im Weltall [. . . ] die Wa¨rme
stets das Bestreben zeigt, ihre Vertheilung in der Weise zu a¨ndern daß
dadurch die bestehenden Temperaturdifferenzen ausgeglichen werden, so
muß sich das Weltall allma¨hlich mehr und mehr zu dem Zustand na¨hern,
wo die Kra¨fte keine neuen Bewegungen mehr hervorbringen ko¨nnen, und
keine Temperaturdifferenzen mehr existiren.”36(Clausius 1864a, p. 323)
In his next paper (Clausius 1865) introduces the concept of entropy. Again, he
considers cyclic as well as open processes. But this time, he does not resort to hypo-
thetical physical quantities. Instead he starts from the observation that the relation
(9) implies that for an open umkehrbar process, say from state si to sf , the integral∫ sf
si
dQ
T
is independent of the integration path, i.e. depends only on the initial and final state.
By a standard argument, one can show that this implies the existence of a state
function S such that ∫ sf
si
dQ
T
= S(sf )− S(si). (13)
Thus, the equivalence value of a transformation can be determined as the change of
entropy between initial and final state.
Now Clausius considers a nicht umkehrbar open process P, say, again, from si to
sf . He assumes that it can be closed into a cycle by some umkehrbar process R. from
sf to si. For the cycle thus obtained he uses the result (10):∮
dQ
T
=
∫ sf
si P
dQ
T
+
∫ si
sf R
dQ
T
≤ 0.
36‘These statements [. . . ] express a generally prevailing tendency in Nature towards changes in
a definite sense. If one applies this to the universe in total, one reaches a remarkable conclusion,
which was first pointed out by W. Thomson, after [. . . ] he had accepted my view of the second law.
Namely, if, in the universe, heat always shows the endeavour to change its distribution in such a way
that existing temperature differences are thereby smoothened, then the universe must continually
get closer and closer to the state, where the forces cannot produce any new motions, and no further
temperature differences exist.’
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For the reversible piece R of the cycle one has∫ si
sf
dQ
T
= S(si)− S(sf ). (14)
Thus, for the nicht umkehrbar process P one gets:∫ sf
si
dQ
T
≤ S(sf )− S(si). (15)
If this process is adiabatic, i.e. if there is no heat exchange with the environment, we
have dQ = 0 for the entire duration of the process and it follows that
S(sf ) ≥ S(si). (16)
Hence we obtain:
The Entropy Principle (Clausius’ version) For every nicht umkehrbar process
in an adiabatically isolated system which begins and ends in an equilibrium state,
the entropy of the final state is greater than or equal to that of the initial state.
For every umkehrbar process in an adiabatical system, the entropy of the final
state is equal to that of the initial state.
This is the first instance of a formulation of the second law as a statement about
entropy increase. Note that only the ‘≥’ sign is established for nicht umkehrbar pro-
cesses. One often reads the stronger view that for irreversible processes the strict
inequality, i.e. with the ‘¿’ sign in (ref5), holds but this has no basis in Clausius’
work. Note also that, in contrast to the common view that the entropy principle
obtains for isolated systems, Clausius’ result applies to adiabatically isolated systems.
Clausius concludes
Der zweite Hauptsatz in der Gestalt, welche ich ihm gegeben habe, sagt aus, dass
alle in der Natur vorkommenden Verwandlungen in einem gewissen Sinne, welche
ich als den positiven angenommen habe, von selbst, d.h. ohne Compensation,
geschehen ko¨nnen, dass sie aber im entgegengesetzten, also negativen Sinne nur
in der Weise stattfinden ko¨nnen, dass sie durch gleichzeitig stattfindende posi-
tive Verwandlungen compensirt werden. Die Anwendung dieses Satzes auf das
gesammte Weltall fu¨hrt zu einem Schlusse, auf den zuerst W. Thomson aufmerk-
sam gemacht hat [. . . ] Wenn na¨mlich bei allen im Weltall vorkommenden Zus-
tandsa¨nderungen die Verwandlungen von einem bestimmten Sinne diejenigen vom
entgegengesetzten Sinne an Gro¨sse u¨bertreffen, so muss die Gesammtzustand des
Weltalls sich immer mehr in jenem ersteren Sinne a¨ndern, und das Weltall muss
sich somit ohne Unterlass einem Grenzzustande na¨hern.37 (Clausius 1867, p. 42)
37 ‘The second law in the form I have given it says that all transformations taking place in nature go
by themselves in a certain direction, which I have denominated the positive direction. They can thus
take place without compensation. They can take place in the opposite direction, that is, the negative,
only when they are compensated at the same time by positive transformations. The application of
this law to the universe leads to a conclusion to which W. Thomson first called attention [. . . ] namely,
if in all changes of state in the universe the transformations in one direction surpass in magnitude
those taking place in the opposite direction, it follows that the total state of the universe will change
continually in that direction and hence will inevitably approach a limiting state.’
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He next notes that his theory is still not capable of treating the phenomenon of heat
radiation. Therefore, he ‘restricts himself’ —as he puts it— to an application of the
theory to the universe:
[. . . ] man [kann] die den beiden Hauptsa¨tzen der mechanischen Wa¨rmetheorie
entsprechenden Grundgesetze des Weltalls in folgender einfacher Form aussprechen:
1.) Die Energie der Welt ist constant.
2.) Die Entropie der Welt strebt einem Maximum zu.38 (ibid. p. 44)
These words of Clausius are among the most famous and most often quoted in the his-
tory of thermodynamics. Perhaps they are also the most controversial. Even Planck,
in many regards a loyal disciple of Clausius, admitted that the entropy of the universe
is an undefined concept (Planck 1897, § 135). For example, in order to define the
entropy difference between two states of a system we need the integral (14). But if
that system is the universe, it is unclear where the heat absorbed by the system might
come from. Van der Waals and Kohnstamm (1927) even argued that the universe
cannot be the subject of scientific study . Ironically, Clausius could have avoided this
objection if he had not ‘restricted’ himself to the universe but generalised his formula-
tion to an arbitrary adiabatically isolated system (but at least beginning and ending
in equilibrium).
A more important objection, it seems to me, is that Clausius bases his conclusion
that the entropy increases in a nicht umkehrbar process on the assumption that such
a process can be closed by an umkehrbar process to become a cycle. This is essential
for the definition of the entropy difference between the initial and final states. But
the assumption is far from obvious for a system more complex than an ideal gas, or
for states far from equilibrium, or for processes other than the simple exchange of
heat and work. Thus, the generalisation to ‘all transformations occurring in Nature’
is somewhat rash.
Another problem is what T refers to in an nicht umkehrbar process. As noted
above, in the integral (9) this temperature refers to the environment of the system
(the reservoirs with which it is in contact). In an umkehrbar process the temperature
of system and environment must be the same, and one is allowed to consider T as
referring to the system itself. But for arbitrary processes we cannot take this step.
Moreover, Clausius applies the integral to an adiabatically isolated system, i.e. one
which does not interact with any reservoir. Thus the T in the left-hand side of in-
equality (15) is not properly defined. This paradox is somewhat mitigated by the fact
that since dQ = 0, the value of T does not matter anyway.
On many occasions Clausius was criticised by his contemporaries. I do not know
if, in his own time, he was criticised in particular for his famous formulation of the
38‘One can express the fundamental laws of the universe that correspond to the two main laws of
thermodynamics in the following simple form:
1. The energy of the universe is constant.
2. The entropy of the universe tends to a maximum.’
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second law as the increase of the entropy of the universe.39 However, Kuhn (1978, pp.
13-15, p. 260) has pointed out the remarkable fact that in the book (Clausius 1876) he
eventually composed from his collected articles, every reference to the entropy of the
universe and even to the idea that entropy never decreases in irreversible processes
in adiabatically isolated systems is deleted! The most general formulation given to
the second law in this book, which may be regarded as the mature presentation of
Clausius’ ideas, is again the relation (10), where the system is supposed to undergo a
cycle, and entropy increase is out of the question.40
We must conclude that in the work of Clausius and Kelvin the connection between
the second law and irreversibility is extremely fragile. Kelvin claimed that the irre-
versibility of all processes in nature is a necessary consequence of his principle, but
gave not a shred of argumentation for this claim. His later versions of the second law
were even completely disconnected from the arrow of time. Clausius does give argu-
mentation, but it is so untransparent and dependent on implicit assumptions that his
famous general conclusion (all processes in nature proceed in the ‘positive’ direction,
i.e. the direction of entropy increase) cannot be considered as established.
Further, we have noted that Clausius employs a definition of ‘umkehrbar ’ that
largely coincides with ‘quasistatic’. This concept is very different from Kelvin’s con-
cept of irreversibility (i.e the irrecoverability of the initial state). The question then
arises whether the (Un)umkehrbarheit of processes (in the sense of Clausius) has any-
thing at all to do the arrow of time. The deceptive nomenclature may make this seem
self-evident. But Clausius also explicitly draws such a connection: in the quotation
39One can find some indications for this. Planck notes in his Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie
(Planck 1948) that prominent German physicists in the 1880s rejected the application of the second
law to irreversible processes. The book by Bertrand (1887) is also skeptical about the validity of
the second law for irreversible (cyclic) processes: ‘Je serai tre´s bref sur les cycles irreversibles; les
de´monstrations et les e´nonce´s meˆmes de leur propriete´s me paraisent jusqu’ici manquer de rigueur et
de precision’. (‘I will be brief about irreversible cycles. It appears to me that the demonstrations,
and even the descriptions of their properties lack rigour and precision.’ He discusses two favorable
examples for the statement that ‘L’entropie de l’univers tend vers un maximum’, but concludes: ‘Les
examples [. . . ] n’autorisent pas a regarder le the´ore`me general comme de´montre´. Il faudrai commencer
par pre´ciser l’e´nonce´, et, dans beaucoup de cas, cela paraˆıt fort difficile.’ (‘Examples do not warrant
regarding the general theorem as proved. One should start by making the statement more precise,
and in many cases, that appears to be very difficult.’
There are also more general complaints about the writings of Clausius. Mach writes: ‘Die Darstel-
lung von Clausius hat immer einen Zug von Feierlichkeit und Zuru¨ckhaltung. Man weiss oft nicht ob
Clausius mehr bemu¨ht ist etwas mitzutheilen oder etwas zu verschweigen’ (Mach 4th edition, 1923).
(‘The presentation by Clausius always has a touch of ceremoniousness and reservation. One often
does not know whether Clausius is concerned more with communicating something or with concealing
something.’) Maxwell too had difficulty swallowing the work of Clausius: ‘My invincible ignorance
of certain modes of thought has caused Clausius to disagree with me (in the digestive sense) so that
I failed to boil him down and he does not occupy the place in my book on heat to which his other
virtues entitle him’ ((Garber e.a 1995, p. 222)).
40That is, of course, for the system itself. For the heat reservoirs this may be different. But since
Clausius’ argument has the purpose of establishing the existence of the property to be called the
‘entropy’ of the system, we cannot suppose without further ado that the reservoirs already possess
entropies or even thermodynamical states.
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on p. 29 he claims that every umkehrbar process can be performed in the reversed
direction, but a nicht umkehrbar process cannot, at least not under influence of the
same forces.
An example to the contrary was given by Sommerfeld (1952, p. 17). Consider a
charged condensor which is short-circuited by a resistance submersed in a heat reser-
voir. When the resistance is very large the discharge will take place by an arbitrarily
small current, and negligible disturbance of electrostatic equilibrium. Thus, such a
process is umkehrbar in the sense of Clausius. The reverse process, however, is not
allowed by the second law.
An example from relativistic mechanics shows that the converse is also conceivable:
an ‘unumkehrbar ’ process of which the reversal is allowed by the theory. In order to
bring a rod into motion it must be accelerated. In general this will bring about internal
stress in the rod, depending on its constitution, the point where the force is applied,
etc. In order to determine the relativistic length contraction, one considers a change of
velocity performed so slowly that at every moment the force remains negligible, so that
the rod remains almost in internal equilibrium. This is analogous to Clausius’ criterion
for an umkehrbar change of state. Further, the time reverse of this transformation (the
Lorentz transformation) is again a Lorentz transformation. Now consider the analogue
of what Clausius called an irreversible change: the measuring rod is suddenly put in
motion, causing internal deformations and shock waves in the rod. The length of
this rod is not described by the Lorentz transformation. Still, the time reversal of
this process, i.e. a sudden deceleration, is also dynamically possible, even under the
influence of the same external forces. Clearly the claim that umkehrbar processes can
be reversed, but nicht umkehrbar not, is not a tautological truth.
At the same time it is undeniable that the idea of grounding the irreversibility
of processes in a law of nature is very suggestive and attractive. Even if for Kelvin
and Clausius the idea may have been nothing more than a short flirtation, many later
authors, starting with Boltzmann (1872) and Gibbs (1875), have built upon Clausius’
famous formulation of the second law as the tendency of the universe towards an
entropy maximum. In particular Planck propagated the view that the essence of the
second law lies in the principle of the increase of entropy.
An example of the confusion that entered thermodynamics as a result of the con-
fusing terminology is provided by the fate of a criticism by Rankine (1852). Rankine
denied the validity of Kelvin’s dissipation doctrine, in particular the claim that heat
radiation is an example of an irrecoverable process. His argument was straightfor-
ward. Imagine that mirrors are placed on a huge sphere around the sun, that would
reflect the solar radiation billions of years after its emission. The radiation would
reconcentrate and reheat the sun to its original temperature, even after it had become
cold and extinct, and thus undo the apparently irreversible dissipation.
A response to this objection came from Clausius (1864b). Since the dissipation
principle was seen as a necessary consequence of the second law, Clausius understood
the objection as an attack on his own work. Clausius believed that Rankine wanted to
propose a construction in which a body which absorbs radiation could be made hotter
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than the bodies emitting the radiation. This, of course, would be in conflict with
Clausius’ claim about the natural behaviour of heat flow and lead to a perpetuum mo-
bile of the second kind. He argued that such a construction is impossible. But clearly
Clausius had not understood Rankine. The latter was concerned with a recovery of
the original state, not a perpetuum mobile of the second kind. That is, his intension
was to make a radiating body just as hot as it originally was, by refocussing its own
radiation. Clearly, Kelvin’s dissipation principle and the second law in the form of
a perpetuum mobile principle are not equivalent: the supposition that the processes
mentioned by Kelvin as examples of dissipation are in fact reversible does not entail
the possibility of a perpetuum mobile of the second kind.
7 The attempt at clarification by Planck
If someone can be said to have codified the second law, and given it its definitive
classical formulation, that someone is Max Planck. His Vorlesungen u¨ber Thermody-
namik went through eleven successive editions between 1897 and 1966 and represent
the authoritative exposition of thermodynamics par excellence for the first half of this
century.41 It is no exaggeration to claim that all later writers on the topic have been
influenced by this book. Planck puts the second law, the concepts of entropy and
irreversibility at the very centre of thermodynamics. For him, the second law says
that for all processes taking place in nature the total entropy of all systems involved
increases, or, in a limiting case, remains constant. In the first case these processes are
irreversible, in the second case reversible. Increase of entropy is therefore a necessary
and sufficient criterion for irreversibility.
Before Planck’s work there were also alternative views. We have seen that Kelvin
attributed irreversibility to processes involving special forms of energy conversion.
This view on irreversibility, which focuses on the ‘dissipation’ or ‘degradation’ of
energy instead of an increase in entropy was still in use at the beginning of the century;
see e.g. Bryan (1904). Planck’s work extinguished these views, by pointing out that
mixing processes are irreversible even though there is no energy being converted or
degraded.
Because of the enormous historical influence of Planck’s formulation of the second
law I will attempt to analyse his arguments. However, this is not a simple task. The
eleven editions of the Vorlesungen show considerable differences, in particular in the
addition of footnotes. Also, the last English translation (Planck 1945) (of the seventh
German edition of 1922) contains some unfortunate errors. Moreover, from the eighth
edition onwards, Planck replaced his argument with a completely different one. Below,
I will analyse the argument up to the seventh edition, because this is presumably the
41But even the Vorlesungen have not received unanimous acclaim. Truesdell (1968, p. 328) describes
the work as ‘gloomy murk’, Khinchin (1949, p. 142) calls it an ‘aggregate of logical and mathematical
errors superimposed on a general confusion in the definition of the basic quantities’. Still, apart from
a review by Orr (1904) of the first English translation, I do not know of any attempt to analyse the
arguments in this book in some detail.
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most widely known today. In section 10.1, I will consider Planck’s later revision of
the argument. Let us first distinguish the meaning of two concepts that Planck uses.
7.1 Planck’s concept of Umkehrbarheit
We have already noted that the concept of a reversible process was used by Clausius
and Kelvin with very different meanings. In Planck’s work we encounter a passage
which is quite similar to Clausius (1862), cited above on page 29:
Von besonderer theoretische Wichtigkeit sind diejenigen thermodynamischen Pro-
zesse, welche, wie man sagt, unendlich langsam verlaufen, und daher aus lauter
Gleichgewichtszusta¨nden bestehen. Wo¨rtlich genommen ist zwar diese Ausdruck-
sweise undeutlich, da ein Prozeß notwendig Vera¨nderungen, also Sto¨rungen des
Gleichgewichts zur Voraussetzung hat. Aber man kann diese Sto¨rungen, wenn
es nicht auf die Schnelligkeit, sondern nur auf das Resultat der Vera¨nderungen
ankommt, so klein nehmen wie man irgend will, namentlich auch beliebig klein
gegen die u¨brigen Gro¨ßen, welche im Zustand des betrachteten Systems eine
Rolle spielen. [. . . ] Die hohe Bedeutung dieser Betrachtungsweise besteht darin,
daß man jeden “unendlich langsamen” Prozeß auch in entgegengesetzer Rich-
tung ausgefu¨hrt denken kann. Besteht na¨mlich ein Prozeß bis auf minimale
Abweichungen aus lauter Gleichgewichtszusta¨nden, so genu¨gt offenbar immer
eine ebenso minimal passend angebrachte A¨nderung, um ihn in entgegengeset-
zter Richtung ablaufen zu lassen, und diese minimale A¨nderung kann durch einen
Grenzu¨bergang ebenso ganz zum verschwinden gebracht werden. (§71–73)42
Obviously, Planck’s ‘disturbance of equilibrium’ is intended to mean the same thing
as Clausius’ ‘inequality of forces’. In fact, Planck immediately proceeds to call his
infinitely slow processes umkehrbar, just as Clausius had done before. Indeed, this
name turns out to be his favourite and he uses the term ‘infinitely slow’ only rarely.
On a closer reading there is a distinction between the passages from Clausius and
Planck. Consider a container filled with gas and closed by a piston so tight that when
it moves it experiences friction with the walls of the container. When we compress
the gas extremely slowly, the force on the piston must be large enough to overcome
this friction; but reversal of the process is not physically possible under the same
force, because friction always opposes the motion. Such processes are not umkehrbar
according to Clausius, even if they are performed infinitely slowly, in contrast to the
criterion of Planck (and Carnot).
42‘Of particular theoretical importance are those thermodynamical processes which, as one says,
proceed infinitely slowly, and which, therefore, consist purely of equilibrium states. Strictly speaking,
this terminology is unclear, because a process presupposes changes, i.e. disturbances of equilibrium.
But when only the result of the changes matters, and not their speed, one can make these disturbances
as small as one wishes, namely, arbitrarily small compared with the other quantities which play a
role in the state of the considered system. [. . . ] The high significance of this viewpoint is that one
can think of every ‘infinitely slow’ process as being carried out in the opposite direction. Indeed,
if a process consists purely of equilibrium states, then, obviously, a minimal change, appropriately
applied, will suffice to make it proceed in the opposite direction, and this minimal change can also be
made to vanish by a limiting procedure.’
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However, one may wonder whether this distinction was intended by Planck. His
claim that infinitely slow processes can also be performed in the opposite direction
with some suitable minimal adaptions, which can be as small as we wish, suggests
that the example just mentioned would not qualify as ‘infinitely slow’ or umkehrbar.
Another difficult issue is how to judge when deviations of equilibrium are small.
How to compare e.g. a small variation in the temperature of the whole system with a
larger temperature variation in a small part? It is obvious that there are many ways
to quantify the ‘disturbance’ of equilibrium, and we cannot speak of a well-defined
limit by making the disturbances smaller and smaller.43
7.2 Planck’s concept of reversibility
Planck also defines the term reversibel.
Ein Prozeß der auf keine einzige Weise vollsta¨ndig ru¨ckga¨ngig gemacht werden
kann, heißt “irreversibel”, alle andere Prozesse “reversibel”. Damit ein Prozeß ir-
reversibel ist, genugt es nicht, daß er sich nicht von selbst umkehrt, —das ist auch
bei vielen mechanische Prozessen der Fall, die nicht irreversibel sind— sondern
es wird erfordert daß es selbst mit Anwendung alle in der Natur vorhandenen
Reagentien kein Mittel gibt, um, wenn der Prozeß abgelaufen ist, allenthalben
genau den Anfangszustand wiederherzustellen, d.h. die gesamte Natur in den Zu-
stand zuru¨ckzubringen, die sie am Anfang des Prozesses besaß.44 (§112)
‘Reversibel ’ denotes of possibility of undoing processes. It deals with the recoverabil-
ity of the initial state, and is obviously closer to Kelvin’s (1852) ‘reversibility’ than
to Clausius’ ‘Umkehrbarheit ’. The unfortunate fact that the English translation of
Planck’s work (but also that of Clausius (1862)) uses reversible in both cases surely
bears part of the blame for the widespread confusion in the meaning of this term.
The English reader of Planck is faced with a curious text which apparently ventures
to define a term in §112 that has already been used on many previous occasions, but
in a different meaning. In order to keep the distinction between these two concepts,
as well as with previous notions of irreversibility, I will in the sequel denote Planck’s
concept of reversibility by his own phrase ‘reversibel’, and, for ease, treat it and its
conjuncts as if it were an English word. (Thus I will also write ‘(ir)reversibelity’, etc.)
43For example, consider a container, half of which contains gas, the other half being vacuum and
partitioned by a large number n of parallel membranes into tiny empty volumes. If one ruptures the
membranes, one by one, one can let the gas expand in n steps, until it fills the entire container. If
we take n very large, so that at each rupture the gas expands over a tiny volume, and wait between
ruptures until the gas attains equilibrium, there is a sense in which the disturbance from equilibrium
is small at each step. Still it would be undesirable to allow this as an ‘infinitely slow’ process; see
e.g. Callen (1960, p. 99).
44‘A process which can in no way be completely undone is called “irreversible”, all other processes
“reversible”. In order for a process to be irreversible, it is not sufficient that it does not reverse by it
self, —this is also the case for many mechanical processes, which are not irreversible— rather, it is
demanded that, once the process has taken place, there is no means, even by applying all the agencies
available in Nature, of restoring exactly the complete initial state, i.e. to return the totality of Nature
to the state which it had at the start of the process.’
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Three remarks are in order. In the first place, Planck speaks about a complete
recovery of the initial situation in ‘die gesamte Natur’. This does not merely refer to
the initial state of the system. He emphasizes:
Die in dem Worte ‘vollsta¨ndig’ ausgesprochene Bedingung soll nur die sein
daß schließlich u¨berall wieder genau die bekannte Anfangszustand [. . . ]
hergestellt ist wozu auch notwendig geho¨rt daß alle etwa benutzten Mate-
rialien und Apparate am Schluß sich wieder in demselben Zustand befinden
wie am Anfang, als man sie in Benutzung nahm.45 (§109)
Obviously it is no mean feat to restore the initial state everywhere in the ‘totality
of Nature’. Suppose we perform some process on a thermodynamical system. In the
meantime, the Earth rotates, an atom on Sirius emits a photon, etc. Do we have to
be able to undo all of this, before we can say that the process is reversibel? In that
case Planck’s completeness condition would become grotesque. It appears reasonable
to assume that the recovery is complete when we restrict the ‘gesamte Natur’ to all
bodies that have interacted with the system in the original process. That is to say, I
will understand the clause mentioned by Planck (after ‘wozu auch notwendig geho¨rt’
in the above explanation of the completeness condition as not only necessary but also
sufficient.
Secondly, Planck emphasises that the way in which the initial state is restored
may be chosen freely; i.e. it is not necessary that the system retraces every stage of
the original process in reverse order. Any procedure whatsoever that restores the
initial state will do. He says: ‘Was dabei an technischen Hilfsmitteln, Maschinen
mechanischer, thermischer, elektrischer Art verwendet wird, ist ganz gleichgu¨ltig’46
(§109). On many occasions (Planck 1905a, Planck 1948), he emphasised the impor-
tance of this aspect of his concept of irreversibelity. It implies that the statement
that a particular thermodynamical process is irreversibel has consequences, not only
for thermodynamical processes, but for all types of interactions occurring in nature,
including even those not yet discovered. In this respect too the concept ‘reversibel’
differs from ‘umkehrbar ’ !
In the third place, it should be noted that for Planck’s criterion of ‘reversibelity’ it
is necessary that recovery can be obtained with “in der Natur vorhandenen Reagen-
tien”. That we might conceive of a recovery process as in a thought experiment, (i.e. a
process allowed by the theory in some possible world) is not good enough for Planck.
An example (given by Planck himself) of a reversibel process is the motion of a
harmonic oscillator. This system returns after every period to its initial state without
demanding any change occurring anywhere else in nature. The motion is therefore
45‘The condition expressed in the word “completely” will be only this: that eventually the given ini-
tial state [. . . ] is restored everywhere, and this includes necessarily that all materials and apparatuses
employed are returned to the same state as they occupied initially, before they were used.’
46‘Whatever technical resources, apparatuses of a mechanical, thermal, electrical nature are used
here is completely indifferent.’
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reversibel; it is not infinitely slow, because the deviation from equilibrium (rest) is not
negligible.47
As another example, consider a non-periodic mechanical process, say a free particle
in uniform motion through empty space. To bring it back to a previous state, we must
interfere with it, e.g. by means of a collision with another body. This will return the
particle to its original position. Then we must also reverse its velocity, e.g. by a
collision with a third body, to obtain the original mechanical state. But is this a
complete restoration? The answer is not so obvious. The body has gone through
at least two collisions, and thus exchanged momentum with two other bodies in its
environment. In order to realize complete restoration, this exchange must be undone.
One can do this, e.g., by arranging a rigid connection between these two auxiliary
bodies, e.g. they are walls of a rigid box, so that the total momentum exchange
vanishes. Then, the particle simply bounces to and fro periodically, and we have
complete reversibelity.
Planck claims that all mechanical processes are, in fact, reversibel. But it is
not clear to me whether they always comply with Planck’s condition of complete
recoverability, especially if one demands that restoration should be achieved by ‘in
der Natur vorhandenen Reagentien’. It would not seem far-fetched to me, if one
argues that, by Planck’s criterion, the motion of the solar system is irreversibel.
These subtle aspects of Planck’s concept of reversibelity have not always been
noticed. The unfaithful English translation (although sanctioned by the author) surely
contributed to the proliferation of confusion. It is no surprise, therefore, to find Planck
at the end of his life complaining about confusion on the true meaning of reversibelity:
der Fehler, [. . . ] den ich mein ganzes Leben hindurch unermu¨dlich beka¨mpft habe,
ist, wie es scheint nicht auszurotten. Denn bis auf den heutigen Tag begegne ich
statt der obigen Definition der Irreversibilita¨t der folgenden: “Irreversibel ist ein
Prozeß, der nicht in umgekehrter Richtung verlaufen kann.” Das ist nicht ausre-
ichend. Denn von vornherein ist es sehr wohl denkbar, daß ein Prozeß, der nicht
in umgekehrte Richtung verlaufen kann, auf irgendeine Weise sich vollsta¨ndig
ru¨ckga¨ngig machen la¨ßt.48 (Planck 1948, p. 10)
7.3 The second law for ideal gases
In part 3 of his book, Planck sets the aim of demonstrating that the second law
in the form of the principle of increase of entropy follows from Kelvin’s principle.
At this stage he has already announced that this proof “bei dem heutigen Stande
47The harmonic oscillator can be realised as a thermodynamic system e.g. as a cylinder containing
two ideal gases separated by an adiathermal frictionless piston.
48‘the error which I have battled against my entire life with tiring appears to be inextinguishable.
Untill this very day I meet, in stead of the above definition of irreversibility the following: “An
irreversible process is one which cannot proceed in the reverse order.” This is insufficient. Indeed,
it is very well conceivable that a process which cannot proceed in the reverse direction can be fully
undone in some other way.’
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der Forschung nicht leicht sorgfa¨ltig genug gefu¨hrt werden kann, da theils seine All-
gemeingu¨ltigheit noch mehrfach bestritten, theils seine Bedeutung, auch von seinen
Anha¨ngern, noch recht verschieden beurtheilt wird.’49 (§55).
This task is finally taken up in §106–136. For clarity, I have organized the argument
into a number of Lemmas. Consider n moles of ideal gas in a state of equilibrium,
characterized by the temperature T and volume V . Planck defines the entropy of the
gas straight away as a function of these equilibrium states:
S(V, T ) := n(cV log T +R log V +K) (17)
where R is the gas constant and cV is the specific heat capacity at constant volume.
The choice of the constant K is arbitrary, as long as it does not depend on V and T .50
Planck shows
Lemma 1 In every adiabatic umkehrbar process performed on an ideal gas its entropy
S remains constant.
Such a process can be approximated by a succession of equilibrium states, and thus
be represented as a curve in state space (i.e. (T, V )-diagram). For each infinitesimal
element of such a curve one can write dQ = pdV +dU = 0. For an ideal gas one has, by
definition, pV = nRT and U = ncV T . Substitution gives: dQ = n(RT
dV
V + cV dT ) =
TdS = 0, which proves the lemma.
Next, Planck considers a system consisting of N ideal gases in separate containers.
Its state is characterised by the 2N variables: s = (V1, T1, . . . , VNTN ). The total
entropy of such a system is defined as
Stot(s) :=
∑
i
ni(cV i log Ti +R log Vi +Ki). (18)
Planck shows (§121– §123)
Lemma 2 In every adiabatic umkehrbar process performed on a system consisting
of N ideal gases, which are connected by diathermal walls and remain in thermal
equilibrium, the total entropy Stot remains constant.
This lemma is proven as follows: when the gases are connected by diathermal
walls, the condition of thermal equilibrium implies that their temperatures are equal
at each stage of the process: Ti = Tj =: T . In an adiabatic process the gases can
exchange heat only with each other. If the amount of heat absorbed by gas i is dQi,
one has
T
∑
i
dSi =
∑
i
dQi = 0,
which implies that Stot is constant.
Combining the previous Lemmas, he then argues for
49‘cannot easily be demonstrated carefully enough, at the present stage of research, partly because
its general validity is sometimes denied and partly because even its adherents interpret its meaning
very differently.’
50However, K may depend on n and the units used for V and T .
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Lemma 3 Every pair of states s, s′ of a system consisting of N ideal gases in which
the total entropy is the same can be transformed into each other by means of an
adiabatic umkehrbar process.
Proof: let s = (V1, T1, . . . , VN , TN ) and s
′ = (V ′1 , T
′
1 . . . V
′
N , T
′
N ) be two arbitrary states
such that Stot(s) = Stot(s
′). We first assume that each gas is adiabatically isolated
from the others. By umkehrbar expansion or compression, we can change the volumes
V1, . . . , VN to any desired set of values. Since the entropies Si remain constant in such
an expansion or compression, the temperatures change and can also be made to attain
any desired set of (positive) values. In particular, we can perform a series of adiabatic
umkehrbar expansions or compressions until all the temperatures are equal.
Next, one introduces a diathermal connection between the gases, while the whole
system remains adiabatically isolated. Continuing with umkehrbar changes of volume,
the gases will now exchange heat and entropy, while, according to lemma 2 the total
entropy remains constant. Perform such changes of volume until the entropies Si
have attained the values S′i = S(V
′
i , T
′
i ). At that point, one removes the diathermal
contacts, so that each gas becomes adiabatically isolated as before. Finally we change
the volumes again (adiabatically and umkehrbar) until they attain the values V ′i .
Since the entropies S′i are conserved in this stage too (according to lemma 1), both
the volumes and the entropies of all gases are the same as in the state s′. But then this
holds for their temperatures too, and the final state is identical to s′. Thus we have
constructed a series of adiabatic umkehrbar processes starting from s and resulting in
s′.
Up till here the development of the argument has been straightforward. The
only point worth mentioning is that the argument is constructive and relies on the
availability of umkehrbar adiabatic processes by which the volume or the temperature
can be made to attain any value desired. For the ideal gas this assumption is of course
unproblematic, but for more general fluids it is not.
But now Planck argues (§122, 123:)
Lemma 4 All processes considered in Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 are reversibel.
It is here that Planck’s concept of reversibelity enters into the argument. It is also
here that the argument becomes liable to confusion and misunderstanding. Planck’s
argument for this Lemma is exceedingly brief. Considering the processes of Lemma 2
(with N = 2) he writes:
Ein jeder derartiger mit den beiden Gasen ausgefu¨hrter Prozeß ist offenbar in
allen Theilen reversibel, da er direkt in umgekehrter Richting ausgefu¨hrt werden
kann, ohne in anderen Ko¨rpern irchendwelche Vera¨nderungen zu hinterlassen.51
(§122)
51 ‘Every process of this kind performed on the two gases is obviously in all parts reversibel, because
it can be performed directly in the opposite direction without leaving any changes in other bodies.’
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The claim that such processes are ‘directly’ and ‘in all parts’ reversibel obviously relies
on the claim that every ‘infinitely slow’ process can be performed in the opposite
direction after some minimal suitable adaptions. But in order to qualify the process
as reversibel, one needs a complete restoration of the initial state of the system as
well as its environment. Planck’s claim that the considered processes do not leave any
changes in other bodies is somewhat rash, because the argument up till now did not
pay any attention to the environment of the system.
Perhaps worries about the environment of the system are most easily expressed
by formally assigning a state to the environment. We can then denote the complete
situation with a pair of states and represent a process by a transformation (change of
state)
〈s, Z〉
P
−→ 〈s′, Z ′〉, (19)
where s is the thermodynamical state of the system, and Z the formal state of the
(relevant part of) the environment. A process P is then reversibel just in case there
exists a process P ′ which produces the transformation:
〈s′, Z ′〉
P ′
−→ 〈s, Z〉. (20)
Apparently, Planck assumed that the processes considered in the previous Lemmas
simply do not require any changes outside of the system.52 That is, one can put
Z = Z ′ in (19) and (20). In that case, Lemma 4 would be an immediate consequence
of the symmetry of Lemma 3 under the interchange of s and s′.
However, the assumption is false. The point is, of course, that an adiabatic
umkehrbar change of volume involves work, and therefore an exchange of energy with
the environment. Something or somebody has exchanged mechanical energy with the
system and in order to call the process reversibel there must be a restoration process
which returns that energy to its previous owner.
According to Orr (1904), it was Ogg, the translator of the first edition into English,
who pointed this objection out to Planck. In response, Planck included a couple of
footnotes in the second edition in which the matter is discussed further. Appended to
the phrase ‘ohne in anderen Ko¨rpern irchendwelche Vera¨nderungen zu hinterlassen’53
of §122 quoted above, he adds the footnote:
Hier ist das Wort “in” zu beachten. Lagena¨nderungen starrer Ko¨rper (z.B.
Hebung oder Senkung von Gewichten) sind keine inneren A¨nderungen; wohl aber
der Temperatur und der Dichte.54 (Planck 1905b, p. 89)
and when the phrase reappears one page later in the same paragraph we read the
footnote:
52It is clearly Planck’s intention to consider such interventions as the establishing or breaking of a
diathermal connection as operations requiring no or negligible effects on the environment.
53‘without leaving any changes in other bodies’
54‘Here the word ‘in’ must be emphasised. Changes of place of rigid bodies (e.g. the raising or
lowering of weights) are not internal changes; in contrast to changes of temperature or density.’
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‘Denn die Leistung der erforderlichen mechanischen Arbeiten kann durch Heben
oder Senkung von unvera¨nderlichen Gewichten erfolgen, bedingt also keine innere
Vera¨nderung.55
(In later editions the exact phrasing of these footnotes is altered, but their essential
content remains the same.) Clearly then, Planck’s strategy for avoiding the problem
is to assume that any exchange of work is done by means of weights, and that lifting
or lowering weights is not a relevant change in the environment because it is not
‘internal’.
I want to make three remarks about this manoeuvre. First, it does not completely
save Lemma 4, because the assumption is obviously special. One can also obtain work
by means of an electrical battery, by a combustion engine, by muscle, etc. In all these
cases the reversibelity of the process is at least doubtful. Thus, the claim that every
adiabatic umkehrbar process in a system of ideal gases is reversibel is not proven.
Secondly, coupling a thermodynamical system to a weight obviously requires the
presence of a gravitational field. This is often regarded as undesirable in thermody-
namics.56 For this reason, Giles (1964) proposed to replace the weight by a flywheel,
as an alternative mechanical ‘work reservoir’. Of course, one may wonder whether a
change of angular velocity of a flywheel would be considered by Planck as an ‘internal’
change or not.
But the most important remark is that the way out of the objection chosen
by Planck seems completely at odds with what he had written before. Just a few
pages earlier, in his explanation of the completeness requirement in his concept of re-
versibelity, Planck had explicitly discussed a process where work is done on a system
by means of descending weights and heat is exchanged with a reservoir. To call that
process reversibel, we need to achieve the following conditions:
so mu¨ßte, damit der Prozeß vollsta¨ndig ru¨ckga¨ngig wird, dem Reservoir die emp-
fangene Wa¨rme wieder entzogen und ferner das Gewicht auf seine urspru¨ngliche
Ho¨he gebracht werden, ohne daß anderweitige Vera¨nderungen zuru¨ckbleiben57
(§ 110, emphasis added).
If we now decide that lowering or raising of a weight is not really a relevant change of
state at all, it seems puzzling, to say the least, why one should insist that it is undone
in a recovery process.
This leaves two options. Either one understands Planck’s footnotes as intending
that any discussion of changes of bodies in the environment, including the explanation
of the concept of reversibelity, is to be understood as restricted to internal changes
555 ‘Since the mechanical work needed here can be obtained by the raising or lowering of inalterable
weights, this does not presuppose any internal changes.’
56An obvious problem is that an ideal gas in a gravitational field is no longer homogeneous with
respect to pressure and density, and therefore, strictly speaking, not a fluid. Some thermodynamicists
even argue that the notion of adiabatic isolation is applicable only when gravity is excluded (Pippard
1966, p. 5).
57‘in order for the process to become completely undone, the reservoir should give back the heat it
received and the weight should be returned to its original heigth.’
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This would mean that one no longer requires the restoration of work done on or by the
system. This interpretation of Planck’s intention was adopted by Orr, who accused
Planck of effectively using a different definition than the one he had stated:
It appears, then, that the enunciation of the propositions should be amended
by changing the phrase “without leaving changes in other bodies” into “without
interchanging heat with other bodies”, and that there should be a correspond-
ing change in the definition of “reversibility”. The definition which is used by
Planck appears in fact to be this, that a process is reversible (“reversibel”) if it is
possible to pass the system back from the final state to the initial state without
interchanging heat with external bodies (Orr, 1904, p. 511).
However, Planck’s reply (1905a) makes clear that he rejected this reading of his work.
The other option is that one sticks to Planck’s original definition of reversibelity,
but allows for an exception in the formulation of the Lemmas, whenever the phrase
‘ohne zuru¨ckbleibende A¨nderungen in anderen Ko¨rpern’ or similar words appear. I
will choose this second option, but for clarity, will insert the exception explicitly in
the formulation. Instead of ‘without leaving changes in other bodies’ I will speak of
processes which leave no changes in other bodies except the possible displacement of
a weight.
In order to bring this out in the notation, I will add the height of the weight to
the total state. Thus the state of the environment is from now on specified by the
pair 〈Z, h〉. A process P can then be represented as a transition
〈s, Z, h〉
P
−→ 〈s′, Z ′, h′〉, (21)
and P is reversibel just in case there is another process P ′ such that:
〈s′, Z ′, h′〉
P ′
−→ 〈s, Z, h〉. (22)
Thus I read Planck as establishing the lemma:
Lemma 4
′ All processes considered in Lemma 1, 2 and 3 which do not leave any
changes in other bodies except the displacement of a weight are reversibel.
This lemma follows from the assumption that these processes do not leave any changes
in other bodies except the displacement of a weight, i.e. they are of the form
〈s, Z, h〉
P
−→ 〈s′, Z, h′〉, (23)
and, as shown by Lemma 1 and 2, they obey
S(s) = S(s′).
The existence of a restoration process P ′ with
〈s′, Z, h′〉
P ′
−→ 〈s, Z, h〉
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is now no longer trivial on grounds of the symmetry of the premise in lemma 3.
(This only entails the existence of a process with 〈s, Z, h′′〉 as final state.) But the
proposition is still true due to the conservation of energy. That is, every process
which restores the original energy to the system must also bring back the weight to its
previous position. Note however, that it is crucial here that the energy is delivered by
a single weight. When two or more weights are employed, or more generally, if their
are more mechanical degrees of freedom in the environment than conservation laws,
this argument fails.
Planck concludes this stage of his argument with:
Lemma 5 Every pair of states of a system consisting of N ideal gases in which the
total entropy is the same can be transformed into each other by a reversibel process,
without leaving any change in the environment, except the displacement of a weight.
This conclusion follows by application of Lemma 3. Indeed, that Lemma showed that
every two states of equal entropy can be transformed into each other by means of a
umkehrbar adiabatic process. When this process is assumed to be of the form (23),
Lemma 4′ shows it is reversibel.
Planck now (§118 and 124) appeals to Kelvin’s principle for the next step in the
argument:
Lemma 6 Adiabatic expansion of an ideal gas without performance of work is an
irreversibel process.
Adiabatic expansion without performance of work is a process in which T is constant
and V increases. One can think of a gas expanding into a vacuum after a partition
has been removed in a two-chamber container. The process proceeds without requiring
any change in the environment.
The lemma is arrived at by a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose the process were
reversibel. Then there is a process in which the expanded gas is driven back into
its initial volume, which similarly proceeds without producing any changes in the
environment. Planck argues that by means of this process one could construct a
perpetuum mobile of the second kind.
Let us represent the adiabatic expansion process without performance of work by
〈si, Z, h〉
P
−→ 〈sf , Z, h〉
where si = (T0, V0), sf = (T0, V1) and V1 > V0, and we have assumed that 〈Zi, hi〉 =
〈Zf , hf 〉 = 〈Z, h〉, i.e. the expansion occurs without any changes in the environment.
Let the hypothesis be that this process is reversibel. Then there is another process P ′
which produces the transition:
〈sf , Z, h〉
P ′
−→ 〈si, Z, h〉. (24)
The combination of these two gives rise to a cycle:
〈si, Z, h〉
P
−→ 〈sf , Z, h〉
P ′
−→ 〈si, Z, h〉
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which establishes complete recovery. But this, of course, is not yet a perpetuum mobile.
Planck’s argument is therefore more subtle. He assumes that the same hypothetical
recovery process (24) can also be combined with another process, Pˆ in which the gas
expands isothermally with performance of work and simultaneous heat transfer. This
is a process in another environment, in which the gas is not adiabatically isolated but
rather in thermal contact with a heat reservoir. Let the transition in this process be:
〈si, Zˆi, hˆi〉
Pˆ
−→ 〈sf , Zˆf , hˆf 〉. (25)
The final state of the environment 〈Zˆf , hˆf 〉 differs from 〈Zˆi, hˆi〉 because the system
has absorbed heat from a heat reservoir and has done work by raising the weight.
In order to combine the process (25) with the hypothetical process (24) into a cycle,
the final state of process (25) must be equal to the initial state of (24). We should
therefore assume that Zˆf = Z and hˆf = h. In that case, performing the processes
(25) and (24) one after another yields
〈si, Zˆi, hˆi〉
Pˆ
−→ 〈sf , Zˆf , hˆf 〉 = 〈sf , Z, h〉
P ′
−→ 〈si, Z, hˆf 〉 = 〈si, Zˆf , hˆf 〉
and we have indeed constructed a perpetuum mobile of the second kind: the system
undergoes a cycle and the only effect on the environment is conversion of heat into
work. Thus, we see that a crucial assumption in the argument is that states of the
system and environment can be chosen independently.
Planck argues next (§126) that:
Lemma 7 Every process in a system of gases in which entropy increases and which
does not leave any changes in the environment other than the displacement of a weight
is irreversibel. In other words, there is no process in which the entropy of a system
of ideal gases is decreased without leaving any changes in the environment other than
the displacement of a weight.
The argument again proceeds by a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose there were two
states s and s′ of the system which could be joined by a process obeying the mentioned
conditions. Thus, suppose there exists a process
〈s, Z, h〉
P ′
−→ 〈s′, Z, h′〉 with S(s′) < S(s).
Let now s′′ be a third state of the system which differs from s only in the sense that
one single gas has a smaller volume, and which has the same total entropy as s′. That
is, if the state s of the system is:
s = (V1, T1, V2, T2, , . . . , VN , TN ),
the state s′′ has the form, say,
s′′ = (V ′′1 , T1, V2, V2 . . . , VN , TN ),
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where
V ′′1 = V1 exp
Stot(s′)−Stot(s))/(n1R),
so that Stot(s
′′) = Stot(s). According to Lemma 3, there is an adiabatic umkehrbar
process which connects s′ and s′′:
〈s′, Z, h′〉
Q
−→ 〈s′′, Z, h′′〉.
Performing P ′ and Q in succession yields a process
〈s, Z, h〉 −→ 〈s′′, Z, h′′〉
in which the only changes are that a single ideal gas has reduced its volume and a
weight has been displaced. Since the energy of an ideal gas is independent of its
volume, one concludes U(s) = U(s′′) so that by energy conservation one has also
h = h′′. This would be a process that brings about the complete recovery of the
adiabatic expansion of an ideal gas without performance of work. The impossibility
of this process has already been demonstrated by Lemma 6.
His conclusion is now that equality of entropy is not only a sufficient but also a
necessary condition for the reversibelity of a process if it proceeds without leaving
changes in other bodies, except for the possible displacement of a weight.
7.4 The second law for arbitrary systems
The above argument has still only yielded a formulation of the entropy principle
for the ideal gas, whose entropy was introduced by a conventional definition. The
question is then of course how to proceed for other systems. Planck considers an
arbitrary homogeneous system for which the thermodynamical state is determined by
two variables (say temperature and volume). Such a system is often called a fluid. By
exchange of work and heat, the system can undergo cyclic processes, either reversibelly
or irreversibelly. Planck assumes that the heat exchange is obtained by means of ideal
gases, which act as heat reservoirs. (He does not consider the exchange of work, but
it is probably easiest to assume that it is again obtained by means of an auxiliary
weight.) The relevant environment then consists, apart from the weight, only of ideal
gases, and this allows us, by means of definition (17) to speak about the entropy of
the environment.
At the end of the cyclic process the fluid has returned to its initial state; but the
states of the heat reservoirs have changed: at least one of them has absorbed heat
and another one has lost heat. If dQ is the amount of heat absorbed by the system
during an infinitesimal element of the cycle from the heat reservoir with temperature
T one has: ∮
dQ
T
≤ 0
In particular, if there are only two heat reservoirs involved, heat must have flown from
the hotter to the colder gas.
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If the cycle is umkehrbar the special case
∮
dQ
T
= 0
obtains. This implies that dQ/T is an exact differential, which we may call dS. We
can express this differential in the state variables of the fluid. Since the umkehrbar
process obeys dQ = dU + pdV , one obtains:
dS = (dU + pdV )/T (26)
The function S(T, V ) cannot be written explicitly, if the equation of state for the fluid
(or rather: the equations expressing U and p as functions of V and T ) is unknown.
But —and this is the main point according to Planck— one can still conclude that
for arbitrary fluids there exists some function S with properties analogous to (17) for
the ideal gas, which enable us to repeat the proof of the previous Lemmas.58 He is
satisfied with stating the result:
Es ist auf keinerlei Weise mo¨glich die Entropie eines System von Ko¨rpern
zu verkleinern, ohne daß in andere Ko¨rpern Aenderungen zuru¨ckbleiben.59
(§132)
This last clause about other bodies is simply lifted by including these other bodies in
the system. The conclusion is then:
The Entropy Principle (Planck’s version) Jeder in der Natur stattfind-
ende physikalische und chemische Prozeß verla¨uft in der Art, daß die Summe der
Entropieen sa¨mtlicher an dem Prozeß irgendwie betheiligten Ko¨rper vergro¨ßert
wird. Im Grenzfall, fu¨r reversible Prozesse, bleibt jene Summe ungea¨ndert. Dies
ist der allgemeinste Ausdruck des zweiten Hauptsatzes der Wa¨rmetheorie. (§132)
[. . . Es] ist hier ausdru¨cklich zu betonen daß die hier gegebene Form [des zweiten
Hauptsatzes] unter allen die einzige ist, welche sich ohne jede Beschra¨nkung fu¨r
jeden beliebige endlichen Prozeß aussprechen la¨ßt, und daß es daher fu¨r die Ir-
reversibilita¨t eines Prozesses kein anderes allgemeines Maass gibt als den Betrag
der eingetretenen Vermehrung der Entropie.60 ( §134)
58Obviously, to extend the proof of Lemma 3 to an arbitrary fluid, one needs to assume that an
ample choice of adiabatic umkehrbar processes is available by which one can change its volume from
any given value to any other desired value. This is not self-evident. This tacit assumption is brought
out explicitly in the formulation of Carathe´odory (see section 9).
59‘It is in no way possible to decrease the entropy of a system of bodies, without leaving changes
in other bodies.’
60‘Every physical or chemical process occurring in nature proceeds in such a way that the sum of
the entropies of all bodies which participate in any way in the process is increased. In the limiting
case, for reversibel processes, this sum remains unchanged. This is the most general expression of
the second law of thermodynamics.. . . [It] must be explicitly emphasised that the formulation [of the
second law] given here is the only one of them all which can be stated without any restriction, and
that, therefore, there is no other general measure for the irreversibelity of a process than the amount
of increase of entropy.’
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Shortly thereafter (§136) Planck raises the question whether there are any restrictions
to the validity of the second law. In principle, he recognises two possible restric-
tions. Either the starting point of his argument could turn out to be false. That
is, a perpetuum mobile of the second kind can be realised after all. Or else, there
might be a logical defect in his argumentation. Planck dismisses this last possibility
light-heartedly. It ‘erweist sich bei na¨herer Untersuchung als unstichhaltig’.61 On
the former option only experience can give the final answer. But Planck is full of
confidence. He predicts that future metaphysicians will assign the entropy principle
a status even higher than empirical facts, and recognise it as an a priori truth. The
quotation from Eddington in section 2 confirms that Planck was right about that.
7.5 Evaluation
Let us summarise the weak and strong aspects of Planck’s argument. A good point is
that Planck, by assuming that the heat reservoirs in the environment of the system
consist of ideal gases allows for an explicit thermodynamical description of their state.
Thus, in contrast to previous approaches, it is now possible to conclude that, at least
in this case, if a system performs an unumkehrbar cycle, the entropy of its environment
increases.
Less good aspects are the following. When he wants to show that one can assign an
entropy to arbitrary systems, Planck restricts his discussion to ‘beliebige homogene
Ko¨rper von der Art wie wir in §67 ff. betrachtet haben’62 (§128). The text in §67
makes clear that this refers to fluids. In the course of the argument, this restriction
is never mentioned again. He simply refers to these systems as ‘Ko¨rper ’. But fluids
are not to be confused with the arbitrary bodies mentioned in the recurring phrase
about ‘zuru¨ckbleibende A¨nderungen in anderen Ko¨rpern’63. These other bodies in
the environment include heat reservoirs, rigid bodies like stirrers and pistons, weights,
and ‘technische Hilfsmittel, Maschinen mechanischer, thermischer, elektrischer Art’64
and maybe living creatures.
The step of regarding all such bodies in the environment simply as parts of the
thermodynamical system, —without considering the question how their entropy is to
be defined— does not appear very plausible: when these bodies are more complex
than a fluid, or if they are not in equilibrium or if their environment is more complex
than a system of ideal gases, their entropy still remains undefined.65
Another objection is that Planck’s general formulation of the second law states
61It ‘turns out, after closer examination, to be untenable’.
62‘arbitrary bodies of the kind we considered in §67 and further.’
63‘remaining changes in other bodies’
64‘technical devices, apparatuses of mechanical, thermal, electrical nature’
65Planck emphasises that the attribution of entropy is not restricted to systems in equilibrium. But
concrete applications of such a non-equilibrium entropy remain restricted to the remark that as long
as a system is locally in equilibrium its total entropy can be identified with a sum or integral of local
entropies. But this is a meager harvest. For this application one still needs recourse to equilibrium
states. For systems far from equilibrium this approach does not work.
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that the law is valid for arbitrary physical and chemical processes. This is surprising.
Only one page earlier Planck (rightly) emphasised that the expression (26) for entropy
could not be applied to chemical processes: ‘Denn von A¨nderungen dieser Art [i.e.
changes of mass or chemical composition] ist bei der Definition der Entropie nicht die
Rede gewesen (§131).’66 Indeed, the entropy function (17) is defined up to a constant
which may depend on the chemical nature of the substance. How this restriction can
suddenly be lifted remains unclear.67
In my opinion, Planck’s argumentation allows no more general conclusion than the
following statement.
For any system consisting of fluids which are capable of exchanging work with the
environment by means of single mechanical coupling (a weight) and which can
be placed at will in a heat bath or in adiabatic isolation: if irreversibel processes
take place in the system whose final result is only a change of volumes and/or
temperatures of the system, leaving no changes in auxiliary systems other than
the displacement of the weight, its entropy increases. And conversely, if entropy
increases during such a process, it is irreversibel.
There is no argument that all natural processes are of this kind. Examples mentioned
by Planck such as mechanical friction are already outside this category.
Yet, there is another remarkable aspect of Planck’s result worth mentioning. His
version of the entropy principle is not restricted to adiabatically isolated systems, as
in Clausius’ version. Instead, it applies to all processes performed by a system which
proceed under the condition that all auxiliary systems in the environment which are
employed during the process return to their initial state, with the possible exception
of a single weight.
In one sense, this condition is much more general than the condition of adiabatic
isolation, because it allows for heat exchange between the system and its environment.
In another sense, it is more restricted, because processes in adiabatic isolation may
very well proceed by interaction with auxiliary systems which do not return to their
initial state. We shall see in a later section how Lieb and Yngvason adopted Planck’s
condition to devise a new definition of the term ”adiabatic”
Conclusion: the goal of Planck’s approach is to take the phenomenon of irre-
versibility of natural processes as the essential element of the second law. But his
claim to have derived a formulation of universal generality cannot withstand scrutiny.
Besides, this emphasis on irreversibelity and the universal validity of the second law
actually remains sterile in Planck’s own work. The final part of his book, which is
devoted to applications of the second law, only discusses equilibrium problems.
66‘Because changes of this kind were not considered in the definition of entropy’.
67In the seventh and later editions of the Vorlesungen this problem is avoided by simply dropping
the reservation about chemical processes!
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8 Gibbs
The work of Gibbs in thermodynamics (written in the years 1873-1878) is very differ-
ent from that of his European colleagues. Where Clausius, Kelvin and Planck were
primarily concerned with processes, Gibbs concentrates his efforts on a description of
equilibrium states. He assumes that these states are completely characterised by a
finite number of state variables like temperature, energy, pressure, volume, entropy,
chemical potentials etc. He makes no effort to prove the existence or uniqueness of
these quantities from empirical principles.
Gibbs proposes:
The Principle of Gibbs: For the equilibrium of any isolated system it is
necessary and sufficient that in all possible variations of the state of the system
which do not alter its energy, the variation of its entropy shall either vanish or be
negative. (Gibbs 1906, p.56)
He writes this necessary and sufficient condition as:
(δS)U ≤ 0
Actually, Gibbs did not claim that this statement presents a formulation of the
second law. But, intuitively speaking, the Gibbs principle, often referred to as principle
of maximal entropy, does suggest a strong association with the second law. Gibbs
corroborates this suggestion by placing Clausius’ famous words (‘Die Entropie der
Welt strebt ein Maximum zu’) as a slogan above his article. Indeed, many later
authors do regard the Gibbs principle as a formulation of the second law.
Gibbs claims that his principle can be seen as ‘an inference naturally suggested
by the general increase of entropy which accompanies the changes occurring in any
isolated material system’. He gives a rather obscure argument for this inference.68 But
68His argument that the principle is a sufficient condition for equilibrium contains the following
passage:
Let us suppose [. . . ] that a system may have the greatest entropy consistent with
its energy without being in equilibrium. In such a case, changes in the state of the
system must take place, but these will necessarily be such that the energy and entropy
will remain unchanged and the system will continue to satisfy the same condition, as
initially, of having the greatest entropy consistent with its energy. Let us consider the
change which takes place in any time so short that the change may be regarded as
uniform in nature throughout that time. [. . . ] Now no change whatever in the state of
the system, which does not alter the value of the energy, and which commences with
the same state in which the system was supposed at the commencement of the short
time considered, will cause an increase in entropy. Hence, it will generally be possible
by some slight variation in the circumstances of the case to make all changes in the
state of the system like or nearly like that which is supposed to actually occur, and not
involving a change of energy, to involve a necessary decrease of entropy, which would
render the change impossible.
His argument that the condition (or actually the equivalent condition (δU)S ≥ 0) is necessary reads:
whenever an isolated system remains without change, if there is any infinitesimal vari-
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fortunately there is no need for us to fret about the exact meaning of his words, as
we did in the case of Planck. His approach has been followed by many later authors,
e.g.˙ (Maxwell 1876, van der Waals and Kohnstamm 1927, Callen 1960, Buchdahl
1966). We can follow the lead of these Gibbsians and Truesdell (1986) about how the
principle is to be understood.
The first point to note is that in this view the principle of Gibbs is not literally
to be seen as a criterion for equilibrium. Indeed, this would make little sense because
all states characterisable by the state variables are equilibrium states. Rather, it
is to be understood as a criterion for stable equilibrium. Second, the principle is
interpreted as a variational principle, analogous to other variational principles known
in physics such as the principle of least action, the principle of virtual work, etc. Here,
a ‘variation’ is to be understood as a comparison between two conceivable models or
possible worlds (i.e. states or processes). The variations are virtual. That is to say,
one should not think of them as (part of) a process that proceeds in the course of
time in one particular world. Instead, the variational principle serves to decide which
of these possible worlds is physically admissible.
In the case of the principle of least action the compared worlds are mechanical
processes, and ‘admissible’ means: ‘obeying the equations of motion”. (The circum-
stance that the worlds are here themselves processes of course immediate blocks the
idea that variations could be considered as processes too.) In the principle of virtual
work, one considers mechanical states, and ‘admissible’ means: ‘being in mechanical
equilibrium’. In the case of Gibbs, similarly, the possible worlds are equilibrium states
of a thermodynamical system, and ‘admissible’ means stable equilibrium.
According to this view, the principle of Gibbs tells us when a conceivable equilib-
rium state is stable. Such a proposition obviously has a modest scope. In the first
place, Gibbs’ principle is more restricted than previous statements of the second law
in the sense that it applies to systems which are isolated (i.e. no energy exchange is
allowed) and not merely adiabatically isolated. But more importantly, of course, it
contains no information about evolutions in the course of time; and a direction of
natural processes, or a tendency towards increasing entropy, cannot be obtained from
it.69
To be sure, there is a long tradition in physics of regarding variational principles
ation in its state which would diminish its energy [. . . ] without altering the entropy
[. . . ] this variation involves changes in the system which are prevented by its passive
forces or analogous resistances to change. Now as the described variation in the state
of the system diminishes its energy without altering its entropy, it must be regarded as
theoretically possible to produce that variation by some process, perhaps a very indirect
one, so as to favor the variation in question and equilibrium cannot subsist unless the
variation is prevented by passive forces (Gibbs 1906, p. 59–61).
69Another argument for the same conclusion is that Gibbs proposes another formulation of his
principle, which he claims to be equivalent. This is the principle of minimal energy, saying that in
every variation which leaves the entropy of the system unaltered, the variation of energy should be
positive or vanish: (δU)S ≥ 0. Does this express a tendency in Nature towards decrease of energy?
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as expressing a tendency or preference, or even purpose, in Nature; see Yourgrau
and Mandelstam (1955). For example, the principle of least action has often been
explained as a preference for efficiency. But even so it would be a mistake to interpret
this as a statement about evolution in the course of time. The principle of least action
does not say that mechanical processes tends to loose ‘action’ during their course.
Similarly, the principle of maximal entropy is no basis for the idea that entropy will
increase as time goes by.
In fact, a description of processes is simply not available in the approach of Gibbs.
Indeed, the resulting theory is sometimes called thermostatics (Van der Waals and
Kohnstamm, 1927). Obviously, there are no implications for the arrow of time in the
second law as formulated by Gibbs.
Of course this view is not completely coincident with Gibbs’ own statements. In
some passages he clearly thinks of variations not as virtual but as actual processes
within a single world, as in the quotation in footnote 68: ‘it must be regarded as
generally possible to produce that variation by some process’. Some sort of connection
between virtual variations and actual processes is of course indispensable if one wants
to maintain the idea that this principle has implications for time evolutions.
Probably the most elaborate attempt to provide such a connection is the pre-
sentation by Callen (1960). Here, it is assumed that, apart from its actual state, a
thermodynamic system is characterised by a number of constraints, determined by a
macroscopic experimental context. These constraints single out a particular subset
C of Γ, consisting of states which are consistent with the constraints. It is postu-
lated that in stable equilibrium, the entropy is maximal over all states allowed by the
constraints.
A process is then conceived of as being triggered by the cancellation of one or
more of these constraints. Examples are the mixing or expansion of gases after the
removal of a partition, loosening a previously fixed piston, etc. It is assumed that
such a process sets in spontaneously, after the removal of a constraint.
Now, clearly, the set of possible states is always enlarged by the removal of a
constraint. Hence, if we assume that the final state of this process is again a stable
equilibrium state, and thus characterised by a maximum value for the entropy among
all states consistent with the remaining constraints, one concludes that every process
ends in a state of higher (or at best equal) entropy.
I will not attempt to dissect the conceptual problems that this view brings along,
except for three remarks. First, the idea of extending the description of a thermody-
namical system in such a way that, apart from its state, it is also characterised by a
constraint brings many conceptual problems. For if the actual state is s, it is hard to
see how the class of other states contained in the same constraint set C is relevant to
the system. It seems that on this approach the state of a system does not provide a
complete description of its thermodynamical properties.
Second, the picture emerging from Callen’s approach is somewhat anthropomor-
phic. For example he writes, for the case that there are no constraints, i.e. C = Γ,
that ‘the system is free to select any one of a number of states’ (1960, p. 27). This
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sounds as if the system is somehow able to ‘probe’ the set C and chooses its own state
from the options allowed by the constraints.
Third, the established result that entropy increases in a process from one equilib-
rium state to another, depends rather crucially on the assumption that processes can
be successfully modeled as the removal of constraints. But, clearly, this assumption
does not apply to all natural processes. For instance, one can also trigger a process by
imposing additional constraints. Hence, this approach does not attain the universal
validity of the entropy principle, as in Planck’s approach.
9 Carathe´odory
Constantin Carathe´odory was the first mathematician to work on thermodynamics
and to pursue its rigorous formalisation. For this purpose he developed a new version
of the second law in 1909. Apparently, he had no revolutionary intentions in doing so.
He emphasised that his purpose was merely to elucidate the mathematical structure of
the theory, but that the physical content of his version of the second law was intimately
related to the formulation by Planck. However, as we shall see, his contribution was
not received with a warm welcome, especially not by Planck.
Before I consider this in more detail, I want to mention some further merits of
Carathe´odory’s work. In the first place, he is the first to introduce the concept of
‘empirical temperature’, before the treatment of the first and second law. The em-
pirical principle he proposed for this purpose was later baptised as the zeroth law of
thermodynamics (by Fowler). Also, Carathe´odory’s introduction of the first law is
superior to the flawed version by Planck (cf. footnote 3). Most modern textbooks use
his formulation of these two laws, often without mentioning his name. However, I will
not discuss these aspects of his work.
Carathe´odory follows Gibbs in the idea that thermodynamics should be construed
as a theory of equilibrium states rather than (cyclic) processes. A thermodynamical
system is described by a space Γ consisting of its possible states, which are represented
by n state variables. It is assumed that this state space can be represented as a (subset
of an) n-dimensional manifold in which these thermodynamic state variables serve as
coordinates. Carathe´odory assumes that the state space is equipped with the standard
Euclidean topology. However, metrical properties of the space do not play a role in the
theory. For example, it makes no sense to ask whether coordinate axes are orthogonal.
Further, there is no preference for a particular system of coordinates.70
However the coordinates are not completely arbitrary. Carathe´odory distinguishes
between ‘thermal coordinates’ and ‘deformation coordinates’. (In typical applications,
70Some authors (Thomsen and Hartka 1962), (Truesdell 1986, p. 118) raise the objection that Cara-
the´odory’s formulation would demand the use of pressure and volume as coordinates for the state of
a fluid. These are not always suitable. For example, water of about 4oC possesses physically distinct
states with the same values of (p, V ). It is true that, at the beginning of his paper, Carathe´odory
chooses this pair of coordinates to represent the state of a system, but, as far as I can see, this is not
essential to the theory. In fact he explicitly extends his treatment to general coordinates.
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temperature or energy are thermal coordinates, whereas volumes of the components
of the system are deformation coordinates.) The state of a thermodynamic system
is specified by both types of coordinates; the ‘shape’ (Gestalt) of the system by the
deformation coordinates alone.
Although he does not mention this explicitly, it seems to be assumed that the
deformation coordinates remain meaningful in the description of the system when the
system is not in equilibrium, whereas the thermal coordinates are generally defined
only for equilibrium states. In any case, it is assumed that one can obtain every
desired final shape from every initial state by means of an adiabatic process.
The idea is now to develop the theory in such a way that the second law provides
a characteristic mathematical structure of state space. The fundamental concept is a
relation between pairs (s, t) of states that represents whether t can be reached from
s in an adiabatic process.71 This relation is called adiabatic accessibility, and I will
denote it, following Lieb and Yngvason (1999), by s1 ≺ s2. This notation of course
suggests that the relation has the properties of some kind of ordering. And indeed,
given its intended physical interpretation, such an assumption would be very natural.
But Carathe´odory does not state or rely on this assumption anywhere in his paper.
In order to introduce the second law, Carathe´odory starts from an empirical claim:
from an arbitrary given initial state it is not possible to reach every final state by
means of adiabatic processes. Moreover, such inaccessible final states can be found
in every neighbourhood of the initial state. However, he immediately rejects this
preliminary formulation, because it fails to take into account the finite precision of
physical experiments. Therefore, he strengthens the claim by the idea that there must
be a small region surrounding the inaccessible state, consisting of points which are
also inaccessible.
The second law thus receives the following formulation:
The Principle of Carathe´odory: In every open neighborhood Us ⊂ Γ of an
arbitrarily chosen state s there are states t such that for some open neighborhood
Ut of t: all states r within Ut cannot be reached adiabatically from s. Formally:
∀s ∈ Γ ∀Us ∃t ∈ Us & ∃Ut ⊂ Us ∀r ∈ Ut : s ≺6 r, (27)
where Us and Ut denote open neighborhoods of s and t.
He then specialises his discussion to so-called ‘simple systems’, obeying four addi-
tional conditions. In the first place, it is demanded that the system has only a single
71A characteristic (but for our purpose not very important) aspect of the approach is that Carathe´o-
dory wishes to avoid the concept of ‘heat’ as a primitive term. Therefore he gives a more cumbersome
definition of the term ‘adiabatic process’. He calls a container adiabatic if the system contained in
it remains in equilibrium, regardless of what occurs in the environment, as long as the container is
not moved nor changes its shape. Thus, the only way of inducing a process in a system contained
in an adiabatic vessel is by deformation of the walls of the vessel. Examples of such deformation
are compression or expansion and also stirring (the stirrer is also part of the walls). Next, a process
is called adiabatic if it takes place while the system is adiabatically isolated, i.e. contained in an
adiabatic container.
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independent thermal coordinate. Physically speaking, this means that the system has
no internal adiabatically separated subsystems since in that case it would have parts
with two or more independent temperatures. For a simple system the state can thus
be represented with coordinates s = (x0, . . . , xn−1), where x0 is, by convention, the
thermal coordinate.
Secondly, it is demanded that for any given pair of an initial state and final shape
of the system there is more than one adiabatic process P that connects them, differing
in the amount of work done on the system during the process. For example, for a gas
initially in any given state one can obtain an arbitrary final value for its volume by
adiabatic expansion or compression. This change of volume can proceed very slowly
or very fast, and these two procedures indeed differ in the amount of work done. This
assumption can also be found in the argument by Planck (see page 46).
The third demand is that the amounts of work done in the processes just mentioned
form a connected interval. In other words, if for a given initial state and final shape
there are adiabatic processes P1,P2 connecting them, which deliver the work W (P1)
and W (P2) respectively, then there are also adiabatic processes P with any value of
W (P), for W (P1) ≤W (P) ≤W (P2).
In order to formulate the fourth demand Carathe´odory considers a more special
kind of adiabatic process. He argues that one can perform a process starting in any
given initial state and ending with any given final shape, where the changes of the
deformation coordinates follow some prescribed continuous functions of time:
x1(t), . . . , xn−1(t), (28)
Note that the system will in general not remain in equilibrium in such a process, and
therefore the behaviour of the thermal coordinate x0 remains unspecified.
Consider a series of such processes in which the velocity of the deformation becomes
infinitely slow, i.e. a series in which the derivatives
x˙1(t), . . . , x˙n−1(t).
converge uniformly towards zero. Such a limit is called a quasi-static change of state.
For example, if the deformation coordinates (28) are prescribed on the interval
0 ≤ t ≤ 1, one can consider the series of processes Pλ, defined on the time intervals
[0, λ], where the deformation coordinates change as:
x1(
t
λ
), . . . , xn−1(
t
λ
), (29)
with λ→∞.
The fourth demand is now that in such a series of processes the work done on the
system converges to a uniquely determined value, depending only on the given initial
state and final shape, which can be expressed as a time integral:
W = lim
λ→∞
W (Pλ) =
∫ tf
ti
dW
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where dW denotes a differential form of the deformation coordinates:
dW = p1dx1 + · · · + pndxn,
and p1, . . . , pn denote some given functions on Γ, i.e. they may depend on x0, . . . , xn−1.
This value W is the work done on the system in a quasi-static adiabatic change of
state. Physically, this demand says that for adiabatic processes, in the quasi-static
limit, there is no internal friction or hysteresis.
By means of Carathe´odory’s version of the first law (which I have not discussed
here), one can then show that
dW = dU, (30)
and hence W = U(sf )−U(si), or in other words, the work done on the system equals
the energy difference between final and initial state. This means that for a quasistatic
adiabatic change of state between a given initial state and final shape the thermal
coordinate of the final state is also uniquely fixed. Since the choice of a final shape is
arbitrary, this holds also for all intermediate stages of the process.
Thus, a quasistatic adiabatic change of state is represented by a unique curve in
Γ. That is to say, it is what Planck called an ‘infinitely slow process’. It represents
a limit of processes performed so slowly that the system can be considered as if it
remains in equilibrium for the whole duration of the process.
With this concept of a ‘simple system’ he obtains:
Carathe´odory’s Theorem: For simple systems, Carathe´odory’s prin-
ciple is equivalent to the proposition that the differential form dQ :=
dU − dW possesses an integrable divisor, i.e. there exist functions S and
T on the state space Γ such that
dQ = TdS. (31)
Thus, for simple systems, every equilibrium state can be assigned values for entropy
and absolute temperature. Obviously these functions are not uniquely determined by
the relation (31). Carathe´odory discusses further conditions to determine the choice
of T and S up to a constant of proportionality. However, I will not discuss this issue.
Because of Carathe´odory’s first law, i.e. relation (30), the curves representing
quasi-static adiabatic changes of state are characterised by the differential equation
dQ = 0,
and by virtue of (31) one can conclude that (if T 6= 0) these curves lie on a hypersurface
S(x0, . . . xn−1) = const.
Thus, for simple systems, the entropy remains constant in adiabatic quasi-static
changes of state.
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Next, Carathe´odory argues that T is suitable to serve as a thermal coordinate. In
such a coordinate frame, states with the same entropy differ only in the values of the
deformation coordinates, so that all these states are mutually adiabatically accessible.
Before we proceed to the discussion of the relation of this formulation with the ar-
row of time, I want to summarise a number of strong and weak points of the approach.
Undoubtedly, a major advantage of the approach is that Carathe´odory provides a suit-
able mathematical formalism for the theory, and brings it in line with other theories in
modern physics. The way this is done is comparable to the development of relativity
theory. There, Einstein’s original approach, which starts from empirical principles like
the invariance of the velocity of light, has been replaced by an abstract geometrical
structure, Minkowski spacetime, where these empirical principles are incorporated in
local properties of the metric. Similarly, Carathe´odory constructs an abstract state
space where an empirical statement of the second law is converted into a local topolog-
ical property. Furthermore, all coordinate systems are treated on the same footing (as
long as there is only one thermal coordinate, and they generate the same topology).72
Note further that the environment of the system is never mentioned explicitly
in his treatment of the theory. This too is big conceptual advantage. Accordingly,
nearly all attempts in the subsequent literature to produce an axiomatic formalism for
thermodynamics take the work of Carathe´odory as their point of departure; e.g. (Giles
1964, Boyling 1972, Jauch 1975, Hornix 1993, Lieb and Yngvason 1999).
It is also remarkable that in contrast to previous authors, Carathe´odory needs
many special assumptions, which are packed into his concept of a ‘simple’ system,
in order to obtain his theorem. The reason for this distinction, is of course that
Carathe´odoryaims to present a formal theory, where the formalism decides what is
possible. Thus, while Planck simply assumed without further ado that it is possible
to perform some required process, e.g. compressing or expanding a gas to any desired
volume, this is because he took ‘possible’ in sense (ii) of section 3 above. For him it
suffices to observe that in the actual world provides the means to do this. But for
Carathe´odory a process is possible if the formalism allows it. For this purpose, the
theoretical assumptions which are needed to complete such arguments must be made
explicit. Again, this is an important advantage of Carathe´odory approach.
But Carathe´odory’s work has also provoked less positive reactions among thermo-
dynamicists, in particular because of its high abstraction. Many complain that the
absence of an explicit reference to a perpetuum mobile obscures the physical content
of the second law. The complaint is put as follows by Walter:
A student bursts into the study of his professor and calls out: “Dear professor,
dear professor! I have discovered a perpetual motion of the second kind!’ The
professor scarcely takes his eyes of his book and curtly replies: “Come back when
72Indeed, as Lieb and Yngvason have shown, the analogy with relativity theory can be stretched
even beyond this point. Let Fs = {t : s ≺ t} be the ‘forward cone’ of s. This is similar to
the definition of the future lightcone of a point p in Minkowski spacetime which can similarly be
characterised as the set of all points q which are ‘causally accessible’ from p. Thus, Carathe´odory’s
principle implies that s is always on the boundary of its own forward cone.
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you have found a neighborhood U of a state x0 of such a kind that every x ∈ U
is connected with x0 by an adiabat (cited in (Truesdell 1986, p. 118)).
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The question has been raised (e.g. by Planck (1926)) whether the principle of Cara-
the´odory has any empirical content at all. However, Landsberg (1964) has shown that
for simple systems Kelvin’s principle implies Carathe´odory’s principle, so that any
violation of the latter would also be a violation of the former.
Other problems in Carathe´odory’s approach concern the additional assumptions
needed implicitly or explicitly to obtain the result (31). In the first place, we have
seen that the result is restricted to simple systems, a restriction which involves four
additional auxiliary conditions. Even the definition of quasi-static changes of states
is confined to simple systems alone. Falk and Jung (1959) objected that the division
of these five assumptions into four pertaining to simple systems and one ‘Principle’,
intended to express a general law of nature, seems ad hoc. Indeed, the question
whether Carathe´odory’s principle can claim empirical support for non-simple systems
still seems to be open.
Secondly, there is an implicit assumption that thermodynamic state variables can
be used as differentiable coordinates on Γ. For systems that possess phase transitions
or critical states this assumption is too strong. (This objection can obviously also be
raised against other approaches.) A generalization of Carathe´odory’s work, encom-
passing certain non-simple systems (namely, systems composed of simple subsystems)
is given by Boyling (1972). A different elaboration, avoiding assumptions of differen-
tiability has been given by Lieb and Yngvason (1999). This is discussed in section
11.
In the third place, Bernstein (1960) has pointed out technical defects in the proof
of Carathe´odory’s theorem. What Carathe´odory’s principle actually implies for simple
systems is merely the local existence of functions S and T obeying (31). That is, for
each state s there is some environment Us in which one can find such functions. Ss, Ts
But this does not mean that there exists a single pair of functions, defined globally
on Γ, that obey (31). In fact, a purely local proposition like Carathe´odory’s principle
is too weak to guarantee the existence of a global entropy function.
As a simple-minded counterexample, consider the case where Γ is the surface of
a cylinder (see Figure 2), with coordinates (φ, z), 0 ≤ φ < 2π. Let z represent the
deformation coordinate. For every point s ∈ Γ let Ds denote a narrow strip of points
just below s: Ds := {t ∈ Γ : φ(s) − ǫ < φ(t) ≤ φ(s) (mod 2π)} where ǫ is a
positive number less than 2π. Now define the relation ≺ by: s ≺ t if and only if
t ∈ Ds. This relation obviously satisfies the principle of Carathe´odory. Moreover the
theorem of Carathe´odory is also satisfied: adiabatic quasi-static changes obey dφ = 0,
and this differential equation is integrable. Further, for every point s, one can find
a continuous differentiable coordinate function (namely φ itself, plus, if necessary, an
appropriate constant) such that locally, in a small environment of s: s ≺6 t if and
only if φ(t) < φ(s). But there is no continuous function that does this globally. In
73Note that Walter only states Carathe´odory’s preliminary version of his principle here.
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Figure 2: Carathe´dory’s principle can be valid in a cylindrical phase space, even though there
is no global continuous entropy function.
fact, the relation ≺ is intransitive in this example, and every point can be reached
from every other point by a series of adiabatic changes of state. Boyling (1968)) has
given a more sophisticated example of a two-dimensional state space with ordinary
(contractible) topology, which satisfies the principle of Carathe´odory, without a global
entropy function.
For the purpose of this essay, of course, we need to investigate whether and how
this work relates to the arrow of time. We have seen that Carathe´odory, like Gibbs,
conceives of thermodynamics as a theory of equilibrium states, rather than processes.
But his concept of ‘adiabatic accessibility’ does refer to processes between equilibrium
states. The connection with the arrow of time is therefore more subtle than in the
case of Gibbs.
In §9 of Carathe´odory (1909), he gives a discussion of the notorious notion of
irreversibility. Consider, for a simple system, the class of all final states s′ with a
given shape (x′1, . . . , x
′
n−1) that are adiabatically accessible from a given initial state
s = (x0, . . . xn−1). For example, an adiabatically isolated gas is expanded from some
initial state (T, V ) to some desired final volume V ′. The expansion may take place
by moving a piston, slowly or more or less suddenly. The set of final states that
can be reached in this fashion differ only in the values of their thermal coordinate
x′0. For this coordinate one may choose either energy U , temperature T or entropy
S. For simple systems, (due to demand 3 above) the class of accessible final states
constitutes a connected curve, parameterised by an interval on the U -axis. Carathe´o-
dory argues that, for reasons of continuity, the values of S attained on this curve will
also constitute a connected interval. Now among the states of the considered class
there is the final state, say t, of a quasi-static adiabatic change of state starting from
s. And we know that S(s) = S(t). He then claims that the entropy value S(s) cannot
be an internal point of this interval. Indeed, if it were an internal point, then there
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would exist a small interval (S(s) − ǫ, S(s) + ǫ) such that the corresponding states
on the curve would all be accessible from s. Moreover, it is always assumed that we
can change the deformation coordinates in an arbitrary fashion by means of adiabatic
state changes. By quasi-static adiabatic changes of state we can even do this with
constant entropy But then, all states in a neighborhood of s would be adiabatically
accessible, which violates Carathe´odory’s principle.
Therefore, all final states with the final shape (x′1, . . . , x
′
n−1) that can be reached
from the given point s must have an entropy in an interval of which S(s) is a boundary
point. Or in other words, they all lie one and the same side of the hypersurface
S = const. By reasons of continuity he argues that this must be the same side for
all initial states. Whether this is the side where entropy is higher, or lower than that
of the initial state remains an open question. According to Carathe´odory, a further
appeal to empirical experience is necessary to decide this issue.
He concludes:
[Es] folgt aus unseren Schlu¨ssen, daß, wenn bei irgend einer Zustandsa¨nderung
der Wert der Entropie nicht Konstant geblieben ist, keine adiabatische Zus-
tandsa¨nderung gefunden werden kann, welche das betrachtete System aus seinem
End- in seinem Anfangszustand u¨berzufu¨hren vermag.
Jede Zustanda¨nderung, bei welcher der Wert der Entropie variiert, ist “irre-
versibel”74 (Carathe´odory 1909, p. 378).
Without doubt, this conclusion sounds pleasing in the ears of anyone who believes
that irreversibility is the genuine trademark of the second law.75 But a few remarks
are in order.
‘Irreversibel’ here means that the change of state cannot be undone in an adiabatic
process. This is another meaning for the term, different from those of Carnot, Kelvin,
Clausius and Planck. In fact, this definition is identical to the proposal by Orr,
discussed on page 45. The question is then of course whether changes of states
that cannot be undone by an adiabatic process, might perhaps be undone by some
other process. Indeed, it is not hard to find examples of this possibility: consider a
container of ideal gas in thermal contact with a heat reservoir. When the piston is
pulled out quasi-statically, the gas does work, while it takes in heat from the reservoir.
Its entropy increases in this process, and the process would thus qualify as irreversible
in Carathe´odory’s sense. But Planck’s book discusses this case as an example of a
reversibel process. Indeed, when the gas is recompressed equally slowly, the heat is
restored to the reservoir and the initial state is recovered everywhere, i.e. for both
system and environment. Thus, Carathe´odory’s concept of ‘irreversibility’ does not
coincide with Planck’s.
74‘[It] follows from our conclusions that, when for any change of state the value of the entropy has
not remained constant, one can find no adiabatic change of state, which is capable of returning the
considered system from its final state back to its initial state. Every change of state, for which the
entropy varies is “irreversible”.’
75Carathe´odory argues that his formulation of the second law imply Gibbs’ principle. I’d rather
not go into this.
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The obvious next question is whether such counterexamples can be avoided by
restricting the proposition to all adiabatic changes of state of a simple system in which
the entropy varies. But this does not solve the problem. Planck says explicitly in his
criterion for reversibelity that in the recovery process, any auxiliary systems available
may be employed. The system certainly need not remain in an adiabatic container.
Even if the original process were adiabatic, it would remain reversibel as long as a
non-adiabatic recovery process can be found. There seems to be no guarantee that
something like that is excluded in Carathe´odory’s approach.
There is also another way to investigate whether Carathe´odory’s approach cap-
tures the content of the second law a` la Clausius, Kelvin or Planck, namely by asking
whether the approach of Carathe´odory allows models in which these formulations of
the second law are invalid. An example is obtained by applying the formalism to a fluid
while swapping the meaning of terms in each of the three pairs ‘heat /work’, ‘ther-
mal/deformation coordinate’ and ‘adiabatic’/‘without any exchange of work’. The
validity of Carathe´odory’s formalism is invariant under this operation, and a fluid
remains a simple system. Indeed, we obtain, as a direct analog of (31): dW = pdV
for all quasi-static processes of a fluid. This shows that, in the present interpretation,
pressure and volume play the role of temperature and entropy respectively. Further-
more, irreversibility makes sense here too. For fluids with positive pressure, one can
increase the volume of a fluid without doing work by expansion into a vacuum, but one
cannot decrease volume without doing work on the system. But still, the analogues
of the principles of Clausius of Kelvin are false in this application. A fluid with low
pressure can very well do positive work on another fluid with high pressure by means
of a lever or hydraulic mechanism.
The next point worth remarking is that the conclusion of Carathe´odory is for-
mulated as a time-symmetric statement: not only an increase of entropy, but also a
decrease cannot be undone in an adiabatic process! As we shall discuss in section 10,
Planck criticised the approach by pointing out that a world where the time reverse
of Kelvin’s principle holds, also obeys the principle of Carathe´odory. Although this
does not mean that the principle of Carathe´odory itself is time symmetrical (that
would mean that the time reversal of every possible world obeying the principle of
Carathe´odory obeys the same principle76), according to Planck it is still not enough
76In order to judge the time-symmetry of the theory of Carathe´odory according to the criterion on
page 9 it is necessary to specify a time reversal transformation R. It seems natural to choose this in
such a way that Rs = s and R(≺) = ≻ . (That is to say: s ≺ t in P∗ if t ≺ s in P .) Then the
theory is not time-symmetric. Indeed, the principle of Carathe´odory forbids that state space contains
a ‘minimal state’ (i.e. states s for which ∃Us ∀t ∈ Us : s ≺ t. It allows models where state space
possesses a ‘maximum’, i.e. a state s for which ∃Us∀t ∈ Us : t ≺ s. Time reversal of such a model
is in conflict with the principle of Carathe´odory. However, this time-asymmetry manifests itself only
in rather pathological cases. (For a fluid, this would mean a local maximum for its temperature and
volume.) If we exclude the existence of such maxima, Carathe´odory’s theory becomes time symmetric.
Indeed a modern variation of the theory (Giles 1964) has been given that is manifestly time-symmetric.
(Giles calls this the ‘principle of duality’). The same goes for the formulation by Lieb and Yngvason
(see section 11).
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to characterise the direction of irreversible processes. In fact Carathe´odory admitted
this point (Carathe´odory 1925). He stressed that an additional appeal to experience
is necessary to conclude that changes of entropy in adiabatic processes are always pos-
itive (if T > 0). In other words, in Carathe´odory’s approach this is not a consequence
of the second law.
Finally it is remarkable that the converse statement (i.e. that every irreversible
process in a simple system is accompanied by a change of entropy) is not expressed.
In this respect too the formulation of Carathe´odory is less far-reaching than Planck.
10 The debate between Born, Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa and
Planck
Carathe´odory’s work did not immediately have much impact on the physics commu-
nity. Only twelve years later, when Max Born (1921) formulated a popularised version
of this work and explicitly presented it as a critique of the traditional formulation of
thermodynamics, did the attention of the physicists awaken.
I first mention some of the simplifications introduced in this paper. In the first
place, Born’s formulation of Carathe´odory’s principle is different:
Carathe´odory’s Principle (Born’s version): In every neighborhood
of each state there are states that are inaccessible by means of adiabatic
changes of state. In other words
∀s ∈ Γ ∀ Us : ∃t ∈ Us s ≺6 t.
In fact, this is the formulation of the principle which Carathe´odory considered as a
preliminary version, and then rejected in favour of (27). Nevertheless, Born’s formu-
lation has since been adopted generally as the statement of Carathe´odory’s principle.
This is unfortunate because it is evident that the statement by itself is inadequate for
the derivation of the result (31). Indeed, one’s first association, when reading that
every neighborhood of a point contains points of another kind, is about the way in
which rational numbers are imbedded in the real line. In fact, if we call a real number
p ‘adiabatically inaccessible’ from number q just in case p− q is irrational, Born’s ver-
sion of Carathe´odory’s principle is satisfied for Γ = IR. But clearly such a model is not
intended at all. So the formulation by Born does not suffice to obtain an interesting
second law. It presupposes additional tacit assumptions about the continuity of ≺.
Next, Born does not mention the restriction to simple systems, and the subtle
assumptions involved states bluntly that the approach is applicable, without any
problems, to ‘ganz beliebige Systeme, wie sie die Thermodynamik zu betrachten
pflegt’77(Born 1921, p. 162)
Further, instead of using Carathe´odory’s definition of irreversibility, Born calls a
process reversibel iff it is quasi-static:
77‘completely arbitrary systems, such as usually considered in thermodynamics’.
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Man leitet den Prozeß unendlich langsam, derart, daß der Zustand in jedem Mo-
mente als Gleichgewicht angesehen werden kann. Man sollte solche Vorga¨nge
quasi-statische nennen, aber man gebraucht gewo¨hnlich das Wort reversibel, weil
sie im allgemeinen die Eigenschaft haben umkehrbar zu sein. Wir wollen hier
auf die Bedingungen, unter denen das der Fall ist nicht na¨her eingehen, sondern
annehmen daß sie erfu¨llt sind, und werden beide Bezeichnungen als synonym
verwenden.78 (Born 1921, p. 165)
That is, he employs the term in the sense of Clausius’ and Planck’s umkehrbar.
The most striking point of Born’s article is his claim that every differential form
defined on a two-dimensional state space has an integrating divisor. This provides a
strong and elegant objection against Planck’s presentation of the second law, because
it implies that the existence of an entropy function for fluids, a topic which occupies
a substantial part of Planck’s laborious argument, is in fact trivial; i.e. an empirical
justification of this result is not needed at all! Planck’s work thus appears to be an
‘attempt to crash through an open door’ (Kestin 1976, p. 207). But this conclusion is
not completely correct.79
A different analysis was given by Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa (1925). Her interpretation
of Carathe´odory’s work also contains a few curious alterations. For example, she calls
a process adiabatic in case there is no net exchange of heat with the environment.
Thus, in this sense, a non-simple system, e.g. a composite system of gases in separate
containers connected by adiabatic pistons, undergoes an adiabatic process if one part
absorbs heat from a reservoir, while another ejects the same amount of heat to some
other reservoir.
This choice of terminology leads her to the view that Carathe´odory’s principle
is violated for non-simple systems. All states in a neighborhood of a given initial
state can be ‘adiabatically’ accessible for such a system. Obviously, this view can be
maintained consistently, and it inevitably leads to the conclusion that Carathe´odory’s
principle does not qualify as a law of nature, but only as a special assumption for
simple systems. The student mentioned in the quotation from Walter would not have
to search very far in order to surprise his professor! But since Carathe´odory used the
term ‘adiabatic’ with a different meaning this should not count as an objection against
his work.
More important is that she correctly pointed out that Carathe´odory’s principle
is also valid in models where the time reverse of the principles of Kelvin or Clausius
78‘One conducts the process infinitely slowly, in such a way that the state at every moment can by
regarded as an equilibrium. One should call such processes quasi-static, but one usually employs the
word reversible, because, in general, they have the property that they can be reversed. We do not
want to discuss the conditions under which this is the case, but rather assume that they are fulfilled,
and use both terms as synonymous.’
79It is true that differential forms in two dimensions always have integrating divisors. But these
can still attain the value zero at some points. In such singular points the integral curves (i.e. the
adiabats) can intersect. (An example is the differential form ydx − xdy in IR2.) Kelvin’s principle
disallows the intersection of adiabats globally. The approach of Planck is thus not empirically empty,
even for fluids.
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hold, or in worlds where only reversible processes occur. She saw this as an important
advantage: it means one is able to introduce the concepts of entropy and absolute
temperature and the equation (31), without being committed to a principle of universal
entropy increase or appealing to the existence of irreversible processes.
Finally, Planck, the main representative of the tradition criticised by Born, also
responded (Planck 1926). He denied that Carathe´odory’s version of the second law
could serve as an adequate replacement of the principle of Kelvin and rejected it as a
‘ku¨nstliche und unno¨tige Komplikation (an artificial and unnecessary complication)’.
He advanced two main objections.80
The first is that by speaking about arbitrarily small neighborhoods, Carathe´odory
appeals to matters beyond the reach of observation. We cannot possibly know, with
our finite experimental faculties, whether every neighborhood always contains adia-
batically inaccessible states. Hence the principle is speculative, and conflicts with the
empiricist guidelines along which thermodynamics ought to be developed, according
to Planck’s point of view.
I don’t think this objection is fair. It may be true that the connection with
experience is less manifest in Carathe´odory’s approach than in that of Planck. But to
conclude that it is therefore more speculative or less reliable seems incorrect. Planck
too freely uses differential calculus for thermodynamical quantities, presupposing that
the state space has the topological properties of a differential manifold. This is equally
speculative: perhaps future experiments will teach us that, on a very small scale,
state space is discrete, or that it has some other weird topology. The fact that Planck
and previous authors ignored these questions should not be mistaken for a sign of
superiority by empiricist standards.
The second objection is more important for our purpose. Planck writes:
. . . das Prinzip [von Carathe´odory] spricht nur von der Unerreichbarkeit gewisser
Nachbarzusta¨nde, es gibt aber kein Merkmal an, durch welches die erreichbaren
Nachbarzusta¨nde von der unerreichbaren Nachbarzusta¨nde zu unterscheiden sind.
Mit anderen Worten: nach dem Prinzip von Carathe´odory ko¨nnte es sehr wohl
mo¨glich sein, Wa¨rme ohne Kompensation in Arbeit zu verwandeln. Dann mu¨ßte
nur der umgekehrte Vorgang, die kompensationslose Verwandlung von Arbeit
in Wa¨rme, als unmo¨glich angenommen werden. Oder es ko¨nnte auch sein, daß
beide Arten von Verwandlung unmo¨glich wa¨ren. Es ist selbstversta¨ndlich, daß
auf einer solchen Grundlage der zweite Wa¨rmesatz nicht vollsta¨ndig aufgebaut
werden kann und daß fu¨r diesen Zweck dem durch das Carathe´odorysche Prinzip
ausgedru¨ckten Axiom noch ein zweites von jenem unabha¨ngiges Axiom, das sich
auf irreversible Vorga¨nge bezieht, hinzugefu¨gt werden muß. . . .81 (Planck 1926,
p.455)
80A third objection voiced by Planck is that in contrast to that of Kelvin, Carathe´odory’s principle
would have to be drastically reformulated when transposed into a statistical mechanical framework.
He does not substantiate this claim, however.
81‘. . . the principle [of Carathe´odory] speaks only of the inaccesibility of certain neighbouring states,
but it provides no mark by which the accessible states can be distinguished from the inaccessible states.
In other words, according to Carathe´odory’s principle it could very well be possible to transform
heat into work without compensation. One only needs to assume that the reverse process, i.e. the
66
The observation that Carathe´odory’s principle is neutral with respect to the irre-
versibility of natural processes had already been noted by Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa.
But whereas she thought of this as a major advantage, in the eyes of Planck it is a
serious defect. He diagnoses the theory of Carathe´odory as suffering from Erga¨nzungs-
bedu¨rftigkeit (need of completion).
It is worthwhile to dwell on the exact nature of Planck’s criticism. The first point
(viz. that Carathe´odory’s principle is also valid in a time reverse of our world) is
rather mild: both worlds could contain irreversible processes; Carathe´odory only fails
to provide a ‘Merkmal’ to indicate the direction in which they proceed. The second
point is more serious: a principle that allows worlds in which only reversible processes
occur does not imply the existence of irreversible processes. This point is correct; but
it can also be raised against Kelvin’s or Clausius’ formulations of the second law.
Planck then presents a new proof of the second law which, he claims, shares the
advantages of Carathe´odory’s approach (namely: that no reference is made to the
ideal gas or cyclic processes), but also hinges essentially on irreversibility. In the
eighth edition of the Vorlesungen (Planck 1926), this proof replaces the ‘careful’ proof
discussed in section 7.
10.1 Planck revisited
I will discuss Planck’s new proof only briefly. The main difference with the argument
discussed in section 7 is that one does not start with the ideal gas. Instead, the
existence of a positive integrating divisor for the inexact heat differential dQ of a fluid
is accepted unquestioningly. Thus, one writes immediately
dQ = TdS,
where the entropy S and temperature T are state variables of the fluid.
He then introduces the statement ‘friction is an irreversibel process’, which he
considers as a formulation of Kelvin’s principle. This view may need some explanation,
because, at first sight, this statement does not seem to address cyclic processes or the
perpetuum mobile at all. But for Planck, the statement is equivalent to the proposition
that there exists no process which ‘undoes’ the consequences of friction, i.e., a process
which produces no other effect than cooling a reservoir and doing work. The condition
‘no other effect’ here allows for the operation of any type of machinery that operates
in a cycle.
He then considers an adiabatically isolated fluid which can exchange energy with
its environment by means of a weight. Planck asks whether it is possible to reach a
state s′ of the system from a given initial state s, in a process which brings about
no changes in the environment other than the displacement of the weight. Let us
compensationless transformation of work into heat were impossible. It is obvious that the second law
cannot be built completely on this foundation and that for this purpose one needs the addition of a
second, independent axiom which refers to irreversible processes.’
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represent this as
(s, Z, h)
?
−→ (s′, Z, h′).
He argues that, by means of ‘reversibel-adiabatic’82 transitions, starting from the state
s, one can always reach a state s∗ in which the volume equals that of state s′ and the
entropy equals that of s. That is, there is a change of state
(s, Z, h) −→ (s∗, Z, h∗),
with
V (s∗) = V (s′) and S(s∗) = S(s).
Whether the intended final state s′ can now be reached from the intermediate state s∗
depends on the value of the only independent variable in which s∗ and s′ differ. For
this variable one can either choose the entropy S, energy U or temperature T .
There are three cases:
(1) h∗ = h′. In this case, energy conservation implies U(s∗) = U(s′). Because the
coordinates U and V determine the state completely, s∗ and s′ must coincide.
(2) h∗ > h′. In this case, the state s′ can be reached from s∗ by letting the weight
perform work on the system, e.g. by means of friction, until the weight has dropped
to height h′. According to the above formulation of Kelvin’s principle, this process is
irreversible.
(3) h∗ < h′. In this case the desired transition is impossible. It would be the reversal of
the irreversible process just mentioned in (2), i.e. produce work by cooling the system
and would thus realise a perpetuum mobile of the second kind.83
Now, Planck argues that in all three cases, a transition from s∗ to s′ is possible by
means of heat exchange in an umkehrbar process in which the volume remains fixed.
For such a process one can write
dU = TdS.
Using the assumption that T > 0, it follows that, in the three cases above, U must
vary in the same sense as S. That is, the cases U(s∗) < U(s′), U(s∗) = U(s′)
or U(s∗) > U(s′), can also be characterised as S(s∗) < S(s′), S(s∗) = S(s′) and
S(s∗) > S(s′) respectively.
82Apparently, Planck’s pen slipped here. He means: umkehrbar -adiabatic.
83Note how much Planck’s application of the perpetuum mobile differs from Carnot and Kelvin.
The latter authors considered the engine, i.e. the device which performs the cycle, as the system of
interest and the reservoir as part of the environment. By contrast, for Planck, the reservoir is the
thermodynamical system, and the engine performing the cyclic process belongs to the environment.
Related to this switch of perspective is the point that the reservoir is now assumed to have a finite
energy content. Thus, the state of the reservoir can change under the action of the hypothetical
perpetuum mobile device. As a consequence, the withdrawal of energy from the reservoir need not be
repeatable. This is in contrast to Carnot’s analysis (see section 4). Indeed, there is nothing ‘perpetual’
about Planck’s present construal of the perpetuum mobile.
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For a system consisting of several fluids the argument is analogous. Planck argues
that, here too, starting from a state s, a state s∗ can be reached by means of quasi-
static-adiabatic processes in which all variables except one are equal to the values of
the variables in state s′, while the entropy has remained constant, etc.84
Just as in earlier editions of his book, Planck generalises his conclusions (without
a shred of proof) to arbitrary systems and physical/chemical processes:
Jeder in the Natur stattfindende Prozeß verla¨uft in dem Sinne, daß die Summe der
Entropien aller an dem Prozeß beteiligten Ko¨rper vergro¨ßert wird. Im Grenzfall,
fu¨r einen reversibeln Prozeß, bleibt diese Summe ungea¨ndert. [. . . ] Damit ist der
Inhalt des zweiten Hauptsatzes der Thermodynamik erscho¨pfend bezeichnet. . . .85
(Planck 1926, p. 463)
The argument just presented is Planck’s definitive formulation of the second law.
Although in some respects clearer and simpler than the earlier proof, I do not believe
it gives a substantial improvement. First, the assumption that for every fluid there
always exist functions S and T (with T > 0) such that dQ = TdS is problematic.
(Although understandable, being a concession to Born). Secondly the generalization
to arbitrary processes in arbitrary systems remains as dubious as it was in the earlier
versions. There is nothing in Planck’s argument that indicates that the argument is
valid beyond the simple systems of Carathe´odory.
I conclude that Planck has not succeeded in his attempt to show that the theo-
rem of Carathe´odory is nothing but ‘an artificial and unnecessary complication’. All
he shows is that by adding Kelvin’s principle to that of Carathe´odory (which is still
necessary to guarantee the relation dQ = TdS), one obtains a time asymmetric state-
ment that no longer admits both entropy increases as well as decreases in adiabatically
isolated systems. Further, although it seems natural to understand the proposition
‘friction is an irreversibel process’ as intended to imply that friction processes occur
in our world, there is no need to assume the actual existence of irreversibel processes
in the argument. Thus, Planck’s formulation also allows models in which all processes
are reversible, and does not repair this defect which he diagnosed in Carathe´odory’s
work.
11 Lieb and Yngvason
It goes without saying that I cannot treat all the numerous reformulations of the
second law that have been attempted in the past 75 years. But this article would
remain incomplete if I did not deal with a very recent contribution by Lieb and
84This is comparable to Carathe´odory’s assumption that from every initial state one can reach all
values of the deformation coordinates by an adiabatic process.
85‘Every process occurring in nature proceeds in the sense in which the sum of the entropies of all
bodies taking part in the process is increased. In the limiting case, for reversible processes this sum
remains unchanged. [. . . ] This provides an exhaustive formulation of the content of the second law
of thermodynamics’
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Yngvason (1999). These authors provide a new attempt to clarify the mathematical
formulation and physical content of the second law. However, I cannot do justice to
this important work in the context of this article: the paper is 96 pages long and
employs no less than 15 axioms in order to obtain the second law. I note, however,
that these elaborate ramifications are partly due to the fact the authors not only wish
to obtain the second law in the form of an entropy principle but also the result that
entropy is an additive and extensive function and (up to additive and multiplicative
constants) unique, and numerous other results. Moreover, they wish to achieve most
of these results without assuming differentiability of the state space.
On the formal level, this work builds upon the approaches of Carathe´odory (1909)
and Giles (1964). (In its physical interpretation, however, it is more closely related
to Planck, as we will see below.) A system is represented by a state space Γ on
which a relation ≺ of adiabatic accessibility is defined. All axioms mentioned below
are concerned with this relation. Further, Lieb and Yngvason introduce a formal
operation of considering two systems in state s and t as a composite system in state
(s, t), and the operation of ‘scaling’ a system, i.e. the construction of a copy in which
all its extensive quantities are multiplied by a positive factor α. This is denoted by
a multiplication of the state with α. These scaled states αs belong to a scaled state
space Γ(α).
The main axioms of Lieb and Yngvason apply to all states s ∈ ∪αΓ(α) (and com-
positions of such states). They read:
A1. Reflexivity:
s ≺ s (32)
A2. Transitivity:
s ≺ t and t ≺ r imply s ≺ r (33)
A3. Consistency:
s ≺ s′ and t ≺ t′ implies (s, t) ≺ (s′, t′) (34)
A4. Scale invariance:
If s ≺ t then αs ≺ αt for all α > 0 (35)
A5. Splitting and recombination:
For all 0 < α < 1 : s ≺ (αs, (1 − α)s) and (αs, (1 − α)s) ≺ s (36)
A6. Stability: If there are states t0 and t1 such that (s, ǫt0) ≺ (r, ǫt1)
holds for a sequence of ǫ’s converging to zero, then s ≺ r.
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The meaning of these axioms is, hopefully, largely self-evident. Axiom A1 and
A2 demand that adiabatic accessibility is a pre-ordering. Axiom A3 says that if
subsystems of a composite system can each go through certain adiabatic changes of
state, it is also possible to achieve these changes of states adiabatically in the composite
system. Axiom A4 expresses an analogous statement for inflated or shrunken copies of
the system. Axiom A5 says that separating and recombining subsystems are adiabatic
processes. One can think of the introduction or removal of a partition in a fluid.
The stability axiom A6 expresses, roughly speaking, the idea that if two states s
and r of a system are adiabatically accessible whenever the system is expanded by a
negligibly small second system, e.g. a dust particle, these states themselves must also
be adiabatically accessible.
The axioms above seem intuitively plausible and physically acceptable for ther-
modynamical systems. This is not to say that one must see them as the expression
of empirical principles. Some seem to follow almost immediately from the intended
meaning of the relation, and have little empirical content; others seem very well ca-
pable of violation by arbitrary physical objects. (Consider the application of Axiom
5 to near-critical masses of plutonium.) It seems reasonable, however, to regard the
axioms as an implicit definition of a ‘thermodynamical system’.
After stating the above axioms, Lieb and Yngvason formulate the following
7. Comparability hypothesis:
For all states s, t in the same space Γ: s ≺ t or t ≺ s. 86 (37)
The comparability hypothesis has, as its name already indicates, a lower status than
the axioms. It is intended as a characterization of a particular type of thermody-
namical systems, namely, of ‘simple’ systems and systems composed of such ‘simple’
systems.87 A substantial part of the effort by Lieb and Yngvason is devoted to an
attempt to derive this hypothesis from further axioms for these ‘simple’ systems and
their compositions. I will, however, not go into this.
The aim of the work is to derive the following result, which Lieb and Yngvason
call
The Entropy Principle (Lieb and Yngvason version): There exists
a function S defined on all states of all systems such that
a. when s and t are comparable then
s ≺ t if and only if S(s) ≤ S(t). (38)
86The clause ‘in the same space Γ’ means that the hypothesis is not intended for the comparison of
states of scaled systems. Thus, it is not demanded that we can either adiabatically transform a state
of 1 mole of oxygen into one of 2 moles of oxygen or conversely.
87Beware that the present meaning of the term does not coincide with that used by Carathe´odory.
For simple systems in Carathe´odory’s sense the comparability hypothesis need not hold.
71
b. When s and t are states of (possibly different) systems
S((s, t)) = S(s) + S(t), (39)
S(αs) = αS(s). (40)
The relations (39) and (40) express that the entropy function is additive and
extensive. For our purpose, it is relation (38) that is particularly relevant. The
authors interpret the result (38) as an expression of the second law: ‘It says that
entropy must increase in an irreversible process.’ and: ‘the physical content of [(38)]
. . . [is that]. . . adiabatic processes not only increase entropy but an increase in entropy
also dictates which adiabatic processes are possible (between comparable states, of
course).’ (Lieb and Yngvason 1999, p. 19,20)).
The question whether this result actually follows from their assumptions is some-
what involved. They show that a special case of the entropy principle follows from the
assumption of axioms A1–A6 and the comparability hypothesis. In particular, special
conditions are needed which (physically speaking) express that mixing and chemi-
cal reactions are to be excluded. To extend the principle beyond this restriction, an
additional ten axioms are needed (three of which serve to derive the comparability hy-
pothesis). And even then, only a weak form of the above entropy principle is actually
obtained, where ‘if and only if’ in (38) is replaced by ‘implies’.
Before considering the interpretation of this result more closely, a few general re-
marks on this approach are in order. This approach combines mathematical precision
with clear and plausible axioms and achieves a powerful and remarkable theorem.
This is true progress in the formulation of the second law. Of course it still holds
that the result applies only for special kinds of systems; but this is also the case for
Carathe´odory’s approach and, when stripped from rhetorical claims, also for Planck’s.
It is remarkable that the theorem is obtained without appealing to anything re-
motely resembling Carathe´odory’s principle. This is undoubtedly an advantage for
those who judge that principle too abstract. In fact the axioms and hypothesis used
above allow models which violate the principle of Carathe´odory (Lieb and Yngva-
son 1999, p. 91). For example, it may be that all states are mutually accessible, in
which case the entropy function S is simply a constant on Γ.
However, there is an additional axiom in Lieb and Yngvason’s approach which
makes for a closer connection with Carathe´odory’s principle. One of the special axioms
invoked to derive the comparability hypothesis reads:
S1: Irreversible Processes: for all s ∈ Γ there is a t ∈ Γ such that
s ≺ t and t ≺6 s.
Here the prefix ‘S’ denotes that it is the first of a series of axioms intended to hold
for simple systems only. We shall have more to say about what this axiom has to do
with irreversibility below. For the moment, I only note that this axiom is the closest
resemblance to Carathe´odory’s principle to be found in this approach: it says that
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for each state there is another adiabatically inaccessible state. In fact, the authors
prove that, in conjunction with other axioms, it implies what they call ‘Carathe´odory’s
principle’.88
However, the present axiom is much more liberal than Carathe´odory’s principle.
First, of course, it no longer demands that the states which are inaccessible from s oc-
cur in every local neighborhood of s. Thus, this axiom evades Planck’s objection that
we don’t have empirical access to arbitrarily small neighborhoods. More importantly,
this axiom is only intended to characterise ‘simple’ systems, and actually serves as
(part of) a definition of this notion. This is in sharp contrast to Carathe´odory’s prin-
ciple, which was presented as a general law of nature. Thus, Lieb and Yngvason also
evade the objection of Falk and Jung (see p. 60). Moreover, note that this axiom is not
essential to the proof of the entropy principle, but only to the attempt to derive the
comparability hypothesis. Anyone who accepts this hypothesis as physically plausible
will obtain the above entropy principle without having to bother with Carathe´odory’s
principle.
For the purpose of this paper, the pertinent question is whether there is a connec-
tion with the arrow of time in this formulation of the second law. As before, there
are two aspects to this question: irreversibility and time asymmetry. We have seen
that Lieb and Yngvason interpret the relation (38) as saying that entropy must in-
crease in irreversible processes. At first sight, this interpretation (and also the name
of the last-mentioned axiom) is curious. We have found in the discussion of section 9
that adiabatic accessibility is not the same thing as irreversibility. How then, can
the present axioms on adiabatic accessibility be interpreted as having implications for
irreversible processes?
This puzzle is resolved when we consider the physical interpretation which Lieb
and Yngvason propose for the relation ≺:
Adiabatic accessibility: A state t is adiabatically accessible from a state s,
in symbols s ≺ t, if it is possible to change the state from s to t by means of
an interaction with some device (which may consist of mechanical and electric
parts as well as auxiliary thermodynamic systems) and a weight, in such a way
that the auxiliary system returns to its initial state at the end of the process
whereas the weight may have changed its position in a gravitational field’ (Lieb
and Yngvason 1999, p. 17).
This view is rather different from Carathe´odory’s, or indeed, from anybody else’s:
clearly, this term is not intended to refer to processes occurring in a thermos flask.
As the authors explicitly emphasise, even processes in which the system is heated are
adiabatic, in the present sense, when this heat is generated by an electrical current
from a dynamo driven by descending weight. Actually, the condition that the auxiliary
systems return to their initial state in the present concept is strongly reminiscent of
Planck’s concept of ‘reversibel’ !
88Here, Lieb and Yngvason employ a formulation of Carathe´odory’s principle which deviates from
both Carathe´odory’ own statement as well as from Born’s version. It reads: ∀s ∈ Γ,∀Us ∃t ∈ Us such
that s ≺6 t or t ≺6 s.
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This is not to say, of course, that they are identical. Let Z be the state of the
auxiliary system and h the height of the weight. For Planck, a process P which
produces the transition 〈s, Z, h〉
P
−→ 〈s′, Z ′, h′〉 is reversibel iff there exists a recovery
process P ′ which produces 〈s′, Z ′, h′〉
P ′
−→ 〈s, Z, h〉. Here, the states Z and Z ′ are
allowed to be different from each other. For Lieb and Yngvason, a process 〈s, Z, h〉
P
−→
〈s′, Z ′, h′〉 is called adiabatic iff Z = Z ′. However, we have seen in section 7 that in
his argument to obtain the entropy principle, Planck always restricted his discussions
to such reversibel processes ‘which leave no changes in other bodies’, i.e. that obey
the additional requirement Z = Z ′. These reversibel processes are always adiabatic
in the present sense. A major difference with the conventional meaning of the term
is that, in the present sense, it automatically follows that if a process P as above is
adiabatic, any recovery process P ′ is also adiabatic.
Thus, we can now conclude immediately that if an adiabatic state changes is
accompanied by an entropy increase, this change of state cannot be undone, i.e., it
is irreversibel in Planck’s sense. This explains why the result (38) can be seen as
a formulation of a principle of entropy increase, and why axiom S1 is interpreted as
stating the existence of irreversible processes. In fact, we can reason as follows: assume
s and t are states which are mutually comparable, and that S(s) < S(t). According to
(38), we then have s ≺ t and t ≺6 s. This means that there exists no process from t to
s which proceeds without producing any change in auxiliary systems except, possibly,
a displacement of a single weight. At the same time there exists a process from s to t
(under the same condition). This process is irreversibel in Planck’s sense.89 Thus we
89This conclusion, obviously, is crucially dependent on the non-standard meaning given to the term
‘adiabatic’. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that in the published version (Lieb and Yngvason,
1999) of the manuscript (1997), a passage is included in which the authors argue that their interpre-
tation coincides with the conventional meaning of this term after all. An example may show that
this claim is misleading. Consider a compound system consisting of two simple systems, each with
a one-dimensional state space. Assume that these two systems are adiabatically isolated from each
other. For example: take two quantities of an incompressible fluid contained in calorimeters (fitted
with a stirring device). In the conventional sense, the only processes which can be called adiabatic,
are (i) stirring and (ii) heat exchange among the two systems by a temporary diathermal connection.
Under this interpretation the compound system does not obey the comparability hypothesis. For
example, if the temperatures of s and t differ, then (s, t ≺6 (t, s) and (t, s) ≺6 (s, t); cf. (Boyling 1972,
p. 38).
However, in the interpretation of Lieb and Yngvason, adiabatic accessibility depends on which other
systems are available as auxiliary devices. Suppose there is another system (say an ideal gas) capable
of performing a Carnot cycle. By means of this system, operated as a heat pump, we can transfer
entropy from one subsystem to the other, and thus increase entropy of the one at the expense of the
other. This process would be adiabatic by Lieb and Yngvason’s criterion. (The auxiliary system goes
through a cycle and hence returns to its original state; the work needed to drive the heat pump can
be provided by lowering a weight.) Thus we have (s, t) ≺ (t, s) and (t, s) ≺ (s, t).
In fact, in this example of a world in which one-dimensional systems and normal fluids coexist the
conventional definition of ‘adiabatic’ does not obey the axioms A1–A6. The argument given by Lieb
and Yngvason in order to conclude that the two interpretations coincide, which assumes the validity
of these axioms, is therefore not applicable. (I acknowledge clarifying personal communications with
Jakob Yngvason on this point.)
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have at last achieved a conclusion implying the existence of irreversibel processes by
means of a satisfactory argument!
However, it must be noted that this conclusion is obtained only for systems obey-
ing the comparability hypothesis and under the exclusion of mixing and chemical
processes. The weak version of the entropy principle, which is derived when we drop
the latter restriction, does not justify this conclusion. Moreover, note that it would
be incorrect to construe (38) as a characterisation of processes. The relation ≺ is
interpreted in terms of the possibility of processes. As remarked in section 9, one and
the same change of state can very well be obtained (or undone) by means of different
processes, some of which are adiabatic and others not. Thus, when S(s) < S(t) for
comparable states, this does not mean that all processes from s to t are irreversibel,
but only that there exists an adiabatic irreversibel process between these states. So
the entropy principle here is not the universal proposition of Planck, even if we restrict
ourselves to systems for which the comparability hypothesis holds and exclude mixing
and chemical processes.
The next question is of course about the time-(a)symmetry of this approach. There
are two ways in which one may analyse this question. The first is to consider all
structures 〈∪αΓ(α), (·, ·),≺〉 as candidate models, and look upon the axioms as singling
out a class of possible worlds. In that case it is easy to show, using the implementation
of time reversal proposed in footnote 76, that the six general axioms, as well as the
comparability hypothesis, are completely time-symmetric!90
Another way of analyzing the question is to start from the interpretation proposed
by the authors for the relation ≺ and note that it invokes the term ‘possible’. One
may regard this as a modal relationship, to be understood in terms of a ‘possible
worlds’ semantics. On this reading, the statement ‘s ≺ t’ does not express a manifest
property of one single world, but rather commits one to the existence of possible
worlds in which the state s can be transformed into t without leaving changes in
auxiliary systems except the displacement of a weight. It does not, however, commit
us to the existence of a possible world in which t is transformed into s under the
same conditions. Thus, the class of possible worlds allowed by such a statement is
time-asymmetric.91
Therefore, the answer to the question whether this approach is time-symmetric or
not depends on whether one analyzes the question from the point of view of the formal-
90This conclusion cannot be extended to the complete set of axioms proposed by Lieb and Yngvason.
For example, axiom S1 (cited above) is already time-asymmetric. However, the time-asymmetry
introduced by this axiom is only temporary. In the course of their presentation, axiom S1 is subsumed
by a stronger axiom (called ‘Transversality’) which restores time-symmetry. (Transversality entails
that for all s there is also a state r such that r ≺ s and s ≺6 r.) Yet, there are two other axioms
(called A7 and T1) which address mixing and equilibration processes. These axioms are explicitly
time-asymmetric. (I thank Jakob Yngvason for pointing this out to me.) Note, however, that as far
as the entropy principle is concerned, these axioms are needed only in the derivation of the (time-
symmetric) comparability hypothesis.
91 In this view, the role of the axioms would then be to characterise a kind of second-order possibility,
namely, to determine which relations between possible worlds are possible (allowed by the theory).
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ism or its interpretation. Nevertheless, the fact that it is not necessary to introduce
time-asymmetry into the formalism to obtain the second law, is very remarkable.
As I have said, the interpretation these authors give to the term ‘adiabatic’ is
much wider than that of Carathe´odory. For the mathematical formalism, this is of
course irrelevant; but not for its physical meaning. The wider the interpretation of
the relation ≺, the stronger is the empirical content of the postulates. This raises the
question whether the proposed interpretation is not, as we saw in the case of Ehren-
fest-Afanassjewa, perhaps already so wide that the axioms conflict with experience.
As far as I can see, this is not the case. Of course, the main point responsible for this
difference from Carathe´odory’s approach is that the present axioms are, in certain
aspects, much weaker.
However, this question leads immediately to one problematical aspect of the pro-
posed physical interpretation. It refers to the state of auxiliary systems in the envi-
ronment of the system. Thus, we are again confronted by the old and ugly question,
when shall we say that the state of systems in the environment has changed, and when
are we fully satisfied that their initial state has been recovered. As noted before (foot-
note 27), this question is rather intractable from the point of view of thermodynamics,
when one allows arbitrary auxiliary systems whose states are not represented by the
thermodynamical formalism. Thus, the question when the relation ≺ is applicable
cannot be decided on the basis of the formalism itself.
12 Summary and moral
What is the relation between the second law of thermodynamics and the arrow of
time? The deeper we go into this question, the more remote a clear-cut relation
appears to be. Nevertheless, I think we can summarise this study by drawing several
conclusions. Moreover, I argue below that it may be more fruitful to abandon the idea
that time-asymmetry or irreversibility is essential to the second law.
First of all, we have seen that a distinction should be made between time-(a)symmetry
and thermodynamical concepts of ‘(ir)reversibility’. Time-asymmetry, in the sense in
which we used this word, refers to a law which allows some process (or possible world),
while excluding its time reversal. In the stock philosophical literature, such processes
are called irreversible. But in thermodynamics a plethora of other meanings are em-
ployed for this term.
The two most important of these are as follows. First, one can understand ‘re-
versible processes’ as processes which proceed so slowly that the system always re-
mains close to equilibrium. Elaborating on conditions employed by Carnot and Kelvin
(1851), Clausius (1864) and Planck (1897) defined the term umkehrbar in this sense.
This concept is of crucial importance to their formulations of the second law. In the
physics literature it is probably the most common usage of the term ‘reversible’, in
spite of Carathe´odory’s proposal to use the better term ‘quasi-static’. However, this
concept is by itself irrelevant for the arrow of time. That is to say, the claim that
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there exist processes which are not reversible in this sense, or indeed, the claim that
some law implies that all processes in nature are irreversible in this sense, does not
imply time-asymmetry.
The second meaning of ‘reversible’ is the notion of a process whose initial state
can be completely restored by some other process, using any auxiliary device available
in our world. This is Planck’s notion of ‘reversibel’, which goes back to Kelvin (1852).
This concept is relevant to the arrow of time, although it is not identical with the
notion of time-asymmetry. Discussions on irreversibility and the second law in the
philosophy of physics seem to have largely overlooked this distinction.
A second conclusion is that different presentations of classical thermodynamics
vary a great deal, both in their formulations of the second law, and in their relation-
ships with the arrow of time. The main division here is between the work of Clausius,
Kelvin and Planck on the hand, and Gibbs and Carathe´odory on the other. However,
also inside each of these ‘camps’ there are significant distinctions. Perhaps the table
below is helpful:
Version of
second law
Applies
only to
cycles?
Time-
asym-
metric?
Allows ir-
reversible
processes?
Implies
existence
of irre-
versible
pro-
cesses?
Argues
for uni-
versal ir-
reversibility?
Carnot’s theorem yes yes yes no no
Clausius (1850) yes no yes no no
Kelvin (1851) yes no yes no no
Kelvin (1852) no yes yes yes yes
Kelvin (1855) yes no yes no no
Clausius (1865) no yes yes yes yes
Clausius (1876) yes yes yes no no
Planck (1897) no yes yes yes yes
Gibbs (1875) n.a. n.a. yes no no
Carathe´odory(1909) no yes yes no no
Lieb & Yngvason (1999) no no yes no no
Table 1: Various aspects of the arrow of time for various formulations of the second law.
Here, ‘irreversible’ is taken in Planck’s sense, and ‘n.a.’ stands for ‘not applicable’.
In the tradition of Clausius, Kelvin and Planck, thermodynamics is a theory about
processes. That is to say, one considers the evolution of a system in the course of
time. To be sure, the role of evolutions is tiny (as the theory is mainly restricted to
cyclic processes), but the question whether the theory is time-asymmetric or implies
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irreversibility (irrecoverability) makes sense.
The answer depends on whether the second law is regarded as a statement con-
cerning cyclic processes only, or also about open (i.e. non-cyclic) processes. We have
seen that the formulations Clausius and Kelvin gave of the second law went through
various changes in this respect. However, most of their formulations of the second law
only concerned cycles. This is reflected in the formulation known today as Kelvin’s
and Clausius’ principle, or the principle of the impossibility of the perpetuum mobile
of the second kind. This formulation is time-asymmetric. The ‘negative’ character of
these principles is no obstacle; time-asymmetry is a characterization of a theory, and
not of our world. But, I have argued, they do not imply the existence of irreversible
(irrecoverable) processes.
However, a few exceptional publications, notably Kelvin (1852) and Clausius (1864,
1865), argued for a universal tendency of processes to proceed in one direction only.
This view led, in particular in the work of Planck, to a grand universal generalization,
according to which the second law says that for all processes in nature the total
entropy of the systems involved never decreases, and that therefore all processes (with
the exception of those in which the entropy remains constant) are irreversible. A
convincing argument for this claim has never been given.
The versions of the second law developed by Gibbs, Carathe´odory and Lieb and
Yngvason apply to equilibrium states. Here, the evolution of systems in the course
of time plays no role, and a connection with any aspect of the philosophy of time is
therefore much less prominent.
As to Gibbs’ version, i.e. the entropy maximum principle, I have argued that such a
connection is completely absent; it rests, in my opinion, on a confusion between virtual
variations and processes. In the case of Carathe´odory, and authors that elaborated
his approach, the situation is more subtle. His formulation of the second law (Cara-
the´odory’s principle) is a proposition intended to provide sufficient grounds for the
existence of entropy and temperature as functions of equilibrium states, at least for
simple systems. There is no direct concern for time-(a)symmetry or irreversibility
here.
However, Carathe´odory’s principle employs a notion of adiabatic accessibility be-
tween states, s ≺ t, which is interpreted in terms of the possibility of an adiabatic
process which transforms s into t. Here, time enters the picture, because the time
reversal of such a process obviously produces an adiabatic process from t to s. I have
argued that, if we construe the time reversal of any model of Carathe´odory’s principle
as one in which ≺ is replaced by ≻, this theory is, strictly speaking, time-asymmetric.
However, this asymmetry is only noticeable in rather pathological models. If the
theory is applied to usual systems (like ordinary fluids or systems composed of such
fluids), then models in which the second law according to the CKP tradition holds,
as well as the time reversals of these models, are allowed. Thus, for this class no
time-asymmetry emerges. The modern extension of the formalism of Carathe´odory
by Lieb and Yngvason, is even manifestly time-symmetric.
The connection with the entropy principle and irreversibility is even more subtle.
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While Carathe´odory gives a discussion aiming at the conclusion that for all simple
systems, adiabatic processes in which entropy varies are irreversible, he only obtains
this conclusion by a redefinition of ‘irreversibility’: a process is called irreversible if the
change of state cannot be undone adiabatically. This result is obviously far removed
from Planck’s universal entropy principle. Even if we restrict ourselves to simple
systems, it is not guaranteed that entropy increases in irreversible processes (in either
Planck’s or Carathe´odory’s sense) nor does it follow that processes in which entropy
increases should be irreversible (in Planck’s sense).
Also in the approach of Lieb and Yngvason, an entropy principle is obtained that
holds for a restricted class of ‘simple’ systems (and systems composed of these). How-
ever, their notion of simplicity does not coincide with that of Carathe´odory. In order
to reach a statement about irreversibility, this approach chooses the opposite strat-
egy: these authors redefine the concept of ‘adiabatic’ in such a way that it (almost)
coincides with Planck’s concept of reversibility. The result is that for every two com-
parable states s and t with S(s) < S(t) there exists an irreversible process, beginning
in s, and ending in t.
It is striking that this version of the second law can be obtained without invoking
time-asymmetry at all. However, the result does have consequences in terms of irre-
versibility (in the sense of recoverability). But this consequence is rather mild: it does
not follow that all such processes from s to t are irreversible. Here too, the universal
formulation of Planck has not been attained. One can even ask whether the result
is so interesting for the philosophy of time, or threatening for the harmony between
different parts of physics. After all, Hamiltonian mechanics also allows the existence
of irreversible processes, for example, the motion of a free particle in an otherwise
empty universe.
This summary leads to the question whether it is fruitful to see irreversibility or
time-asymmetry as the essence of the second law. Is it not more straightforward, in
view of the unargued statements of Kelvin, the bold claims of Clausius and the strained
attempts of Planck, to give up this idea? I believe that Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa was
right in her verdict that the discussion about the arrow of time as expressed in the
second law of the thermodynamics is actually a red herring.
The only way to evaluate such a proposal is by making up a balance-sheet. What
would we loose and what would we gain? It is clear that in fact all concrete applications
of the second law in classical thermodynamics, even in the work of the most outspoken
proponents of the claim that this law implies universal irreversibility, are restricted to
systems in equilibrium. This holds for Kelvin and Planck, but also more recent text
books (e.g. (Becker 1967)). A general opinion among thermodynamicists is even that
the theory is incapable of dealing with systems out of equilibrium; (see the quotation
from Bridgman on page 3). Clearly, in terms of concrete applications, we would loose
very little. What, then, do we gain with this proposal? The main advantage is, to my
mind, that the second law would no longer represent an obstacle to the reconciliation
of different theories of physics. More specifically, attempts to reduce thermodynamics
to, or at least to harmonise it with, a mechanistic world picture would get a new lease
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of life.
The work of Boltzmann in kinetic gas theory is a particularly good example of this
problem. Boltzmann spent the main part of his career trying to find a mechanical
underpinning of the second law. Essential for this task was, in his opinion, finding a
mechanically defined function for isolated mechanical systems, which could exclusively,
or at least with very large probability, increase. Every time he believed himself to have
succeeded in this task, e.g. in 1872 with the H-theorem for a dilute hard spheres gas,
and in 1877 with his combinatorial argument for the ideal gas, objections to his results
emerged (viz. the famous Umkehreinwand and Wiederkehreinwand). The problem of
avoiding these objections is still open.
But apparently there is another option. If the second law does not express time-
asymmetry or irreversibility, it is not necessary to find a mechanical quantity which can
only increase and still achieve reconciliation between thermodynamics and mechanics.
Among philosophers of science, the themes around the second law have drawn
a lot of attention; (Reichenbach, Gru¨nbaum, etc.). Sometimes, this discussion has
taken a flight which seems far removed from the original physical background. There
are serious discussions about the entropy of a footprint on the beach, or about the
question whether the second law can perhaps explain the flow of time itself. It seems
to me that thess discussions can only be understood if we construe terms like ‘entropy’,
‘second law’ or even ‘thermodynamics’ as metaphors that do not literally refer to a
actually existing physical theory. According to the proposal such discussion can be
avoided, or at least sharpened.
With this proposal I do not wish to suggest that there is no connection between
thermodynamics and the arrow of time. Therefore I conclude this study by mentioning
two areas in which the connection might be analyzed with more success.
In the first place, a fundamental presupposition in classical thermodynamics is
that isolated systems attain or approach an equilibrium state, and, once they reach
equilibrium, they remain there as long as they are left to themselves. In fact, equilib-
rium is often defined as a state which will not change in the future, if the system is left
to itself. Changes in the past, in contrast, are allowed or even explicitly presupposed.
This gives a clear time-asymmetric character to thermodynamics.
It is often said that this behaviour of thermodynamical systems (i.e. the approach
to equilibrium) is accompanied by an increase of entropy, and a consequence of the
second law. But this idea actually lacks a theoretical foundation: for a non-equilibrium
state there is in general no thermodynamic entropy –or temperature– at all. We get no
further than where Clausius was in 1864 (see page 28): the second law cannot be seen
as a statement about the quantities of the system, but also involves its environment.
Planck (1897, § 112) too emphasised that the approach to equilibrium has nothing
to do with the second law. This aspect of time-asymmetry is woven much deeper in
the theory.
Although Boltzmann’s H-theorem is not necessary to reconcile the second law with
mechanics, it can still be important to obtain a proper description of the approach to
equilibrium. Uhlenbeck and Ford (1963) therefore associate the work of Boltzmann
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with a foundation of what they call the zeroth law.92 But clearly, for a mechanical
explanation of the approach to equilibrium it is not necessary to prove the monotonous
increase of some mechanically defined quantity.
There is another interesting remark to be made in this connection. There exists,
apart from the works of Carnot, Clausius, Kelvin, Gibbs and Planck, another classical
tradition in the study of heat phenomena, e.g. the heat equation of Fourier, This
equation shows all the aspects one would like to associate with an ‘arrow of time’:
it contains time explicitly; the class of solutions is not invariant when we replace t
by −t; they show a clear unidirectional tendency to equalise temperature differences,
etc. Similar remarks hold for the diffusion equation of Fick, and other equations
describing the macroscopic flow of heat and matter (often collectively called ‘transport
equations’).
Furthermore, transport equations form a bona fide part of classical physics. The
question is then: what is the relation of this tradition to thermodynamics? The
answer is rather surprising. Truesdell (1980) observed that in one and a half centuries
of their coexistence, not a single work has appeared in which the behaviour of heat,
as described by the heat equation, and as described by thermodynamics, are related
to each other.93 One has to conclude that the heat equation and other transport
equations simply do not belong to classical thermodynamics!
However, since the Second World War, a lot of work has been done in obtaining
extensions of thermodynamics which could be applied to systems out of equilibrium.
Such extensions, sometimes called ‘thermodynamics of irreversible processes’, would
be able to describe the approach to equilibrium, as illustrated by the heat equation;
see, e.g., de Groot (1945); Prigogine (1955). Here, a more interesting connection with
the arrow of time could result. This work seems to have resulted in a large number
schools, and I can therefore say little about it. It is characteristic of this type of
work that it is focussed on applications and gives comparatively little attention to
the foundations and logical formulation of the theory. Usually, a time-asymmetric
statement about entropy production is postulated. The question how the entropy of
a non-equilibrium state is to be defined, and the proof that it exists and is unique
for all non-equilibrium states, still seem to be largely unexplored;94 see also (Meixner
1970, Lavenda 1978).
92This means: every isolated thermodynamical system reaches an equilibrium state in the long run.
This terminology is unfortunate since the term ‘zeroth law’ is normally used to denote transitivity of
thermal equilibrium. Perhaps it is better to speak of ‘ law −1’ or even ‘−∞’.
93However, Bertrand (1887) is an exception.
94A typical argument (de Groot, 1945; Yourgrau et al., 1966) is that, on the one hand, orthodox
thermodynamics is rejected on the grounds that it is not valid for irreversible processes, and on the
other hand one justifies the statement about positive entropy production for irreversible processes
with an appeal to the (orthodox) second law. Another curious characterization of the foundations of
this theory is by Callen (1960): ‘Irreversible thermodynamics is based on the postulates of equilibrium
thermostatics plus the additional postulate of time reversal symmetry ’;
81
Acknowledgements
I have benefited a great deal from discussions with and comments by Co Broeder,
Craig Callender, Elliott Lieb, Janneke van Lith, John Norton, Henk de Regt, Jakob
Yngvason and two anonymous referees. Thanks, all of you.
References
Arnold, V. (1990) ‘Contact geometry: the geometrical method of Gibbs’ thermody-
namics’, in D. Caldi and G. Mostow (eds), Proceedings of the Gibbs Symposium,
(Providence: American Mathematical Society), pp. 163–179.
Becker, R. (1967) Theorie der Wa¨rme, (Berlin: Springer).
Bergmann, P. and Lebowitz, J. (1955) ‘New approach to non-equilibrium processes’,
Physical Review 99, 578–587.
Bernstein, B. (1960) ‘Proof of Carathe´odory’s local theorem and its global application
to thermostatics’, Journal of Mathematical Physics 1, 222–224.
Bertrand, J. (1887) Thermodynamique, (Paris: Gauthier-Villars).
Boltzmann, L. (1872) ‘Weitere Studien u¨ber das Wa¨rmegleichgewicht unter Gas-
moleku¨len’, in “Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen”, F. Haseno¨hrl (ed.) (New
York: Chelsea Publishing Company, 1968).
Born, M. (1921) ‘Kritische Betrachtungen zur traditionellen Darstellung der Thermo-
dynamik’, Physikalische Zeitschrift 22, 218–224, 249–254, 282–286.
Boyling, J. (1968) ‘Carathe´odory’s principle and the existence of global integrating
factors’, Communications in Mathematical Physics 10, 52–68.
Boyling, J. (1972), An axiomatic approach to classical thermodynamics’, Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London 329, 35–72.
Bridgman, P. (1941) The Nature of Thermodynamics, Harvard University Press.
Reprinted (Gloucester Mass.: Peter Smith, 1969).
Brush, S. (1976) The Kind of Motion we call Heat, (Amsterdam: North-Holland).
Bryan, G. (1891) ‘Report of a committee, consisting of Messrs J. Larmor and G.H.
Bryan, on the present state of our knowledge of thermodynamics, especially with
regard to the second law’, Report of the British Association for the Advancement
of Science 61, 85–122.
Bryan, G. (1904) ‘The law of degradation of energy as the fundamental principle of
thermodynamics’, in S. Meyer (ed.), Festschrift Ludwig Boltzmann gewidmet zum
sechzigsten Geburtstage 20. Februar 1904, (Leipzig: J.A. Barth), pp. 123–136.
82
Buchdahl, H. (1966) The Concepts of Classical Thermodynamics, (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press).
Callen, H. (1960) Thermodynamics, (New York: John Wiley and Sons).
Callendar, H. (1911) ‘The caloric theory of heat and Carnot’s principle’, Proceedings
of the Physical Society of London 23, 153–189.
Carathe´odory, C. (1909) ‘Untersuchungen u¨ber die Grundlagen der Thermodynamik’,
Mathematische Annalen 67, 355–386. English translation by J. Kestin, in (Kestin
1976), pp. 229–256. This translation is not quite accurate.
Carathe´odory, C. (1925) ‘U¨ber die Bestimmung der Energie und der absoluten Tem-
peratur mit Hilfe von reversiblen Prozessen’, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften pp. 39–47.
Clausius, R. (1850) ‘Ueber die bewegende Kraft der Wa¨rme und die Gesetze die sich
daraus fu¨r die Wa¨rmelehre selbst ableiten lassen’, in (Clausius 1864a), pp. 16–78.
English translation by W.F.Magie, in (Mendoza 1960), pp. 63-107.
Clausius, R. (1862) ‘Ueber die Anwendung des Satzes von der Aequivalenz der Ver-
wandlungen auf die innere Arbeit’, in (Clausius 1864a), pp. 242–279. English
translation Philosophical Magazine 24, 81–97, 201–213, also in (Kestin 1976),
pp. 133–161.
Clausius, R. (1864a) Abhandlungungen u¨ber die mechanische Wa¨rmetheorie, Vol. 1,
(Braunschweig: F. Vieweg).
Clausius, R. (1864b) ‘Ueber die Concentration von Wa¨rme- und Lichtstrahlen und die
Gra¨nzen ihrer Wirkung’, in (Clausius 1864a), pp. 322–361.
Clausius, R. (1865) ‘Ueber verschiedene fu¨r die Anwendung bequeme Formen der
Hauptgleichungen der mechanischen Wa¨rmetheorie’, in (Clausius 1867), English
translation by R.B.Lindsay, in (Kestin 1976, pp. 162-193).
Clausius, R. (1867) Abhandlungungen u¨ber die mechanische Wa¨rmetheorie, Vol. 2,
(Braunschweig: F. Vieweg).
Clausius, R. (1876) Die mechanische Wa¨rmetheorie, (Braunschweig: F. Vieweg).
Davies, E. B. (1976) Quantum Theory of Open Systems, (London: Academic Press.)
Davies, P. (1974) The Physics of Time Asymmetry, (London: Surrey University
Press).
Denbigh, K. (1989) ‘The many faces of irreversibility’, British Journal for Philosophy
of Science 40, 501–518.
83
Dieks, D. (1988) ‘Special relativity and the flow of time’, Philosophy of Science
55, 456–460.
Earman, J. (1967) ‘Irreversibility and temporal asymmetry’, Journal of Philosophy
64, 543–549.
Eddington, A. (1935) The Nature of the Physical World, (London: J.M. Dent &
Sons).
Einstein, A. (1948) ‘Autobiographical notes’, in P.A. Schilpp, ed., The Einstein
Philosopher-Scientist, (La Salle: Open Court), p. 33.
Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa, T. (1925) ‘Zur Axiomatisierung des zweiten Hauptsatzes der
Thermodynamik’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik 33, 933–945; 34, 638.
Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa, T. (1956) Grundlagen der Thermodynamik, (Leiden: E.J.
Brill).
Ehrenfest, P. (1916) ‘On adiabatic changes of a system in connection with the quantum
theory’, Proceedings of the Amsterdam Academy 24, 576–597.
Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa, T. (1959) ‘Preface to the Translation’, in P. Ehrenfest, and T.
Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa, The Conceptual Foundations of the Statistical Approach
in mechanics, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press), pp. viii–x. Republished by (New
York: Dover, 1990).
Falk, G. and Jung, H. (1959) ‘Axiomatik der Thermodynamik’, in S. Flu¨gge (ed.),
Handbuch der Physik, Vol. III/2, (Berlin: Springer).
Garber, E. Brush, S.G. and Everitt, C.W.F. (eds) (1995) Maxwell on Heat and Sta-
tistical Mechanics (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press).
Gibbs, J. (1906) The Scientific Papers of J. Willard Gibbs, Vol. 1, Thermodynamics,
(London: Longmans). Reprinted by (Woodbridge, Connecticut: Ox Bow Press,
1993).
Giles, R. (1964)Mathematical Foundations of Thermodynamics, (Oxford: Pergamon).
Groot, S. de. (1951) Thermodynamics of Irreversible Processes, (Amsterdam: North-
Holland).
Gru¨nbaum, A. (1967) ‘The anisotropy of time’, in T.Gold (ed.), The Nature of time,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
Hatsopoulos, J. and Keenan, G. (1965) Principles of General Thermodynamics, (New
York: John Wiley).
Helmholtz, H. von (1847) U¨ber die Erhaltung der Kraft, (Berlin. G. Reimer).
84
Hollinger, H. and Zenzen, M. (1985) The Nature of Irreversibility, (Dordrecht: D.
Reidel).
Hornix, W. (1993) ‘Wat stelt de tweede hoofdwet van de thermodynamica?’ Unpub-
lished.
Horwich, P. (1987) Asymmetries in Time, (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press).
Hutchison, K. (1973) ‘Der Ursprung der Entropiefunktion bei Rankine und Clausius’,
Annals of Science 30, 341–364.
Jauch, J. (1972) ‘On a new foundation of equilibrium thermodynamics’, Foundations
of Physics 2, 327–332.
Jauch, J. (1975) ‘Analytical thermodynamics. Part 1. Thermostatics–general theory’,
Foundations of Physics 5, 111–132.
Kelvin (1851a) ‘Manuscript notes for ”on the dynamical theory of heat” ’, reprinted
in Archives of the History of the Exact Sciences, 16, 281-282.
Kelvin (1851b) ‘On the dynamical theory of heat. parts i-iii’, in (Kelvin 1882),
Mathematical and Physical Papers, Vol. 1 (1882), pp. 174–210; and partly in
(Kestin 1976).
Kelvin (1852) ‘On a universal tendency in nature to the dissipation of mechanical
energy’, in (Kelvin 1882), pp. 511–514 and in (Kestin 1976).
Kelvin (1854) ‘On the dynamical theory of heat. part vi’, in (Kelvin 1882), pp. 232-
291.
Kelvin (1882), Mathematical and Physical Papers, Vol. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Kestin, J. (1976) (ed.) The Second Law of Thermodynamics, (Stroudsburg, Pennsyl-
vania: Dowden, Hutchinson and Ross).
Khinchin, A. (1949) Mathematical Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, (New York:
Dover).
Klein, M. (1967) ‘Thermodynamics in Einstein’s thought’, Science 157, 509–516.
Klein, M. (1969) ‘Gibbs on Clausius’, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences
1, 127–149.
Kroes, P. (1985) Time: Its Structure and Role in Physical Theories, D.Reidel, Dor-
drecht.
Kuhn, T. (1978) Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894-1912, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago.
85
Landauer, R. (1961) ‘Irreversibility and heat generation in the computing process’,
IBM Journal of Research and Development 3, 183–191.
Landsberg, P. (1956) ‘Foundations of thermodynamics’, Review of Modern Physics
28, 363–393.
Landsberg, P. (1964) ‘A deduction of Carathe´odory’s principle from Kelvin’s princi-
ple’, Nature 201, 485–486.
Landsberg, P. (1984) The Enigma of Time, (Bristol: Hilger).
Lavenda, B. (1978) Thermodynamics of Irreversible Processes, (London: Macmillan).
Reprinted by (New York: Dover, 1993).
Lieb, E. and Yngvason, J. (1999) ‘The physics and mathematics of the second law of
thermodynamics’, Physics Reports 310, 1–96, erratum 314 (1999), 669. Available
as e-print from http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/cond-mat/9708200.
Lindblad, G. (1983) Non-equilibrium entropy and irreversibility, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Mach, E. (1923) Die Principien der Wa¨rmelehre Historisch-kritisch entwickelt,
(Leipzig: J.A. Barth) 4th edition.
Mackey, M. (1992) Time’s Arrow: the Origins of Thermodynamic Behavior, (New
York: Springer-Verlag).
Marvan, M. (1966) Negative Absolute Temperatures, (London: Iliffe Books Ltd.).
Maxwell, J. (1876) ‘On the equilibrium of heterogeneous substances’, in (Maxwell
1878) Volume 2, pp. 498-500.
Maxwell, J. (1877) ‘Tait’s thermodynamics’, in (Maxwell 1878) Volume 2, pp. 660-
671.
Maxwell, J. (1878) ‘Diffusion’, in (Maxwell 1878) Volume 2, pp. 625-646.
Maxwell, J. (1890) Scientific Papers W.D. Niven (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press).
Meixner, J. (1970) ‘On the foundations of thermodynamics of processes’, in B. Gal-
Or. E.B. Stuart and A. Brainard (eds), A Critical Review of Thermodynamics,
(Baltimore: Mono Book Corp.), pp. 37–47. Also in (Kestin 1976), pp. 313–323.
Mendoza, E. (1960) Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire by Sadi Carnot and other
Papers on the Second Law of Thermodynamics by E´. Clapeyron and R.Clausius
(New York: Dover).
Muller, F. (1992) ‘Worldlines are growing!’, unpublished.
86
Orr, W. M. (1904) ‘On Clausius’ theorem for irreversible cycles and on the increase
of entropy’, London, Edinburgh and Dublin Philosophical Magazine 8, 509–527.
Pippard, A. (1966) Elements of Classical Thermodynamics, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Planck, M. (1897) Vorlesungen u¨ber Thermodynamik, (Leipzig: Veit & Comp.)
Planck, M. (1905a) ‘On Clausius’ theorem for irreversible cycles and on the increase
of entropy’, in Physikalische Abhandlungen und Vortra¨ge, Vol. 2, (Braunschweig:
F. Vieweg, 1958).
Planck, M. (1905b) Vorlesungen u¨ber Thermodynamik, second edn, (Leipzig: Veit &
Comp.).
Planck, M. (1926) ‘U¨ber die Begru¨ndung des zweiten Hauptsatzes der Thermody-
namik’, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften pp. 453–
463.
Planck, M. (1945) Treatise on Thermodynamics, (New York: Dover). Translated by
A. Ogg from the seventh German edition.
Planck, M. (1948) Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie, (Leipzig: J.A. Barth).
Price, H. (1996) Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
Prigogine, I. (1955) Introduction to the Thermodynamics of Irreversible Processes,
(New York: Interscience).
Prigogine, I. (1980) From Being to Becoming, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman).
Ramsey, N. (1956) ‘Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics at negative absolute
temperatures’, Physical Review 103, 20.
Rankine, W. (1852) ‘On the reconcentration of the mechanical energy of the universe’,
Philosophical Magazine 4, 358.
Reichenbach, H. (1956) The Direction of Time, (Berkeley: University of California
Press).
Ridderbos, T. and Redhead, M. (1998) ‘The spin-echo experiments and the second
law of thermodynamics’, Foundations of Physics 28, 1237–1270.
Russell, C.A. (1981) Science and belief: from Darwin to Einstein, Vol. 3: Time,
Chance and Thermodynamics, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press).
Savitt, S. (1995) Time’s Arrows Today, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
87
Sklar, L. (1974) Space, Time, and Spacetime, (Berkeley: University of California
Press).
Sklar, L. (1981) ‘Up and down, left and right, past and future’, Nouˆs 15, 111–129.
Sklar, L. (1993) Physics and Chance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Smith, C. and Wise, M.N. (1989) Energy and Empire: a Biographical Study of Lord
Kelvin, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Snow, C. (1959) The Two Cultures and A Second Look, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press). 2nd expanded edition 1964.
Sommerfeld, A. (1952) Vorlesungen u¨ber Theoretische Physik, Band 5, Thermody-
namik and Statistik, (Wiesbaden: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung).
Thomsen, J. and Hartka, T. (1962) ‘Strange Carnot cycles; thermodynamics of sys-
tems with density extremum’, American Journal of Physics pp. 26–33 and 388.
Tribus, M. and McIntire, E. (1971) ‘Energy and information, Scientific American
pp. 179–184.
Truesdell, C. (1968) Essays in the History of Mechanics, (New York: Springer-Verlag).
Truesdell, C. (1980) The Tragicomical History of Thermodynamics 1822-1854, (New
York: Springer-Verlag).
Truesdell, C. (1986) ‘What did Gibbs and Carathe´odory leave us about thermodynam-
ics?’, in J. Serrin (ed.), New Perspectives in Thermodynamics, (Berlin: Springer),
pp. 101–123.
Truesdell, C. and Baharatha, S. (1977) The Concepts and Logic of Classical Thermody-
namics as a Theory of Heat Engines, Rigorously Constructed upon the Foundation
Laid by S. Carnot and F. Reech, 1822-1854, (New York: Springer-Verlag).
Uhlenbeck, G. E. and Ford, G. W. (1963) Lectures in Statistical Mechanics, (Provi-
dence: American Mathematical Society).
Waals, J. van der and Kohnstamm, P. (1927) Lehrbuch der Thermostatik, (Leipzig:
J.A. Barth).
Yourgrau, W. and Mandelstam, S. (1955) Variational Principles in Dynamics and
Quantum Theory, (London: Pitman).
Yourgrau, W., Merwe, A. van der and Raw, G. (1966) Treatise on Irreversible Ther-
mophysics, (New York: Macmillan).
Zeh, D. (1992) The Physical Basis of the Direction of Time, (Berlin: Springer), 2nd
edition.
88
Zemansky, M. (1937) Heat and Thermodynamics, (New York: McGraw-Hill).
89
